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Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education and professional development of USAWC graduates and other senior military officers, as well as members of government and academia concerned with national security affairs.

From the Editor

In This Issue . . .

"Inside an Insurgency" is a thematic presentation incorporating three articles that analyze the impact of human, network, and systems behavior during an insurgency. The authors provide imaginative insight into the world of the insurgent and recommend strategies for successfully countering asymmetric threats in the era of the Long War. In our first article Raymond Millen takes time out from his duties in Afghanistan to remind readers that human nature is not the only variable in an insurgency, but it is one of the more important. "The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavior during an Insurgency" examines Hobbes's contention that extraordinary circumstances must exist for a government to lose its authority and permit an insurgency to take root. The author supports Hobbes's conclusion that "the promise of security" is the critical factor in gaining control over a population, a fact that is as true today as it was in the 1600s. The second presentation is Martin J. Muckian's "Structural Vulnerabilities of Network Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary." The article provides a new perspective for understanding the twenty-first century insurgent. The author warns that today's insurgent is not the Maoist of previous generations. Muckian contrasts the Maoist with his modern equivalent in an attempt to determine how best to defeat future insurgencies. Our final article in this feature is Jim Baker's application of systems thinking models in the development of counterinsurgency strategies. "Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies" is the author's attempt to utilize the dynamics of systems thinking; complex actors, non-liner relationships, difficulty of measurement, and impatience with results, to name but a few, in the context of a counterinsurgency strategy. Baker provides the reader with a series of systems thinking models that might have applicability in a successful counterinsurgency. He concludes that utilization of this analytical framework is paramount if strategists are to comprehend how to alleviate or neutralize the conditions that spawn insurgencies.

"Storming the Ivory Tower: The Military's Return to American Campuses" is Marc Lindemann's assessment of the relationship between the military and the country's premier academic institutions resultant *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.* (FAIR). The author examines the causes for the Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) exile from prominent academic institutions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He provides a brief exposition of *Rumsfeld v. FAIR* and then analyzes one school's antipathy toward the military. Lindemann closes with a discussion of strategies that might ensure the military's access to these "premier" campuses in the future. This author is more than qualified to comment on this thesis. Although, currently serving as an infantry platoon leader in Iraq, he holds under-graduate and master degrees from Yale University and a J. D. from Harvard Law School.

Christopher Spearin provides an enlightening analysis of the rise of special operations forces (SOF) within the American military and the corresponding demand for their skills by private security companies (PSCs). "Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public and Private Divides" recounts the history of the competi-

tion, real and perceived, between the conventional and unconventional military communities. The author then examines why special operations personnel are in such demand by PSCs. Of special interest is the author's assessment of the incentives, within and outside the military, designed to attract and retain military personnel with these special skills. Lindemann concludes with the warning that although some countries, the United States included, have implemented general regulatory policies regarding the licensing and contracting of PSCs, there is nothing to stop these companies from raiding the ranks of the military. He goes on to caution that while SOF may be the ideal strategic resource for the contemporary challenges facing the United States something needs to be done to establish the appropriate balance between public and private sector's control of this "strategic" resource.

Gary Felicetti alerts readers to the possibility that the United States may need to re-think its strategy for training Iraqi police, army, and civil defense forces if they are to assume the security missions presently performed by American forces. "The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force Development" attempts to answer the question as to why the training of more than 277,000 Iraqi security forces by some of the world's best instructors has not resulted in a more stable security environment. The author's analysis reveals that although training is an excellent tool to resolve many human performance issues, it is rarely the entire solution. Felicetti uses the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq as a baseline to evaluate training and mentoring programs. He concludes that even though "training," or something akin to it, is the dominant label used to describe the means by which US forces are to accomplish the missions outlined in the strategy; a more appropriate descriptor might be "nation-building." Whatever the correct term, Felicetti cautions that we are not "going to train our way out of Iraq."

Brigadier General Tariq Gilani of the Pakistani Army presents our final article in this issue, "US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward." The article is the result of General Gilani's Strategy Research Project while a student at the US Army War College during 2006. Gilani provides an insightful, unemotional analysis of the relationship between the two nations. Beginning with a historical review of the major factors influencing the 58-year relationship the author explores several alternatives for strengthening future US-Pakistan cooperation. Of special interest is Gilani's analysis of the influence that the war on terrorism and the personality of President Pervez Musharraf have on the relationship.

The *Review Essays* feature of this issue is especially rich. It is lead by Joseph C. Myers's provocative review of a 1979 book authored by Brigadier General S. K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War.* The book is the authors attempt to instruct his fellow Muslims in the doctrinal aspects of Quranic warfare. Although known in the Islamic world the book has not been widely circulated in American military circles. George H. Quester continues our review essays with his examination of two new works in "Asia's Nuclear Dilemma." The final review essay in this issue is Larry M. Wortzel's sterling analysis of two books related to issues impacting the Taiwan Strait. "Resolving China and Taiwan's Differences" is the reviewer's attempt to examine the historical, political, and security issues dictating the relationship between the two nations. — RHT ❑

The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavior during an Insurgency

RAYMOND MILLEN

Scholars generally reference Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* for theories in international politics. Specifically, scholars subscribe to the concept of international anarchy and the pursuit of survival to explain state behavior. Since Hobbes lived through the English Civil War (1642-1651), his observations arguably could be a reflection of insurgency warfare rather than interstate conflict.[1] In fact, the relevant passages in *Leviathan* to which this article refers connote a concern with domestic conflict vice external threats. With this frame of reference, this article will focus on the effect of insurgency on human behavior.

According to Hobbes, "fear of violent death and desirous peace" are the compelling reasons man forms a society.[2] In making this *a priori* argument, Hobbes advances the idea that individual self-preservation is the primary motivating factor behind the formation of society and not, as Aristotle contends, because man by nature is a social animal. This motivational factor also has tremendous implications for individuals suffering through an insurgency. If the population is the centerpiece of any insurgency and counterinsurgency struggle, as prominent scholars on insurgency contend, then Hobbes's insights are crucial to understanding how individuals caught up in an insurgency behave. This article will address the following questions:

- Why do subsequent generations accept the covenant rather than returning to the state of nature?

- Why do some individuals reject the covenant?
- How do insurgencies take root?
- What are the cascading effects when the covenant is broken?
- Why do citizens fail to assist the government upon liberation from the insurgents?

The answers to these questions will help explain why Hobbes's notion of self-preservation compels the general population to remain noncommittal to either side during an insurgency. Naturally, human behavior is not the only variable in an insurgency, but it is an important variable; and it is one often underappreciated by governments conducting a counterinsurgency.

The General Acceptance of the Covenant by Subsequent Generations

Hobbes argues that the social contract promises to protect the individual from the threat of oppression, death, and injury prevalent in the state of nature. Released from the need for constant vigilance against threats, the individual can pursue private interests and happiness that benefit him and society.[3] Hobbes's analytical framework for the formation of society is logical, but it does not address why subsequent generations accept the covenant. Born into an established society, the individual makes no conscious decision to renew the social contract. Never having experienced political anarchy, he might even take security for granted. As the individual matures to adulthood, one could say his behavior is derived more from social norms than a conscious rational choice. Because security under a common power is nonexclusive, everyone enjoys the collective good automatically whether cognizant of its benefits or not. It could be argued that the individual becomes so accustomed to the order brought by the common power that he does nothing when rebel activity begins, expecting the government will resolve the matter.

When Hobbes speaks of acceptance, he is alluding to the majority of the population. The essential tendency of the citizenry is to accept some re-

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"Hobbes's notion of self-preservation compels the general population to remain noncommittal."

strictions on liberty in exchange for the benefits. Nonetheless, Hobbes makes the case for a common power precisely because not all citizens will accept the covenant, and these individuals represent the greatest danger to society.

The Rejection of the Covenant by the Few

Hobbes recognizes that a small sector of society will never be satisfied under a sovereignty in which they are not in charge. Hobbes contends that the pursuit of power is part of human nature, a second aspect of self-interest: "I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death."[4] The pursuit of power would seem incompatible with his central premise of self-preservation since it often entails great risks and peril for the instigator.

Hobbes qualifies his statement, however, by explaining that only a distinctive group of individuals embarks on gaining power through sedition: "Needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition, as also all men that are ambitious of military command, are inclined to continue the causes of war, and to stir up trouble and sedition; for there is no honour military but by war, nor any such hope to mend an ill game as by causing a new shuffle."[5] These conspirators are more inclined to gaining power and influence through armed conflict rather than working through the political process. "And in sedition," Hobbes stresses, "men being always in the precincts of battle, to hold together and use all advantages of force is a better stratagem than any that can proceed from subtlety and wit."[6] Although Hobbes does not state it, one can assume these rebels possess the organizational skills and experience to conduct a protracted insurgency.

How Insurgencies Take Root

If seditious conspirators are always waiting in the wings, does citizen discontent with the government present them with an opportunity to start an insurgency? Contrary to Hobbes's contention that citizens should remain satisfied with the benefits of established peace under a common power, the historical record of insurrections and uprisings prior to Hobbes's time suggests

a different conclusion.[7] Even in Hobbes's civilized England, government corruption, inequitable socioeconomic and political programs, as well as perceived injustices were likely to lead to grievances, which conspirators could exploit. Hobbes's *Leviathan* actually neutralizes this threat by placing a higher premium on order rather than on perceived injustices. Uprisings may erupt, but society would expect the government to respond with exigent force to establish order once again. Hobbes submits that the common power possesses the requisite force to keep *all* men in "awe," and that this power is justified: "Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."[8] Having made a covenant with the government, the individual expects the government to respond to lawlessness quickly and effectively.

For an insurgency to take root, extraordinary circumstances must exist for the government to lose its authority over some or all of its sovereign territory. Either the state is collapsing or has already collapsed. Collapse could result from a defeat in a war, especially if the loss leads to the fall of the government. In this case, the government is in such disarray that it lacks the capability to respond to challenges to its authority. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime is not the only illustration of an insurgency erupting as a result of a war and regime change. Weimar Germany and post-Tsarist Russia were beset by revolutions and civil wars following World War I. The American War Between the States (1861-1865) escalated rapidly into a full-fledged civil war because the federal government lacked sufficient forces to quell the rebellion. Equally unhelpful was the fact that many professional officers betrayed the Union by joining the Confederacy.[9] The anti-colonial insurgencies in the Cold War era are less an illustration of grievances against imperialism, albeit that was certainly a motivation; rather, they erupted because the colonial powers were weakened by World War II and the insurgents saw an opportunity to seize power. Lastly, Afghanistan suffered from two decades of various insurgencies following the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Naturally, there are cases in which the government totally alienates its base, such as occurred under Somoza in Nicaragua and Batista in Cuba, but even here, the implosion of the government represented a loss of authority. Hence, the cabal of conspirators cannot hope to initiate an insurgency until the authority of the government has diminished over a portion of territory.

One wonders how a small group of rebels can hope to turn the insurgency into a popular uprising. As Hobbes points out, it cannot, but it can give the illusion of one, and this illusion has a profound influence on the individual's perception of government impotence. From the beginning, the cabal attempts to portray the insurgency as a mass movement by committing as many attacks as possible. "Men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between the action of many men and many actions of one multi-

tude," says Hobbes; "and therefore [they] are disposed to take for the action of the people that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the persuasion of one."[10] This observation contains two implications once insurgents have seized control of an area: first, the majority of the citizenry will remain as spectators, trying to ascertain who is winning the conflict; second, and conversely, the insurgents will use force against a portion of the population as a means to control the whole. Under these circumstances, the insurgents initially appear omnipresent and omnipotent, while the government seems to have disappeared.[11]

The Effect the Breach of the Covenant has on Citizen Behavior

The government's loss of authority, even if temporary, has profound effects on the citizens' psyche. Whether the citizen recognizes it or not, the loss of authority represents a breach of the covenant. In making his argument for the establishment of the *Leviathan*, Hobbes provides insights on human behavior in the state of nature. Logically, this behavior would emerge again in the absence of the covenant. Paradoxically, this breach of the covenant may become the insurgent's most powerful weapon during the course of the conflict, as this article will explore more fully.

It would appear by their actions that insurgents have an intuitive understanding of human behavior in peril. Thrusting the local population into the state of nature is effectively achieved by eliminating the vestiges of government authority. As insurgents are not initially powerful enough to seize power outright, they often resort to terrorist acts to eliminate local authorities (political figures, policemen, teachers, and key bureaucrats). Terrorism effectively intimidates the vast majority into passivity. Some extraordinary citizens will emerge to resist the insurgents, but the insurgents, better organized and postured to react, will neutralize them. It is important to note that terrorist acts, such as assassination, murder, intimidation, and kidnappings, have the correlative effect of controlling the local inhabitants. Within a short time, the individual discovers his life and property are no longer safeguarded. He is placed in the state of nature, which, according to Hobbes, is a state of war.[12] But what is this state of nature, exactly?

According to Hobbes, in nature all men are equal. Any physical advantages possessed can be offset by intrigues or alliances with others. Intellectual advantages are actually vain illusions. Experience becomes the essential element, which all men acquire over time. Hobbes asserts that conflict arises whenever men desire the same object (e.g., property) and cannot share it. They become enemies, and in the pursuit of this objective they will endeavor to subdue or kill the other. The matter is never settled, because other

challengers will continually vie for the object as well. Under these conditions, man's position is never secure. He must continually remain vigilant to threats from every quarter.[13]

Hobbes believes that the state of nature is a state of war because no common power exists to keep man's tendency for conflict in check. Hobbes makes the point that battles and actual fighting do not define war; rather, it is the environment of insecurity in which "every man is enemy to every man." Under these conditions, all normal activities of commerce, social and cultural progress, and the pursuits of the arts and sciences cease. Stability is replaced by "continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[14] The system of law and order no longer has any meaning. "Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind."[15] In short, traditional norms and institutions no longer have their predictive influence on citizen behavior.

In accordance with Hobbes's state of nature, a remarkable dynamic takes place in insurgent-controlled areas. The former citizen is isolated physically and psychologically with no hope of finding succor from the central government; observing the fate of earlier government loyalists and believing the insurgency to be so pervasive, he trusts no one, especially in terms of organizing resistance. He may view the insurgents with hostility, but as long as they control the area, he must comply. The individual and his family must also live. They require sustenance and a livelihood. This overarching need makes him susceptible to anyone who will ameliorate his predicament. Once all government bonds are broken, the insurgents fill the vacuum quickly to administer the local population. That the insurgents forcibly establish a covenant with the population becomes irrelevant. It is important to note that once the insurgents have gained control of the population, the continued use of terrorism ceases, because it might drive the population into desperate resistance rather than resigned compliance.[16]

Government Misperceptions of Citizen Loyalty

Governments experiencing an insurgency often erroneously conclude that the citizens will resist the insurgents because the latter are evil. Without taking the individual's drive for self-preservation into consideration, the government also assumes its citizens have choices regarding their loyalty. Whether the individual considers the insurgency evil or not is immaterial, because he is not in a position to refuse the new common power. Hobbes reasons that the individual is caught in a war in which "nothing can be unjust. The no-

"For Hobbes's citizen, a common power, even if harsh, is better than the state of nature."

tions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place."[17] For Hobbes's citizen, a common power, even if harsh, is better than the state of nature. The primary goal of self preservation compels individuals to accept the new conditions.

The real tragedy for the individual is that the ensuing power struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents will involve him intimately. The counterinsurgency begins once the established government takes countermeasures, usually and predominantly through military force. The individual is once again caught in the middle, thrust into the state of war, and embroiled in the worst of all situations.

After experiencing generations of citizen allegiance to its rule, the government might make the mistake of assuming loyal citizens will resist the insurgents or at least assist the counterinsurgency. However, the citizen's options are limited. As previously mentioned, the citizen could assist the local government in combating the insurgents once the threat is recognized. This action is not very effective against insurgents that have formed an extensive political network over many months or even years. The historical experience suggests that insurgents will have an ensconced network of cells throughout the area before initiating hostilities. Since many of the insurgents are native to the area, the insurgents enjoy immediate and accurate intelligence. In turn, insurgents will likely learn of the citizen's assistance to the government and target him or his family quickly. One can assume that the insurgents will announce their acts of retribution to serve as a warning for the rest. Obviously, fear is not the only incentive for cooperation. Ideological indoctrination will create a loyal base of adherents, as Mao patiently instructed, but for the rest, intimidation is critical.[18]

The citizen also can flee his home and become a refugee. This seems an illogical option for anyone not directly targeted or expelled by the insurgents, because the citizen thus thrusts himself into the state of nature. As a refugee, the citizen becomes a direct burden to the state, which must provide emergency necessities. Overburdened by the need to fight a counterinsurgency and care for refugees, the state must establish temporary refugee camps administered with insufficient resources. Unless the camp is very well administered, life there can resemble the state of nature. Additionally, families

are wont to abandon their homes to looters and vandals. Hence, most are likely to remain in their familiar, established community.

The citizen also can join the government counterinsurgency forces in the hope of liberating his community eventually. Only a minority can choose this option, however, in view of the age and physical fitness requirements. The prospective citizen-soldier would naturally worry about the fate of his family as well. The probability that the insurgents would punish the family members of soldiers would likely prove a powerful disincentive against joining the government military forces. The young males will thus either go into hiding, try to keep a low profile, or become impressed into service with the insurgents. As a result, the community will comprise women, children, and old men.

Another option is that the citizen can join the insurgency. A few volunteers are likely to exercise this option out of a sense of adventure, ideology, or grievances against the government. This is a dangerous option, because the citizen has committed himself to the insurgency. If the insurgency fails, his life may be forfeited. Even if the government offers amnesty, the stigma of treachery would likely remain on him and his family. But given the individual's overriding goal of self-preservation, he may provide some assistance to the insurgents in the hope of placating them. He can expect no quarter from the insurgents for aiding the government, but he can at least hope for leniency from the government should it succeed. If impressed into service by the insurgents, he can at least use that as an excuse if captured. Under these difficult conditions, the option of limited assistance to the insurgency provides his best chance of survival.

The most likely option for the majority is to remain neutral and wait to see which side wins the struggle. Neither the insurgents nor the government authorities will be satisfied with this stance and will attempt to draw the citizen to their side. Insurgency recruitment patterns suggest a process of drawing the citizen into the conspiracy by requesting assistance (e.g., providing aid to a wounded insurgent), demanding menial tasks (hiding munitions, delivering explosives, or providing intelligence), and using force or threats to gain the active support of the citizen. By drawing him into the conspiracy, the insurgents turn the citizen into an outlaw, subject to punishment by the government. Counterinsurgency forces sweeping through the area are likely to view all local citizens with suspicion, especially if they are of fighting age. The counterinsurgency forces will expect citizen loyalty and demand intelligence related to insurgent forces. Unless the counterinsurgency forces establish a strong, permanent presence in the area (unlikely in view of limited military resources), the citizens are likely to offer minimal assistance, knowing the insurgents will return once the counterinsurgency forces move on. It does not take too many cases of insurgent retribution against "traitors" to instill in the population the belief that impartiality is the safest course for self-preservation.

The counterinsurgency government will likely experience extreme difficulties regaining the allegiance of the individual once he has come under the power of the insurgency. The government likely takes it for granted that the affected population will willingly proclaim its loyalty and assist the government in destroying the insurgents. Generally, this does not happen, and the breach of Hobbes's covenant may provide a powerful explanation for this passivity. If the government's primary responsibility of security is so easily forfeited to a group of insurgents, why should it expect loyalty from its citizens? The government has betrayed its citizens by failing to fulfill its obligations under the covenant. It should be no surprise that once government forces reestablish control of a former insurgent enclave, the individual might not display any gratitude.

Another facet of the interaction between the individual and the government concerns the use of force. The government has the power to regulate the amount of force to retake an insurgent-controlled area. When it uses force indiscriminately, resulting in high civilian casualties and property damage, it represents a double betrayal. The first betrayal is not providing adequate force to stop the insurgents from taking control. The second betrayal is not valuing the life and property of the individual sufficiently to use minimum force when retaking an insurgent enclave. The individual can reason that insurgents resort to terrorist acts because they lack the means to fight the government forces conventionally. When the government displays seemingly wanton disregard for the individual's safety, what good is the covenant? It is no small wonder that insurgent recruitment increases in the aftermath of major counterinsurgency operations that result in significant noncombatant casualties and damage. It is only logical that some individuals will join the insurgent cause because of this betrayal in the belief that the insurgents will create a better society. Thus, rather than being greeted with cheers and gratitude, the government forces may often experience sullen stares and even hostility among the liberated population.

Often the government compounds its earlier errors by not fully appreciating the role self-preservation plays among the citizenry. If the provision of security is the central tenant of the covenant, then anything short of that is a waste of government energy and resources. The concept of winning hearts and minds without first providing security thus rings hollow. If the struggle was simply over gaining the affections of the populace by providing reconstruction projects, health services, humanitarian relief, and so forth, insurgencies would quickly collapse. The citizens may appreciate the influx of aid, but it does not solve their plight. Hobbes clearly states that the individual initially seeks membership in the society for security. Once that need is met, then he is able to pursue other interests and pleasures for a more complete and happier life. Hence,

winning hearts and minds begins with providing security, and once that need is met unequivocally, then the other initiatives can begin.

In conclusion, gaining control over the population is the centerpiece of both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency. Hobbes suggests that the primary bond which holds society together is the promise of security. Once this is broken, the individual is thrust into a state of nature, which is mitigated only by the establishment of a common power. The struggle between the insurgency and counterinsurgency thus revolves around which side can provide uncontested security. A discussion on counterinsurgency strategy and tactics in attainment of that end is beyond the scope of this article. However, by focusing on individual's plight and motivation for self preservation, the government can produce a framework strategy. It is remarkable that Hobbes's behavioral variable has such profound implications for an insurgency, and yet is so often ignored by governments when conducting a counterinsurgency. In this sense, Hobbes remains relevant to the study and resolution of modern insurgencies and not just as realist theory.

NOTES

1. A civil war is the last stage of an insurgency, in which the insurgents are strong enough to challenge government forces in conventional combat. In the initial stages of an insurgency, the rebels will conduct guerrilla warfare because they are too weak for a direct confrontation. For an insurgency to be characterized as a civil war, the rebels require secured territory and a trained fighting force.

2. John H. Hallowell and Jene M. Porter, *Political Philosophy: The Search for Humanity and Order* (Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), p. 312; "The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them." Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), p. 78.

3. Hobbes, pp. 58-59.

4. Ibid., p. 58.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 59.

7. Ibid., pp. 109-13.

8. Ibid., pp. 76, 106.

9. Two hundred ninety-six graduates of the US Military Academy joined the Confederate forces; 800 remained loyal to the Union. *Bugle Notes* (West Point, N.Y.: US Military Academy, 1978), p. 260.

10. Hobbes, p. 61.

11. Roger Trinquier embraced Hobbes's insight regarding the control of the population: "The *sine qua non* of victory in *modern warfare* is the unconditional support of a population. . . . If it [popular support] does not exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is *terrorism*." Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, trans. by Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 8.

12. Hallowell and Porter, p. 311.

13. Hobbes seems to make an overstatement regarding experience, since not all gain from experience equally. Hobbes, pp. 74-75.

14. Ibid., p. 76.

15. Ibid., p. 78.

16. David Galula is one of the few modern writers on insurgency who recognizes the motivation of self-preservation among the population in counterinsurgency. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 60.

17. Hobbes, p. 78.

18. Mao Tse-tung, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, chapters 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 29, and 30. Accessible on-line at http://art-bin.com/art/omaotoc.html.

Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary

MARTIN J. MUCKIAN

The ongoing conflict in Iraq has sparked a renewed interest in the study of counterinsurgency, leading many to comb the wars of the twentieth century, the "golden age of insurgencies," for lessons that can be applied to today.[1] Much of this recent analysis has focused on the knowledge gained from fighting Marxist revolutionaries.

The insurgent of today, however, is not the Maoist of yesterday. His organization and methods are strikingly different from his twentieth century predecessors. The modern insurgent aims to defeat his opponent by psychological warfare and terrorism instead of military action.[2] He draws his support from criminal networks as opposed to popular mobilization. He fights a netwar not a People's War.

These dissimilarities raise the question of just how much of twentieth century counterinsurgency thought can be applied to twenty-first century conflicts. Methods from past wars are put forth as guiding principles with only a nod towards these differences.[3] Applying these principles without examination could lead, at best, to wasted effort, at worst, to defeat.

Sun Tzu said, "Know your enemy."[4] The structure of a movement, meaning its organization and methods, is the key to understanding it. Modern and Maoist insurgencies are structurally different. In order to be effective, those conducting counterinsurgencies must take into consideration these differences and adapt their methods to the structure of modern adversaries.

This article examines the distinction between Maoist and modern insurgencies and the implications for counterinsurgency methods. First, it contrasts the two types of insurgencies in terms of their organizations and strategies. Building on that information, it analyzes the vulnerabilities of Maoist and modern insurgencies in their organization, political cohesion, support base, and use of information technology. From this analysis, it draws conclusions about how to modify twentieth century methods to combat the modern insurgent.

The purpose of this article is not to propose a comprehensive strategy for a modern counterinsurgency. Instead, it examines one component of such a plan—understanding and exploiting the insurgent's structural vulnerabilities. It does not exhaust this analysis; the conclusions drawn here are demonstrative of the possibilities inherent in this methodology.

Throughout this article, the conflict in Iraq is used as an illustrative example of a modern insurgency. The Iraqi insurgency is thus far the most advanced embodiment of netwar, where small groups coordinate, communicate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central command.[5] As such, this conflict is a powerful predictor of the future of insurgency.

Structure of the Maoist and Iraqi Insurgencies

The first step in learning to defeat this new netwar adversary is to understand how its structure differs from past movements. The following contrasts the organization and strategy of the Maoist and Iraqi insurgencies.

Organization

The last half of the twentieth century witnessed the appearance of several effective revolutionary movements based on Mao's strategy of the People's War.[6] Examples include the Hukbalahap in the Philippines, the Malaya Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in Malaya, and the Viet Cong in Vietnam.

These groups were all organized in similar hierarchies.[7] For example, at the head of the Viet Cong was the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), a committee composed of the top political and military leaders. Below the COSVN were six regional committees, each of which oversaw several provincial and district offices. At the district level was an extensive support organiza-

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tion including medical personnel, weapon manufacturers, training teams, and fiscal auditors. At the lowest level, the cadres organized the entire population to support the movement. Armed bodies consisted of main force units, local guerrillas, and village militias. These military units were fully integrated with the political hierarchy, giving the Viet Cong tight organizational control.[8]

In contrast, the Iraqi insurgency is a constantly shifting network of disparate organizations.[9] There are currently three main armed groups: *Tandhim al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* (al Qaeda's Organization in Mesopotamia), *Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna* (Partisans of the Sunna Army), and *al-Jaysh al-Islami fil-'Iraq* (The Islamic Army in Iraq). There are also a number of smaller groups.[10] The International Crisis Group has suggested that each of these is "more a loose network of factions involving a common 'trademark' than a fully integrated organization."[11] Each group is composed of many small, compartmented or autonomous cells, some as small as two or three people.[12] Many cells specialize in one particular function, such as mortar attacks, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, assassinations, surveillance, or kidnappings.[13] These groups' relationships are very fluid. As Bruce Hoffman described:

> In this loose, ambiguous, and constantly shifting environment, constellations of cells or collections of individuals gravitate toward one another to carry out armed attacks, exchange intelligence, trade weapons, or engage in joint training and then disperse at times never to operate together again.[14]

In contrast to the Maoist hierarchy, this network of insurgent factions has no central leadership.[15] For this loose organization, consultation, coordination and consensus must substitute for central direction. But far more than simple coordination is required if these organizations are to be effective. Networks need what John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt called shared narrative and doctrine to maintain their cohesion and focus.[16] The narrative is the story the network tells to communicate a sense of cause, purpose, and mission and to engender a sense of identity and belonging among members of the network and potential recruits.[17] The insurgents' narrative centers on the fact they are patriotic and pious freedom fighters battling to expel a foreign occupier and overthrow an illegitimate regime. By simultaneously emphasizing nationalism and Islamism, this narrative offers something for everyone and bonds groups who have little in common.[18]

Shared doctrine enables the network to operate in an integrated manner without central control.[19] For example, the insurgents share information about IED operations: techniques, tactics, enemy vulnerabilities, and target priorities. This allows groups acting independently to conduct IED attacks in a coherent pattern.[20] In short, the insurgents "compensate for lack of [central leadership] by emphasizing operational and ideological cohesion."[21]

"The insurgency is particularly dependent on the internet for communication and organization."

Beyond narrative and doctrine, there is another element to the cohesion of the insurgency, information technology. The ubiquity of cellular telephones and computers is largely what makes networked organizations possible.[22] The insurgency is particularly dependent on the internet for communication and organization.[23] This is discussed more fully below, but it is important to keep in mind that information technology is not simply an aid to a network; it is essential to its functioning.

Strategies

Much of the growth and success of Marxist revolutionaries in the twentieth century was due to the effectiveness of Mao's insurgent strategy found in the People's War.[24] This was a sophisticated program to build an insurgency step-by-step. First, the movement focused on intensive underground political activities to build a base of support. It developed a comprehensive political program that highlighted grievances with the government and made detailed promises of a better future under the revolutionaries. This program was the key weapon of the insurgency, because Mao realized that any revolution was primarily a political contest.[25] Next, the insurgents conducted guerrilla actions in a targeted area. Police and security forces were attacked. Government officials were assassinated or forced to flee. The aim was to destroy government control of the region, leaving a power vacuum for the insurgents. The insurgency then integrated the area into the movement; the population, either by persuasion or coercion, provided recruits, supplies, and cooperation. Using this strategy, the movement slowly expanded. Eventually, when the insurgent forces grew strong enough, the government could be defeated by conventional means.[26]

The Iraqi strategy differs from the Maoist People's War on almost every point. First, there is no preliminary political mobilization.[27] In fact, the Iraqi movement is characterized by a lack of any political program related to the future of the country. This is a deliberate strategy of the insurgency in an attempt to avoid divisive issues.[28] Second, the Iraqis do not conduct large-scale guerrilla operations. Viet Cong main force units usually fought in battalion strength or greater, independent guerrilla units in company strength.[29] Iraqis often operate in

"Attacking the perceived insurgency leadership, while it could have a positive propaganda value, is unlikely to have a decisive effect."

groups as small as three men and rarely more than 50.[30] Third, the Iraqi insurgency does not seek to control territory. The lesson it learned from the siege of Fallujah in 2004 was not to fight from a static position. Finally, the Iraqis do not aspire to win a conventional military victory. Their strategy is to maintain a barrage of terrorist attacks on coalition forces, the Iraqi government, and collaborators, with the goal of inflicting enough casualties to cause the Coalition to withdraw and the government to cease to function.[31] As Thomas Hammes stated, the insurgent's strategy is to "destroy the enemy's political will."[32]

Destruction Versus Disruption

Attacking the insurgent organization directly is an important element of any comprehensive strategy. Counterinsurgencies against Maoists often aimed to destroy the leadership hierarchy. One example is the Phoenix Program instituted in Vietnam. This effort attempted to neutralize the Viet Cong by attacking its hierarchy in the hamlets and villages. Police and intelligence units worked to identify and arrest insurgent cadres.[33]

A Maoist organization was particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. The leadership hierarchy, from the central committee down to the cadres in the villages, ran the movement and directed all its operations. The cadre strength in each village was often as few as 10 or 20 men. Destroying a part of the hierarchy would cripple insurgency in a given area.[34]

The United States is following a similar strategy in Iraq. US intelligence assigns each insurgent leader a position in a tiered structure. A great amount of effort is directed toward capturing or eliminating this leadership.[35]

But a networked organization, like the Iraqi insurgency, is very resilient to this type of attack. First, as previously mentioned, this type of organization has no leadership hierarchy. Targeting a leader may impact his subgroup or cell, but will not degrade the movement as a whole. Second, as Luther Gerlach explained in his study of networked organizations, often people who are perceived by outsiders as leaders are more accurately described as "traveling evangelists."[36] They energize and encourage the movement and often help with

recruiting and organizing, but they are not operational directors. As a result, eliminating them will not destroy the movement.[37] Third, a network can sustain significant damage and continue to function. The self-organizing quality of a network allows it to make new connections and work around the injury. To destroy a network requires eliminating a large number of its individual nodes.[38]

Attacking the perceived insurgency leadership, while it could have a positive propaganda value, is unlikely to have a decisive effect.[39] A better paradigm for a counterinsurgency strategy may be found in studying law enforcement operations against criminal organizations. Criminal networks, like insurgencies, are very hard to completely eradicate. Law enforcement strategies, therefore, often focus on disrupting the network's ability to function rather than its destruction.[40]

A network's vulnerability to disruption lies in what netwar expert Phil Williams calls critical nodes. A critical node is a person or cell whose function has a "high level of importance and a low level of redundancy."[41] This could mean a person with an important but rare skill. For example, British intelligence believes that there are only a handful of bombmakers producing the bulk of the IEDs.[42] Or, it could mean a node which serves as the sole link between two organizations. Although these individuals may not be high-ranking, they play a vital role in the network, and their elimination will degrade the insurgency's ability to operate more than the removal of its ostensible leadership. This understanding is key to combating a networked insurgency. A network may be hard to destroy, but it can be disrupted.[43]

Political Vulnerabilities

Every insurgency espouses a political program of some sort to explain its actions and attract supporters. Maoists carefully crafted their political agenda to fit the local circumstances. Usually, it was based, in part, on real grievances and carefully incorporated the hopes and fears of the local population.[44] Because of the ideological discipline of the Maoist insurgents, fracturing the movement by attacking its political agenda was generally not productive. Instead, the standard counterinsurgency response was to create an alternative political program which addressed the underlying grievances of the population. Typically, reforms, political concessions, and economic development were all part of the government's program. In this way, the government competed with the insurgency for the loyalty of the people.[45]

All this is certainly applicable and needed in Iraq. The Iraqi insurgency, however, does not have the political cohesion of its Maoist predecessor. The movement is a loose coalition of groups with widely divergent tenets and goals. There are a number of potentially divisive issues, among them ideology.

The insurgency is balanced between nationalism and Islamic extremism. Of the three main armed groups, al Qaeda's Organization in Mesopotamia is most closely associated with Islamic extremism. On the other hand, the Islamic Army in Iraq is more nationalist in outlook.[46] Internally, each organization is a mix of groups representing a spectrum of ideologies.[47] To achieve cohesion, the insurgency has focused on a middle ground emphasizing patriotism and Salafism. The appeal to patriotism attracts the secular nationalists. The emphasis on Salafism appeals to the Islamists, while not repelling the nationalists. Salafism is not a political program; rather it demands correct personal conduct.[48]

To hold this dissimilar coalition together, any discussion of events beyond expelling the Coalition and toppling the government is carefully avoided.[49] On the one hand, *Tandhim al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* is affiliated with al Qaeda, which is committed to establishing a caliphate in the region. In contrast, another group took great pains to state that, although no political agenda had been articulated, its program definitely did not include an Islamic government in Iraq.[50]

These issues are potential cracks in the shared narrative that holds the movement together. Further cracks showed when the insurgency tried responding to political initiatives by the government. For example, the January 2005 elections forced the insurgency to state a position. But there was no mutual agreement about how to respond: some groups threatened to attack voters, others urged a boycott. The result was chaos which damaged the insurgency's standing with the populace.[51]

These examples demonstrate the limitations of the narrative as a means of cohesion. As long as the network confronts issues that are within the shared story of the narrative, it can maintain its unity. If issues outside the narrative arise, however, such as the elections or an agenda for the future of Iraq, the network loses its cohesion as groups respond according to their own ideology. The network may be capable of reaching a consensus, but this takes time.[52] This disjointedness demonstrates that the political cohesion of a networked insurgency is directly vulnerable in a way the Maoist revolutionaries were not.

Separating the Insurgent From Support

All insurgencies need access to resources, among them recruits, money, supplies, and weapons.[53] An important consideration for counterinsurgencies is to understand how the insurgent obtains these necessities. The Maoist strategy requires occupying territory and eventually conventional warfare, which in turn requires large armed forces. To build these forces and

maintain them in the field demands large quantities of recruits and supplies. The insurgency gains these resources by controlling the population, which is often coerced into providing people and resources to the movement. For example, as Professor Walter Davison wrote in 1968, "The Viet Cong treated villages under their control . . . primarily as sources of manpower, rice, and money with which to carry on the war."[54]

The heart of many counterinsurgency strategies is an attempt to physically separate the insurgent from this base of support. The British executed what is arguably the most sophisticated and most successful version of this strategy while fighting the MRLA. Chinese squatters, the base of support for the MRLA, were systematically moved into fortified New Villages, where they could be both protected and watched. Strict controls were put on the movement of people, food, and other supplies. In this way, the British successfully interdicted the flow of materials and recruits to the MRLA. A primary reason for the surrender of MRLA guerrillas was hunger.[55]

The success of the British strategy in Malaya and other similar efforts have caused some to call for applying these methods in Iraq.[56] A population control strategy is not likely to be effective against the Iraqi insurgency because it does not depend as directly on the population as its Maoist predecessors.

First, the Iraqi insurgency needs far less manpower. Unlike the Maoists, its strategy does not call for controlling territory or conventional warfare; it does not require large guerrilla forces. The insurgency can meet all its personnel needs through volunteers or by hiring criminals or the unemployed.[57] Second, the Iraqi insurgents are dispersed and living among the general population in an urban environment, often at home with their families. The movement does not need to supply large guerrilla units in remote areas. Food and other supplies can be purchased openly—vendors may not even know they are selling to insurgents. Strategies that aim to prevent the insurgency from controlling or coercing the population in order to cut off manpower and supplies are not likely to be effective, simply because the Iraqi groups do not need to control or coerce the population to obtain their needs.

Instead, an effective counterinsurgency strategy should understand the sources of support. The Iraqi insurgency has at least three separate means of financing its cause: former regime leaders, overseas fundraising, and criminal activities.

A major source of funding for the insurgency comes from outside Iraq. This includes former regime officials and groups from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordon. One insurgent financier was captured with $35 million and access to over $2 billion worth of monetary assets stolen from the former Iraqi regime.[58]

Crime has become a major source of funding. For example, kidnapping is a lucrative business for the insurgency, with the average ransom being set at $25,000. Oil smuggling is also profitable, with an estimated $200,000 worth of oil stolen each day.[59] It appears that some cells have become specialized in criminal activities, with one cell for example, handling only kidnappings.[60] If so, these may be prime examples of critical nodes.

The criminal connections of the insurgency are both a strength and a weakness. Having independent sources for funding gives the insurgent independence and flexibility.[61] However, criminal associations may also cause a backlash against the movement.[62] To be effective, a counterinsurgency should aim to sever the connections between the insurgency and its sources of funding. Traditional population controls will not do this.

Information Technology Vulnerabilities

One of the ways that a network such as the Iraqi insurgency departs from its hierarchical predecessors is its dependence on information technology. It is important to understand that this technology is not simply a communication tool; in large part, it is what makes a networked organization possible.

All the insurgent groups use the internet as a primary means of communication. Many groups publish daily bulletins, either on their web sites or through mass emailing.[63] Their skillful use of the internet allows them to attract support and recruits by directly communicating with the Iraqi populace and the world in a manner that was not previously possible. In the past, groups had to rely on newspapers or television to spread their message.[64]

Information technology, however, is not simply about better communications. By massively reducing the costs and time required to communicate and increasing the sheer volume of information that can be transmitted, information technology makes dispersed networked organizations possible.[65] The Iraqi insurgent groups use the internet to coordinate actions, share tactical lessons, establish objectives, plan operations, and synchronize policy.[66] This is in stark contrast with a Maoist organization which needs an extensive hierarchy to coordinate its activities.

The United States appears to be targeting insurgent internet sites and is presumably attempting to monitor internet communications. The insurgents have become very adept at countering these efforts, for example, using email lists to replace deactivated web sites.[67] Given the dependence of a networked organization on information technology, this is a vulnerability which should be exploited more fully.

The Way Ahead

A modern, networked insurgency, such as the one in Iraq, is structurally very different from the Maoist movements of the twentieth century. Simply rehashing old strategies will not work. An effective counterinsurgency needs to understand the structure of this new insurgency and adapt its strategies accordingly.

The first step is to understand that the enemy is a network, not a hierarchy. Imposing a hierarchical framework on an amorphous organization will only hinder efforts.[68] As Georgetown University's Professor Bruce Hoffman writes, "The problem in Iraq is that there appears to be no such static wiring diagram or organizational structure to identify, unravel, and systematically dismantle."[69]

The next step is to understand that networks are very difficult to destroy, but they can be disrupted. As Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen stated, operations should focus on "fracturing, delinking, and deresourcing" the insurgency.[70] Several avenues for disrupting the insurgent network have been discussed in this article—critical nodes, narrative, support sources, and information technology.

First, attack critical nodes for maximum disruptive effect. Modern insurgencies do not have a hierarchy that can be pulled apart. Targeting the ostensible leadership is not likely to have a significant disruptive effect. People or cells with special skills or who act as critical communication links or perform non-redundant functions are key vulnerabilities of a network.

Second, networked insurgencies do not necessarily have strong political cohesion. Attack the narrative by forcing the insurgency to respond to issues that are outside its scope—this can disrupt or even fracture the movement as each group responds to the issue according to its own ideology. Ideological differences are a primary cause of fracturing within networked groups.[71] A counterinsurgency should take every opportunity to disrupt its adversary by promoting internal dissension.

Third, attack the sources of support. This cannot be done effectively through traditional population control measures; the counterinsurgency must understand where the movement obtains its resources. This may involve international cooperation to stop overseas funding streams. Given that insurgencies are increasingly turning to crime for financing, priority should be given to reducing crime and corruption in an effort to disrupt insurgent financing.[72]

Fourth, attack the information technology infrastructure of the network. A network is absolutely dependent on robust communications to function. It may be that information technology controls are the modern equivalent

of the population controls that were used so successfully against Maoist insurgencies. One extreme proposal is to completely shut down the information technology grid in the insurgent areas—telephones, cellular towers, and so on. This could certainly have a disruptive effect on a networked organization, but more research is needed in this critical area.

The rich history of twentieth century counterinsurgency is a tempting source for those struggling to develop strategies against the modern insurgent. Certainly there are valuable lessons from these conflicts. However, the successful strategies of that era were all based on a detailed understanding of the enemy. To win against a modern insurgency, we need have an equally firm understanding of our adversary and not mistake him for something else.

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Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies

JIM BAKER

This article presents the essentials of a successful counterinsurgency strategy by applying a technique known as systems thinking.[1] The fundamentals of good strategic thought lie both in recognizing the most significant interactions between different players, how they influence each other in unexpected ways, and how to measure progress in achieving the ends of the strategy. Systems thinking has proven successful in other contexts at explaining human behavior, policy choices, unintended consequences, and the resistance of systems to change. It also offers insight into how to assess one of the most difficult questions related to strategy in complex environments—how to know when the strategy has been successful.

A strategist encounters many difficulties in developing and implementing a counterinsurgency strategy. One major impediment is the lack of a clear and simple way to describe the strategy—US military forces and senior policymakers have traditionally shown a need to learn and re-learn the basic tenets of counterinsurgency strategies. Another difficulty is determining appropriate measures of success, as the twists and turns of a counterinsurgent campaign often lead to considerable ambiguity regarding progress in relationship to the ultimate goal. Issues like these are not unique to counterinsurgencies. Systems thinking has proven useful in understanding public management and policy, energy and the environment, and theory development in the natural and social sciences. Many of these have something in common with insurgencies—complex actors and non-linear relationships, difficulty in measurement, band-aid solutions, impatience with results and unintended consequences or side effects. Systems thinking can provide intuitive and counterintuitive insights for understanding counterinsurgencies. While counterinsurgent theorists will encounter much that looks like "old

wine in a new bottle," several advantages accrue from developing and defending a counterinsurgency strategy through the lens of systems thinking, including an approach for gauging progress.

Four different models of an insurgency will be introduced. Each model extends the previous one, providing new insight about the dynamics of counterinsurgent operations. In addition to unveiling the strategic imperatives for a counterinsurgent, the models also suggest a new way to organize measures of progress in a counterinsurgent campaign. First, however, a short introduction is needed to explain basic systems thinking.

Systems Thinking

All systems thinking models rely on two feedback loops—balancing and reinforcing loops. A reinforcing loop describes systems where elements reinforce one another, creating either a virtuous or a vicious cycle (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Reinforcing loop.

For example, in a bank account, as principal increases, it generates more interest, which in turn adds to the original principal, which in turn leads to even more interest, and so on. A "snowball rolling down a hill" symbol in the center denotes a reinforcing loop, to remind readers that there is an exponentially growing cycle. Reinforcing loops have inherent limits to growth, usually because one of the elements interacts with another loop to eventually slow growth.

The other key feedback loop is called a "balancing loop." A balancing loop describes efforts to solve a problem or close a gap between a desired state and a current state (Figure 2).

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The balancing loop is read from bottom to top in the order of the arrows: an action is taken to increase a current state. The "+" sign indicates an increasing relationship. This results in some closing of the gap with the desired state (the minus sign indicates an inverse relationship between elements). As the gap grows smaller, it adds to the desire for action, but it adds less and less as the gap shrinks, causing a slowing change in the current state, until the gap reaches zero, and no further action is required. If the desired state changes, or if an event occurs to change the current state and recreate the gap, action to balance the gap would begin again. The see-saw symbol in the middle indicates a balancing loop.



Figure 2. Balancing loop.

Although appearing abstract, the balancing loop describes a great many everyday processes. Consider filling a glass with water. The desired state is the water fill line, the current state is the level of the water, and the gap is the distance between the two levels. The gap is at its maximum with the glass empty, so you turn on the faucet with near full intensity. As the water fills the gap closes, you slowly turn down the water and the intensity of the action slows, until the glass is filled and the gap equals zero. If you put a hole in the glass, the gap would reappear and you would turn on the faucet again, with strength proportional to the loss. Systems thinking also emphasizes the time delay often inherent between action and current state, and how this may lead to inappropriate action. For example, if you inserted a two-second delay between the time you turned the faucet and the time the water came on, you would probably miss the fill line. Delays of hours or days in more complex systems often cause unforeseen consequences as actions tend to lead the system to exceed the desired state.

Fixes That Fail

A simplified systems thinking model based on the balancing loop for a counterinsurgency strategy looks like Figure 3. This is a simple loop, but it

contains the key element of counterinsurgent strategy: decreasing popular support for the insurgent. Most theorists agree that reducing popular support for insurgents is the single most critical element confronting an insurgency. In the model reflected at Figure 3, driving the gap to zero is a problem addressed by the balancing loop. This challenge preoccupies the counterinsurgent strategist, and forms the theme for several extensions of the model.



Figure 3. Provide security balancing loop.

Before examining this model further, it is important to clarify the term "popular support." It does not necessarily mean that the insurgents and their actions are welcomed by the population. As often as not, apathy, fear or coercion is the motivator for popular support. Regardless of motive, actions arising from that support promote the insurgency. Typical support includes providing intelligence on counterinsurgent operations to the insurgents, allowing sanctuary, harboring supplies or ammunition, and supporting new recruits. Each of these actions provides more opportunity for insurgent attack, and increases the likelihood attacks will be successful.

Working around the loop in Figure 3 starting from the bottom leads to the following chain of reasoning: popular support for the insurgency leads to increased or more effective insurgent attacks. Increased attacks encourage government forces to conduct some type of security response. Typically, this might involve cordon operations, establishing checkpoints, setting up roadblocks, establishing a curfew, or perhaps even search and destroy operations. These actions result in fewer insurgents, weaken their ability to attack effectively, and therefore increase feelings of security in the populace. There is, however, a delay from the initial security action and the impact on insurgents and the corresponding increased feeling of security. It takes time for the populace's state of mind to adapt.

Recall that the negative sign on the arrow between "feelings of security" and "popular support" means an inverse relationship—as the population feels more secure, support for the insurgents decreases. As popular support wanes, insurgents eventually have difficultly finding a safe haven to plan or train, garnering supplies or recruits, and collecting intelligence about counterinsurgent forces. Lack of these resources diminishes the insurgent's ability to attack. This, in turn, means that the intensity of insurgent attacks and corresponding government security measures also decrease or become less onerous. Eventually, all popular support dwindles—or so the reasoning would seem to indicate. Providing security is typically the first action counterinsurgent forces tend to adopt. Without security, other elements of counterinsurgency strategy simply cannot be brought into play.



Figure 4. Extended provide security model—why the fix fails.

There is another reason for a preference for "providing security." Taking direct action against insurgents appears to satisfy the need for solid results in a short period of time. It is analogous to the classic tasks most conventional armies train for—finding, fixing, and destroying the enemy. The balancing loop provides a key insight: the action and its result take place in a relatively compressed period, making it seem as though this is simply an engagement in a larger campaign. It appears straightforward to measure success in terms of dead or detained insurgents, and captured weapons, supplies, or territory. Certainly, this appears to be the most appropriate initial response to insurgent attacks and, perhaps, the best way to "drain the swamp" in an effort to avoid future violence.

Unfortunately, the balancing loop is a fix that often fails.[2] An updated model incorporating the typical arguments found in counterinsurgency literature is shown in Figure 4.

Here, the "provide security" action not only increases feelings of security, but it also increases feelings of resentment. Kicking in doors of suspected

insurgent hideouts, enforcing curfews, conducting block-by-block searches, rounding up villagers to find the few insurgents—all of these necessary tactics inevitably lead to increased rancor in the population.[3] Indeed, polls of Iraqis report nearly an equal balance between those who have had positive experiences and those who have had negative interactions with US forces, even though a much smaller percentage of the population is the target of actions related to "provide security."[4] The intensity of these negative feelings vary according to the cumulative effect of perceived or actual grievances—from minor cultural slights to major property damage, to inadvertent casualties and deaths. Even when forces are highly discriminate in their use of force, lack of cultural training or familiarity with the local environment, or the use of derogatory language or gestures may contribute to discontent. As a result, at the critical juncture at the bottom of the loop in Figure 4, there is a positive force (resentment) working against the reducing force (feeling secure) to change insurgent popular support. Note in the outer reinforcing loop actions and consequences tend to strengthen one another, and work to undermine the inner balancing loop. In other words, actions taken to "provide security" as a solution may simultaneously act to intensify the problem.

For the counterinsurgent strategist, this second model raises several key questions. Will "provide security" tactics lead to changes in the security environment quickly enough? What is the best method to shrink the delay between actual changes in the security environment and the perception of security? Will the resulting feelings of security for the population increase faster than any growth in feelings of resentment? Will the relative intensity of these factors be sufficient to increase or decrease popular support for insurgents? Even if these questions can be answered satisfactorily, another more troubling aspect remains; it does not take significant popular support to enable insurgencies, so even small pockets of support can be problematic. Answering these questions is further complicated by a lack of appropriate metrics to judge such matters.

The outer reinforcing loop in Figure 4 also has a time duration that will be considerably shorter than the inner balancing loop. Feelings of resentment tend to grow more rapidly than feelings of security. The general populace, especially in an insurgency where the security forces are not indigenous, will quickly feel anger at real or perceived slights. Feelings of safety from increased security, are not as obvious. They can also be more quickly reversed by insurgent actions. Taken together, the fact that a new security environment is in place takes longer to seep into a mindset. The result all too often is an upswing in popular support for insurgents after initial security measures are instituted. The model thus emphasizes another central tenet of counterinsurgent doctrine: the importance of restraint in the use of force.

Indeed, the central challenge of the "providing security" element for the counterinsurgent is to weigh the competing moods of the population against

options for action. Restrained force slows down the development of feelings of resentment, but also slows any direct action to affect the situation. Military commanders have a problem explaining rules of engagement (ROE) that limit the employment of force. ROE which limit kinetic responses in order to establish a more amiable environment probably risk increasing their own casualties. Yet, the environment becomes only more hostile if ROE allow for a more direct response. This is the dilemma the model exposes: units may be asked to be more vulnerable (in the short-term) in order to reach the longer-term goal of decreased popular support for the insurgents. Yet, this difficult to measure goal is much harder to recognize than, the clearly necessary response to a sniper firing from a mosque. There is no such thing as "low intensity conflict" for the soldier being shot at. Taking casualties for abstract gains undermines unit morale. It is therefore unsurprising that as late as April 2004, 11 months after Saddam Hussein's regime had fallen, British observers noted of US tactics in Iraq:

> The American approach was markedly different [from the UK]: When US troops are attacked with mortars in Baghdad; they use mortar-locating radar to find the firing point and then attack the general area with artillery, even though the area they are attacking may be in the middle of a densely populated residential area. They may well kill the terrorists in the barrage but they will also kill and maim innocent civilians. That has been their response on a number of occasions. It is trite, but American troops do shoot first and ask questions later.[5]

The quote fails to characterize the rectitude displayed by Western military forces in a majority of counterinsurgency cases. As the systems thinking model in Figure 4 highlights, the insurgent takes advantage of the core dilemma for the counterinsurgent—walking the fine line between too forceful and too limited military actions related to security.

The first goal for the insurgent is to exploit insufficient security actions by employing more numerous and possibly more effective attacks. At the same time, he tries to fan the flames of resentment of any overzealous use of force, magnifying its effect with rumors or innuendo. The insurgent benefits from the human tendency to assume the worst and to equate perception with reality. Even small-scale insurgent attacks or assassinations that do not significantly increase individual risk will have a disproportionate impact by frightening or coercing the population. Moreover, localized errors by military forces in employing force—especially when that force is viewed as an occupier—can be leveraged to increase "man on the street" bitterness. Both these actions help to increase popular support for the insurgent.

Through the mediums associated with globalization, the 21st century insurgent has the ability to magnify this already potent advantage. The explosion of information technology, communications pathways, television,

and the rise of the internet increase the insurgent's ability to leverage minor tactical successes into strategic information advantages.[6] Improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks (and the footage that often accompanies them, deliberately taken by insurgents) may be quickly and easily distributed worldwide by mainstream journalists or individuals. These images of violence have an impact disproportionate to the actual military value of the attacks, exacerbating the challenges illuminated by this model.

Regardless of the tactics used to combat these challenges, the need to provide security action is clearly necessary. However, even if the issues associated with the model are being met, they are often not sufficient to counter the insurgency. The other critical function is the increase in government legitimacy. Adding this element to the model is reflected in Figure 5.



Figure 5. Systems model for two key aspects of influencing popular support.

The top loop is repeated from Figure 4. The bottom loop reflects the second major effort of a counterinsurgency strategy, namely increasing broad government legitimacy. This loop would be read from the top as follows: increasing popular support for insurgents decreases support for the government. This can be reflected in actions ranging from failure to volunteer for local government, to pay taxes, active civil disobedience, or the loss of administrative control of territory. The government attempts to "rule (more) justly," to woo the populace by redressing the most severe of the perceived

popular grievances. Resolution of these grievances are assumed to result in better economic or civil conditions for the population as a whole. These actions increase real or perceived government legitimacy, thereby reducing popular support for the insurgents. Legitimacy also comes from increased security for the population, but this arrow is deleted for clarity.

This sense of the element "rule justly" implies a Western interpretation of the rights and status of the individual versus the state. Other government models such as limited authoritarianism or totalitarianism may function more effectively in a counterinsurgency, for a variety of reasons concerning the relative power of the state.[7] These forms of government and their sometimes brutal but occasionally effective means of combating insurgents are beyond the scope of this article.

The delays in this balancing or problem-solving loop again show why a preference for military action may be strong. Since there must have been perceived injustices of one sort or another for the insurgency to take hold, "ruling justly" is not a transformation that can take place quickly. In the absence of a functioning local government, it will take even longer for an occupying force to establish good governance. "Ruling justly" involves many tasks, such as delivering basic social and physical services, setting up functioning courts, organizing local or national elections, holding referendums and establishing political councils, and encouraging the growth of a free press. It may also reach the point of political accommodation with elements of the insurgency, as was the case in Northern Ireland, El Salvador, and reputedly in Iraq today. Ruling justly is a long-term achievement, and there are anticipated delays throughout the process—delays in bribing (coercing or convincing elites holding power to support the government), delays in training technocrats, delays in building physical infrastructure, and delays in creating and executing new bureaucratic processes. Once these activities are started, additional delays can be expected as positive actions slowly take effect, and then continue to lag while portions of the population who are suspicious or apathetic are convinced to actively oppose the insurgency. Frustration with delays (on the part of the government and the population) often leads policymakers to reach for the tool with the most short-term impact, "provide security."

In spite of these difficulties, the model in Figure 5 demonstrates to struggling officials that "ruling justly" is not a mere moral concern, but also a highly practical one. As a population becomes convinced of the just rule of their government, their support for the insurgency drops, it is then that the counterinsurgency can succeed. At the same time, occupying forces should also bear in mind that "ruling justly" represents a spectrum of activities, some of which may not be consonant with Western notions of fair and just government. If a power holding elite (warlord) can provide some level of security and

basic infrastructure (food, water, shelter, and power) to a majority of the populace, he may be extremely useful in the early phases of the counterinsurgency. "Ruling justly" may eventually come to mean constitutional liberalism, but in the short-run, the model suggests a strategy of co-opting small tyrants or elites early; through elections if possible, but through pure power brokering if not. This contribution to overall stability may be far more important than implementing idealistic notions about an effective national government. The creation or transition of institutions to support this goal are subject to all the delays noted previously; all the while government legitimacy may be eroding. However, because it is the surest route to eventual undermining of popular support for the insurgent, a strategy of governing well—or at least the appearance of governing well—satisfies both the idealist and realist policymakers.

The model can be expanded in two ways to show another reason why counterinsurgency strategy is difficult to maintain. Consider the following diagram, modified again from Figure 4.



Figure 6. Extended systems model for counterinsurgency showing how (ruling justly) can be undermined by shorter term (provide security) measures.

In Figure 6, the two inner balancing loops remain unchanged, but an outer reinforcing loop has been added. This loop reflects two important aspects of counterinsurgent strategy. As popular support for the insurgents' increases, intelligence sources directed at the insurgency diminish. This means that the

opportunity for targeted, selective action become rarer, which when combined with outcomes of "provide security" may lead to an increase in indiscriminate military actions. As UK counterinsurgency theorist Alistair Finlan notes:

> Throughout mid-2003, US forces [in Iraq] engaged in a number of dragnet or sweep operations that involved house searches, mass arrests and detention of suspected insurgents. The problem with such operations was that they were imprecise, offensive (unpopular foreign troops searching any house in the dead of night from Boston to Belfast or Baghdad would generate anger amongst civilians no matter what nationality) and counter-productive. Instead of isolating the resistance, such activities have "perversely inspired insurgent violence."[8]

These actions provide further opportunities for fostering the feelings of resentment among the general populace. Instead, the counterinsurgent should strive to create the opposite effect by increasing security that ultimately will undermine support for the insurgent and result in better intelligence. Andrew Krepenevich, long-time observer of the war in Iraq, notes that "the insurgents' problem is . . . compounded if the people feel secure enough from retribution to provide counterinsurgent forces with intelligence on insurgent movements and cadre members."[9]

Also, this expanded model shows how feelings of resentment work to undermine the ability of the government to rule justly. In Figure 4, feelings of resentment directly led to an increase in popular support. The model in Figure 6 makes the cause-effect relationship more explicit. No matter how specific a population's discontent may be toward the military, ultimately, they hold a government responsible. Again, it is the perception as much as the reality of good governance that is needed to counter insurgent support. And effective propaganda can also help reduce the delay, by increasing the perception of just rule in the minds of the populace, giving reality a chance to catch up.

The model in Figure 6 argues for several other points besides restraint in the use of force. It suggests combining the civil and military authorities at the local and national level, as demonstrated by the Combined Action Platoon programs in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Such units can share intelligence among civil and military personnel, but more importantly they strike a balance between coaxing and provoking the population while providing security, keeping the focus on "ruling justly." The Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* reflects this environment:

> The initial problem is to restore peace. There may be many economic and social factors involved, pertaining to the administrative, executive, and judicial functions of the government. These are completely beyond military power. . . . [but] Peace and industry cannot be restored permanently without appropriate provisions for the economic welfare of the people.[10]

Local and national politicians are more sensitive to the social and political realities caused by the inappropriate or unsystematic use of force than a military unit—and thus more responsive to the popular reaction. They are better suited to "feel" out the situation on the ground, judge the strength of the players, and better able to coordinate responses, figure out the worst grievances and try to redress them. The *Small Wars Manual* reinforces the importance of indigenous and responsive local officials:

> In general, [any] plan of action states the military measures to be applied, including the part the forces of occupation will play in the economic and social solution of the problem. The same consideration must be given to the part to be played by local government and the civil population. The efforts of the different agencies must be cooperative and coordinated to the attainment of the common end.[11]

These four models illuminate several fundamental considerations for the counterinsurgent. They confirm the ideal strategy is restraint in the application of force through a combined military-civilian organization working in small teams close to the affected populations. They emphasize the role of intelligence in providing specific targeting and the avoidance of large operations. The models stress the constant delay between action and reaction, explain the frustrating, protracted and ambiguous character of most counterinsurgencies, and they suggest that in the short-term, information operations can assist in closing the legitimacy gap.

Taken in total, they highlight why there is an ever-lurking temptation to resort to more direct action in an effort to demonstrate progress. As counterinsurgent practitioner Larry Cable succinctly notes:

> Without a doctrinal recognition that results will inherently be ambiguous, indicators hazy and results seemingly quite slow in coming, commanders and decision-makers alike will cast about for ways in which to convince themselves . . . that US forces are succeeding. [Any strategy] . . . must provide for a uniquely un-American attribute: the ability to accept a wide range of outcomes and complete uncertainty as to the duration of our effort or even the short-term effectiveness of our actions.[12]

The models also support committing a greater amount of resources to providing security. An appearance of strength and unshakeable permanency can increase feelings of security without the concomitant increase in feelings of resentment. The models counter actions that undercut the perception of government impartiality between factions, and the associated increase in popular support for the insurgent.[13] In short, the model literally and figuratively centralizes the criticality of winning the hearts and minds of the popu-

lation in support of the legitimacy of the government, conforming with the conclusions of relevant counterinsurgency theorists.[14]

Some critics may charge that systems thinking is inappropriate to the task of understanding or analyzing the basics of counterinsurgency strategy. After all, feedback loops related to examples like "filling up a glass of water" cannot account for the intricate, challenging, unique, and sometimes messy business of counterinsurgency. How can a model account for an active, thinking, imaginative enemy whose moves and countermoves can hardly be predicted or anticipated? This criticism carries some weight. One response might be that systems thinking has proven useful in understanding other complex societal and organizational behavior. Therefore, its lens may be useful even in such problematical contexts as small wars. A second and more potent rejoinder to the criticism would be to point out that classic counterinsurgency strategy is well understood, and as the previous analysis shows, the model represents key elements of successful past strategies. The most potent counter-argument is simpler: the model is based on the key objective that both insurgents and counterinsurgents universally agree is critical— popular support. In this way, the insurgent's strategy is as clear as the counterinsurgents, though his tactics or techniques may be distinct.

Another criticism may be that this model reveals nothing new. However, having a model in-hand allows the counterinsurgent strategist a means to steady himself and his forces in times of difficulty as well as explain to others why the strategy he has adopted will work. This is no small accomplishment. Military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz said:

> The means and forms which strategy uses are in fact so extremely simple, so well known by their constant repetition, that it only appears ridiculous to sound common sense when it hears critics so frequently speaking of them with high-flown emphasis.[15]

Although Clausewitz was not talking specifically about small wars, a similar observation can be made for counterinsurgency strategy—the basics are well known and almost universally applicable. The difficulty is often staying the course. This model represents the non-linear nature of counterinsurgency, the ability to calm policymakers and the public, and to underscore the need for patience.

Metrics for Success

Having an understanding of why things happen is the foundation of a good strategy. Determining ways to measure success in the midst of a counterinsurgent campaign is much more difficult. There are no phase lines, no geographic decisive points, and oftentimes little information regarding the en-

emy's resources or will. However, this same simple model and the insight it can provide suggests some preliminary metrics. These indicators can be roughly grouped into the two key aspects of highlighted in the model—"provide security" and "rule justly." In addition, strategists may find it useful to consider these potential measures from two perspectives. First, they might classify the component *nature* of the insurgency confronted: whether it is operating in a rural or urban environment will guide selection of some measures. Second, they should be aware that some measures while indicating the current status of an insurgency, others may be giving some hint of what the future will likely be—these will be referred to as *lagging* or *leading* indicators. Finally, US counterinsurgents should be preoccupied with several overriding concerns about measures in general, and keep these in mind when selecting indicators.

Urban and rural insurgents have similarities and differences. Rural based insurgents typically have greater ease in massing and dispersing units and in using the countryside as sanctuary. They may find it easier to attack remote outposts and villages. They may also overtly take control of portions of the country, and set up shadow governments to increase their legitimacy, such as collecting taxes or providing public services. The rural-based insurgent trades time for space. The typically successful counterinsurgency strategy is to limit insurgent movement by building roads or fortifications to partition the countryside. An "oil spot" strategy is applied to gradually clear areas of insurgents and ensure forces left behind can hold the area against any resurgence of activity. In some cases, it may even include complete resettlement of populations. Measures should focus on these unique characteristics.

Urban-based insurgents, working in the alleys and slums of unimproved urban spaces, are just as difficult for military forces to engage as the rural guerilla hiding in the mountain or jungle. There is, however, easier access to soft, infrastructure targets and the ability to manipulate crowds.[16] Urban insurgents have greater access to media—a strategic advantage. Urban economic networks also provide opportunities for collecting income through drug trafficking or extortion. The urban insurgent cannot easily mass forces, and must depend on small cells.[17] The fact that keeps urban insurgencies small also negatively impacts the government forces, since they have a greater challenge finding the enemy. The counterinsurgent cannot easily mass force and may inadvertently cause civilian deaths in any action. Politically, denying freedoms such as assembly, speech, press, or movement tends to punish large segments of the populace in attempts to pursue the few. As we have seen, repressive strategies can lead to increased and more widespread resentment of the government, playing into the hands of the insurgent. Good counter-strategies include increased patrols and policing, emphasis on intelligence, establishing checkpoints, crowd dispersal, redress of popular grievances, and eventual political reconciliation. However, it

is the limited insurgent's inability to affect mass uprisings that causes urban insurgencies to fail more often than their rural counterparts.[18]

Both of these forms depend on weakening the patience of the government or occupying force, bringing about either their overthrow or a change in power. They avoid military decisions and conventional firefights wherever possible. Both depend critically on indigenous popular support. These forms may also extort money, food, or supplies from their population in return for protection. They may also seek to supplant the legitimate government by providing basic services like education or medical assistance. As the system dynamics model showed, counterinsurgent strategies also have much in common: highly discriminate use of violence, coordinated civil and military action, and the ability to provide political paths for change while redressing grievances.

Another way of organizing measures of progress is to examine whether they indicate a future change in progress, or serve to document a change that has already taken place. The former is called a "leading" indicator, while the latter is a "lagging" indicator. Leading indicators forecast progress. Lagging indicators confirm whether existing strategies are working.

One example of the difference between the two might be trying to measure the progress in delivering educational services to a population. Leading indicators would include number of schools built, number of teachers hired and trained, and the number of students enrolled. As these numbers go up, the potential for reaching the goal of improving education is increased. Hopefully, these indicators serve to forecast potential outcomes and highlight problems early enough to make the required course corrections. Lagging indicators for a similar goal might include the latest exam test scores, literacy rates, and the number of students matriculating. The numbers prove after the fact that the strategy worked. Both types of indicators are needed to affirm if the right strategy has been chosen to meet the goal of improving a populace's education.

There are, however, two key advantages to using a leading indicator. These advantages derive from the ability to measure capacity and potential rather than results. First, the indicator provides an early assessment of results with sufficient time to make changes. A counterinsurgent might need to modify the goals or add resources depending on this early insight. The counterinsurgent also could use early measures to calibrate popular expectations for on-going security or governance programs. Second, early indicators give a policymaker a validation that some kind of progress is being made. Counterinsurgencies do not progress smoothly, and it is often difficult to sense whether progress is being made. As noted previously, this can lead to lack of patience, resulting in ill-conceived actions undoing a successful counterinsurgency at both the tactical and strategic levels. Having measures in hand early on permits public officials and military commanders to demonstrate to themselves, their

subordinates, their supervisors, the media, and the population at large that progress is being made. Or, more honestly, it demonstrates that the strategy has potential for progress. Being essentially predictive, many things can go wrong between the time an indicator presages a likely outcome and the actual fruition of results. This is the key disadvantage of the leading indicator.

When properly chosen, lagging indicators prove the viability of assumptions made in the choice of leading indicators. By measuring a project or activity "as-is," lagging indicators have the advantage of more directly measuring the desired outcome. Their drawback, however, is that they come so late that any modifications made to the strategy at that point may require an extended period to make their impact felt. Good counterinsurgent strategists should rely on both leading and lagging indicators, bearing in mind the implicit assumptions of the former, and the temporal disadvantages of the latter.

Strategists should also be concerned about three "snares" they may encounter in choosing indicators. The first of these snares, as noted above, is that leading indicators will have built-in assumptions about both progress to date and progress yet to be made. For example, predicting educational progress by measuring the number of schools built assumes that a new building is required for learning. Progress towards an educational goal also assumes that the schools will be have a sound curriculum, sufficient teachers, and sufficient security to ensure a good learning atmosphere. These are significant assumptions. Even the mere act of constructing a lagging indicator (without sufficient data) may reflect the reliance on such assumptions. With a leading indicator in-hand, fixing in mind the eventual outcome and determining how best to measure it often brings to mind the other required conditions.

Second, leading indicators tend to become input or resource based. Inputs to a system are usually the easiest to measure, and a correlation is usually assumed between input and output. Both of these factors contribute to the heavy use of input-based measures that may have only an indirect bearing on the system as a whole. An example of this phenomenon in counterinsurgencies is a "body count" mentality. That is, the key to measuring strategic success is that fewer insurgents (input) must mean fewer insurgent attacks (output). Yet, in this example, the would-be strategist has made two key assumptions that may prove to be untrue. The first being that more insurgents are being killed than are being replaced by whatever government tactics employed. Second, that fewer insurgents means fewer attacks. Both are often false assumptions, as in the case of Iraq today and Vietnam a generation ago. It would appear that in Iraq, thousands and thousands of insurgents have been detained or killed since the end of major combat operations.[19] However, the estimated strength of the insurgency has remained steady since May 2004, and the number of attacks per month continue to rise.[20] Clearly, measuring resources does not necessarily in-

dicate progress. Nevertheless, if something is easy to measure, be assured that it probably will be.

There is a third concern about measurements in counterinsurgencies. The staff officers at various headquarters and developmental agencies can generate reams of quantitative measures. One should not judge the success of a counterinsurgency, the mood of a society, its potential for violence, or its ability to resist an insurgency solely on "the top 10" indicators and their red, yellow or green status as outlined by some technocrat or think tank. That is not to say that objective indicators are not critical. They form a basis for demonstrating progress for media, for popular consumption, and above all provide basic information ensuring that the project is delivering a tangible result. However, quantitative data may not be sufficient to judge the degree and intensity of popular feeling, or more importantly, the way that these feelings are distributed throughout geographic or demographic strata. One way systems typically compensate for a lack of hard data and clear cause-effect relationships is to increase the human dimension used to interpret the situation. For counterinsurgent strategists, this could equate to longer troop rotations and more engagement with the local populace. Personal judgment and intuition borne of close continuing ties with the populace permits a useful view of the moods of various elites or the general populace. Numbers must be balanced by informed, interactive human judgment. Western positivist culture tends to subscribe to legendary Vince Lombardi's claim "If you're not keeping score, you're not playing to win." However, qualitative measures may play an equally important part. Measures should be developed based on the dominant character of an insurgency (rural/urban/both), and by whether they are able to predict or confirm progress.

Conclusion

This article has introduced an analytic framework for understanding the dynamics of counterinsurgency, and suggested considerations for how to measure progress. Hopefully, it has demonstrated that winning on the battlefield is irrelevant. When countering an insurgent adversary, the struggle for power and legitimacy among competing factions has no pure military solution. Often, the application of force has the negative, unintended effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruitment, and demonstrating the brutality of government forces. An alternative approach to fighting an insurgency involves a comprehensive plan to alleviate the political conditions behind the insurgency; civil-military cooperation; the application of minimum force; deep intelligence; and an acceptance of the protracted nature of the conflict.[21] All of these factors arise from considering

the two major motivations for insurgent action—"providing security" and "ruling justly." The insights revealed by this simple model can help steady the decisionmaker in times of difficulty and assist in determining indicators for success.

NOTES

1. In spite of thousands of papers and hundreds of books of examples of applied systems thinking to other fields of hard and soft science, the author was unable to find any published examples of systems thinking as applied to insurgency or counterinsurgency strategy. The closest is found in a recent grant application filed from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School on "Research Initiative to Understand & Model State Stability: Exploiting System Dynamics," February 2005, http://web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp/2005-02.pdf.

2. Systems thinking has developed a number of archetypes, or recurring combinations of reinforcing and balancing loops that appear over and over again in the examination of systems. Some patterns occur often—one of which is the archetype "Fixes That Fail."

3. USMC, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1940), chap. 1, sect. 2, 15. "While curbing the passions of the people, courtesy, friendliness, justice, and firmness should be exhibited."

4. Oxford Research International, Ltd. *National Survey of Iraq*, February 2004, p. 26. Eleven months after regime change, 8.4 percent of Iraqis had a positive experience with US forces, 9.3 percent had a negative experience.

5. Sean Rayment, "US Tactics Condemned by British Officers," *The Daily Telegraph*, 11 April 2004.

6. John Mackinlay, "Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan," The Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Paper 64, 2005, pp. 10-13.

7. Consider for example, several regimes in Latin America, such as El Salvador or Guatemala. Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy*, p. 158: "[there was a period of] . . . political violence [against insurgents] by special commandos . . . acted under government control, but outside the judicial process to abduct, torture during interrogation and extra judicially execute thousands. . . . [According to one government official] this was the beginning of an epoch of "good intra-group relationships and the most successful in combating urban insurgency."

8. Alastair Finlan, "Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Iraq," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 16 (March 2005), 1-21.

9. Andrew Krepenevich, "Training Iraqi Security Forces," FDCH Congressional Testimony, House Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005.

10. *Small Wars Manual*, p. 16.

11. Ibid.

12. Larry Cable, "Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 7 (Spring 1996), 107.

13. Ibid., p. 105.

14. Ibid., p. 98.

15. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 178. Clausewitz explains several reasons why this is so: that few generals or statesmen possess the combination of intellect and iron will to stay the course in the face of danger and uncertainty. Another reason being that few commanders possess the coup d'oeuil needed to weigh appropriately the combination of effort and will versus that of the enemy to accomplish the goal. Finally, that friction throughout the military machine makes it likely that the best of plans will go awry or be delayed, and that there is a need for fortitude and creativity in such times.

16. Marshall V. Ecklund, "Task Force Ranger vs. Urban Somali Guerillas in Mogadishu: An Analysis of Guerilla and Counterguerilla Tactics and Techniques used during Operation GOTHIC SERPENT," *Small War and Insurgencies*, 15 (Winter 2004), 49.

17. Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to US Army Operations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, undated), p. 10.

18. Ibid., 18.

19. The Brookings Institute, "Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq," 21 November 2005, http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex, p. 15. This collection of statistics is taken entirely from open sources; some of the figures appear to be more reliable than others.

20. Ibid., 28.

21. Montgomery McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship," *Military Review* (March/April 2005), 27. This approach was adopted by the UK with regard to the IRA.

Storming the Ivory Tower: The Military's Return to American Campuses

MARC LINDEMANN

"The process of obtaining high human capital for fighting units, like readiness for battle itself, cannot be instituted at the last minute."
— General Max Thurman, October 1981[1]

A recent Supreme Court decision, *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.* (FAIR), has once again opened university campuses to military recruiters. No longer can the nation's most selective schools accept federal Education or Health and Human Services Department dollars while restricting military recruitment on their grounds. As we go forward, it is important to understand the evolution of these universities' antipathies toward the military and to craft a reasoned recruiting response targeting students from schools that have previously shut their doors to the military.

After more than 50 years of cooperation between the US military and universities, antiwar protests culminated in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps' (ROTC) exile from many campuses in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Two decades later, not content with the mere absence of ROTC, some prominent institutions, such as Harvard and Yale, went so far as to erect barriers to military recruiting on campus, claiming that US Defense Department regulations were incompatible with the schools' own non-discrimination policies. In the mid-1990s, Congress attempted to bring the military back to these campuses through federal legislation, but several of the schools and their faculties petitioned the courts to overturn these laws.

The *Rumsfeld v. FAIR*[2] decision is a signal victory in the ongoing effort to return the military to the country's most selective universities. Granted, during the past four decades, many schools never severed their ties with the military. Recruiters have continued to play valuable roles in job fairs and career counseling, successfully ushering thousands of students into uniform. For example, today 272 campuses host Army ROTC programs; Army ROTC generates more officers than the US Military Academy, Officer Candidate School, and direct commissions combined. One might be tempted to say that the military has gotten along quite well despite the hurdles to recruiting and lack of ROTC programs on most Ivy League campuses; why try to fix what's not broken? This article does not intend to denigrate the quality of existing campus outreach efforts but rather to address the reintroduction of the military to schools that have been hostile to the military since the Vietnam War. There is a largely untapped pool of talented young men and women at universities such as Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and Columbia. Our armed services would be remiss if they did not take appropriate steps to bring the military to these individuals with an eye toward bringing these individuals into the military.

This article provides a brief exposition of *Rumsfeld v. FAIR* then examines the origins of one school's antipathy toward the military as a representative case amongst the country's premier academic institutions. The article finally turns to a discussion of strategies by which to reinstate the military on these campuses in the wake of *Rumsfeld v. FAIR*.

Rumsfeld v. FAIR and the Solomon Amendment

On 6 March 2006, the US Supreme Court ruled in *Rumsfeld v. FAIR* that universities accepting certain federal funds must allow military recruiters the same access that other prospective employers enjoy on campus. Prior to this decision, many of the country's top academic institutions had restricted military recruiting, claiming that the military's so-called "don't ask, don't tell" approach toward homosexuals violated the universities' own non-discrimination policies. In 1994, Congress responded in its annual defense appropriation bill by adopting what is now commonly known as the Solomon Amendment. The Amendment tied millions of dollars in federal funding to universities' willingness to allow military recruiters on campus.[3]

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For years, the Solomon Amendment languished in the law books. After 11 September 2001, however, the federal government expanded the scope of the Solomon Amendment and stepped up its enforcement, triggering a backlash in the halls of academia. Moreover, in 2002 Defense Department officials interpreted the Solomon Amendment to require the cancellation of federal funding to an entire university if even one of its sub-divisions restricted military recruiting. For example, the Yale School of Medicine, which relies heavily upon federal dollars, would have been crippled by Yale Law School's hostile position toward recruiters. In addition, instead of merely requiring universities to allow recruiters on campus, Congress instructed universities to accommodate recruiters "in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer."[4] At the time, career counselors at the country's most selective schools worked hand-in-hand with prospective private-sector employers but pointedly prohibited military recruiters from participating in the schools' formal interview systems.

Considering the Solomon Amendment a violation of their own First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, an anonymous consortium of 31 law schools and professors banded together to form the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. and challenged the Solomon Amendment's constitutionality. Several universities announced that they were temporarily suspending their non-discrimination policies until there was a legal resolution to the constitutionality dispute. In the meantime, these schools, under protest, permitted military recruiters to participate in their interview programs and job fairs.

The controversy came to a head in the case of *Rumsfeld v. FAIR*. In 2003, FAIR filed suit against the federal government, seeking to prevent enforcement of the Solomon Amendment. After contradictory decisions in lower courts, the US Supreme Court agreed to hear the arguments of FAIR and the Department of Defense. Reasoning that Congress could legitimately require universities to provide military recruiters with equal access, even without tying the issue to the receipt of federal funds, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously, 8-0, against FAIR.[5] Campus gates once again swung open to the military.

A Case Study: Yale University

One of the great ironies of the Solomon Amendment battle is that among the most bitter foes of the armed services' presence on campus were those institutions with the longest traditions of military service. Yale University is such a school.

At Yale today, there are about 5,200 undergraduates and 6,000 graduate students. The college remains one of the most selective undergraduate programs in the nation, offering admission to only 8.6 percent of the more than 21,000 applicants for the Class of 2010. A walk across the campus in New Haven, Con-

necticut reveals monumental war memorials of granite and white marble, celebrating the ultimate sacrifice of past graduates. Neat rows of carved names attest to passersby of the school's past commitment to military service: 227 graduates killed in World War I; 514 in World War II. Indeed, one of the iconic images of Yale is a statue of Army Captain Nathan Hale, Class of 1773, facing execution during the Revolutionary War and regretting that he had but one life to give for his country.

University as Military Camp

Yale's tradition of military service remained strong through the first half of the 20th century. Even before the United States entered World War I, Yale had established a military training program for its students. In 1915, when the university called for the formation of a field artillery unit as part of the Connecticut National Guard, more than 1,000 Yale students and graduates volunteered. Turning half of the prospective artillerymen away, the school sponsored four National Guard batteries.[6] A year later, a generous alumnus funded the building of the Yale Armory, which first functioned as a US Cavalry training center. Congress created ROTC in the National Defense Act of 1916, and Yale President Arthur Hadley folded the university's program into the larger national effort. Yale faculty members voted 38-0 to award academic credit for ROTC training.[7]

On 27 March 1917, ten days before the United States officially entered World War I, the Yale administration's senior officers announced that for any junior who enlisted in the military "due credit towards a degree will be given him for satisfactory work in the Army or Navy."[8] In total, more than 9,000 Yale students and graduates served in the military during the war. And, as already noted, 227 Yale students lost their lives in the conflict. The administration acknowledged the sacrifice of these men and celebrated the role of the university in supplying such individuals to the war effort.[9]

After World War I, ROTC maintained its position on Yale's campus and spread rapidly across the country. There were 135 campuses that featured ROTC units in 1919; the program counted 220 colleges and universities by 1940.[10] In the National Defense Act of 1920, Congress provided more uniforms, equipment, and instructors for ROTC, and cadets began to receive a subsistence allowance for haircuts and uniform maintenance, as well as a stipend during the six-week summer program between junior and senior years. During the inter-war period, ROTC involved four years of military science instruction, including a basic course of three hours per week during a student's first two years and an advanced course of five hours per week during his final two undergraduate years. Each school could determine the number of credit hours awarded for the military science courses. Some Yale professors, however, harbored reservations about the intellectual value of the courses that com-

prised the ROTC curriculum; furthermore, professors took issue with the quality of the instructors that the military assigned to the school.

The clouds of international conflict stifled faculty objections to ROTC's content and instructors. As Nazi Germany swept through Poland and France, Yale President Charles Seymour prepared the school for war, believing that "the justification of a university is to be found in the service which it gives to the nation."[11] After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941, hundreds of Yale students rushed to military recruiting stations and Seymour announced that the university would operate year round, granting undergraduate degrees in three years in an effort to provide graduates to the military as quickly as possible.[12] Enrollment soared and, as Yale professor Paul Kennedy has observed, Yale became a crowded "military camp" for the second time in its history.[13] By the conflict's completion, 18,678 Yale alumni had served in the military and 514 of these men had died in uniform.

With the conclusion of World War II, the armed services attempted to keep ROTC viable while the country's campuses demilitarized. A total of 129 schools claimed Army ROTC units in September 1945.[14] As the Cold War set in, professors and administrators at the country's most prestigious universities still trumpeted the importance of retaining a military presence on their campuses.[15] The Korean War brought with it a powerful incentive to join Yale and other schools' ROTC programs; by the terms of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, a student who enrolled in ROTC gained a deferment from the draft.[16]

When the Korean War ended, student interest in ROTC began to flag. Furthermore, university faculty members again began to express doubts about the inclusion of ROTC in a liberal education. In 1960 the Army attempted to silence academic critics of ROTC by unveiling the Modified General Military Science Program, which permitted students to use college courses in fields such as psychology, political science, and communications to fulfill certain ROTC curriculum requirements. Then, to boost officer production, Congress passed the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, which featured 5,500 scholarships, a raise in the monthly subsistence allowance from approximately $27 to $50, and an abbreviated, two-year curriculum option.[17] The expansion of the draft in 1964 added further incentive for students to enter the military on their own terms by earning commissions through ROTC; other students participated in ROTC with an eye toward avoiding military service entirely.[18]

The Banishment of ROTC

As the Vietnam War progressed, campus sentiment at many schools began to turn against the military. The Viet Cong's Tet Offensive in January 1968 touched off a succession of student and faculty rallies against United States in-

volvement in Vietnam. Antiwar sentiment at universities crystallized around opposition to the most visible sign of the military on campus: ROTC. Protests, violence, and vandalism erupted across the Ivy League. On 9 April 1969, Harvard students occupied their school's chief administration building, University Hall, in protest of the Vietnam War. Antiwar faculty members at Yale set their sights on the school's ROTC program, resurrecting the old arguments that "[s]ince 1917 ROTC . . . had been an academic anomaly, providing credit toward the Yale degree with courses of slight intellectual weight taught by officers with courtesy faculty rank but slight teaching experience."[19] These professors contended that ROTC instruction was a vocational intrusion, rather than a legitimate part of a liberal education, and thus was not fit for Yale's campus.

Two weeks after the student occupation of Harvard's University Hall, the Yale faculty asked Yale President Kingman Brewster to call an open meeting of the school community to discuss the military's presence on campus. Brewster obligingly held such a meeting at the Yale's Ingalls Hockey Rink on 1 May 1969. Nearly 4,000 people attended the meeting, including the majority of the university's trustees. The question of whether the university should sever all connections with ROTC resulted in a tie: 1286 to 1286.[20] The next day the faculty voted to end credit for ROTC courses and faculty status for officers and, as Yale had provided office and training space to ROTC without charge, to shift the full cost of the program to the government. On 3 May, the university's trustees endorsed the faculty's decision.[21] After a few months of desultory discussions between the university and the Army and Air Force, ROTC abandoned Yale's campus. Across the country, ROTC units weakened and vanished.[22] Harvard's Army ROTC unit left campus the following year, and that school's Air Force and Navy ROTC units commissioned their last officers in 1971.[23]

As the Vietnam War drew to a close, many universities simply refused to renew ROTC contracts with the Department of Defense; the DOD removed other units. ROTC was reeling: "ROTC enrollment plummeted by 75 percent (from 165,430 to 41,294) between school years 1967-68 and 1972-73."[24] In response, Congress struggled to make ROTC more attractive with financial incentives.[25] It took the military nearly a decade to retrench, however, and only did so by offering additional training options and more scholarships to prospective cadets.[26] Between 1978 and 1983, the number of Army ROTC units increased by 40 percent (from 297 to 416).[27]

Yet ROTC continued its exile from the country's most selective schools. Any Yale, Columbia, or Harvard students who wanted to participate in ROTC had to go off campus and affiliate with other schools' programs. Yale students had to travel to other Connecticut schools; Columbia students had to commute to Fordham University; and Harvard students had to go to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In leaving campus for ROTC instruc-

tion several days each week, students forfeited the ability to take many courses at their primary institutions. The handful of Yale students who did participate in ROTC could earn scholarship money but not college credits through the program.

In the 1990s, another wave of anti-military sentiment swept college campuses, this time coalescing around the military's policy toward homosexuals.[28] The Clinton Administration's "don't ask, don't tell" compromise in 1993 permitted gays and lesbians to serve in the military as long as they did not openly discuss their sexual orientations. The "don't ask, don't tell" policy did little to blunt the anti-military sentiment at the country's most selective universities, however. Campus protests continued and the schools themselves, citing their own non-discrimination policies, restricted recruiters' access to students. In response to these restrictions, Congress passed the Solomon Amendment in 1994, but, as noted previously, the legislation lacked teeth.

The Doors Open

It took the tragedy of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 to galvanize the federal government into making good on the threats implicit in the Solomon Amendment. Furthermore, campus opinion shifted dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on American soil, as professors and students alike reevaluated their schools' attitude toward national service. Yale's daily newspaper called for the outright reinstitution of ROTC at Yale.[29] A new Harvard president, Lawrence Summers, earned national attention for praising students' military service.[30] Alumni from the country's most selective schools formed the group "Advocates for ROTC" to press for the program's reinstatement at their alma maters.[31]

In 2002, the Department of Defense stepped up its enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, notifying premier academic institutions that the federal government would withhold funds if the universities persisted in restricting military recruiting. At the time, Yale received about $350 million in federal funds annually. In the face of the Solomon Amendment's impending enforcement, universities like Harvard and Yale tentatively opened their doors to the military, fearful of losing significant sources of funding. For example, Yale Law School finally allowed the military access to its Career Development Office. Military recruiters could participate in career fairs and on-campus interviews, though they faced protests from campus gay and lesbian groups still upset with the "don't ask, don't tell" policy.

Disgruntled faculty members also fought back.[32] Citing, among other things, Harvard President Summers' favorable comments about ROTC. Harvard's faculty members passed a "no confidence" vote on Summers' presidency;

he resigned soon after. Likewise, in a Columbia University Senate vote, President Lee Bollinger voted with the majority to oppose the restoration of ROTC on campus. In contrast, Yale President Richard Levin straddled the issue: "I believe that would be a concern of many individuals in our community if ROTC were to be restored, but there may be numbers of our students who would very much like to participate in ROTC. . . . It's a difficult question of values."[33] *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights* filed suit against the Department of Defense in 2003, and 44 Yale Law professors filed an *amicus curiae* (friend of the court) brief in support of FAIR's position. In addition, law professor Robert Burt led a group of 45 Yale Law faculty members in separate litigation against the military in federal district court in Connecticut.

As their professors mobilized against the Solomon Amendment, students across the Ivy League demonstrated mixed reactions to the idea of ROTC's return. For example, in a 2003 referendum, Columbia University undergraduates voted 973–530 in favor of ROTC's return. Vocal gay and lesbian rights protestors, however, challenged the military recruiters at every turn. With their professors' increased focus on the Solomon Amendment, some student groups took a step back from advocating the return of ROTC.[34]

The Situation Today

Of the more than 11,000 students who now attend Yale, only five—two Army cadets and three Air Force cadets—participated in ROTC programs last year.[35] Yale's Air Force cadets commute about 70 miles to the University of Connecticut in Storrs every Thursday, whereas Yale's Army cadets commute about 23 miles to Sacred Heart University in Fairfield, Connecticut three times each week. Despite faculty members' protests against university support for ROTC, Yale supplies transportation to help cadets attend their weekly classes at other Connecticut campuses. Those students who do seek out ROTC continue to pay significant academic consequences. Like their counterparts at Harvard and Columbia, Yale students still receive no academic credit for ROTC courses. Scheduling conflicts incurred by the need to commute to distant campuses exact their own costs, preventing students from participating fully in certain classes, sports, and other extracurricular activities.[36]

Despite the protests and law suits, the military's presence at Yale has slowly been growing. These days, military recruiting posters are splashed across campus bulletin boards, and recruiters preside over stations at career fairs. Undergraduates founded the Yale Student Military Organization in 2002, and in January 2005, the Yale College Republicans initiated a "Bring Back ROTC" drive.[37] Later in 2005, a Yale junior founded the Semper Fi Society, whose members—among other things—man a table in the middle of

campus and encourage other students to enroll in the Marine Corps' summer Platoon Leaders Class.[38] In light of these and similar efforts, last year the *New York Times* observed that the campus climate at highly selective universities has become increasingly favorable toward the military.[39]

Prior to the US Supreme Court's *Rumsfeld v. FAIR* decision, a district court injunction was issued against the Solomon Amendment's application to Yale Law School. Despite the higher court's contradictory ruling, the law school is still invoking the injunction, which is currently under review by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While the appeal is pending, the school continues to deny military recruiters full access to its formal interview program. Recruiters are; however, welcome to meet with students on school grounds.[40]

Going Forward

The combination of campuses' changing attitudes to the military and Supreme Court-mandated access for recruiters presents a historic opportunity for the armed services. The military is now poised to avail itself of a group of talented young men and women from which it has largely been cut off for the past three decades. There are three approaches that the military could use to take full advantage of the current state of the American educational establishment.

First, the military could concentrate upon cultivating the study of specific disciplines that dovetail with national security concerns. As the US defense community's interest in certain areas of the world intensifies, the country can look to institutions of higher learning to provide potential service members with expertise in relevant fields. In fact, the military can even stimulate the supply of these specialists. It is not unusual for the military to recognize and reward the study of particular academic disciplines as a means of bringing experts in these areas into uniform. The military already has several programs that target individuals with useful academic skill sets. In order to attract soldiers with medical backgrounds, the Army provides the Health Professions Scholarship Program. Likewise, by offering direct commissions to attorneys, the Army swells the numbers of its law officers. The list of useful academic disciplines is not just limited to medicine and the law.

Geopolitical realities suggest other areas of expertise that would be useful to today's military. Given our current and possible future activities in the Middle East, for example, relevant regional language and culture experts would be a welcome addition to the force. The existence of more service members who speak Arabic would both foster more goodwill to Coalition Forces in Iraq as well as give troops a tactical advantage on the ground. The Army already supplies cultural awareness classes to soldiers before they deploy; while basic Arabic commands and greetings often prove useful in Iraq, there is still a heavy reliance upon interpreters for more complex communications with local

nationals. The Army has taken steps to increase soldiers' fluency and now offers free Rosetta Stone lessons in Arabic and other languages. Furthermore, the military has a history of providing financial incentives for soldiers who maintain proficiency in critical languages.[41] The current military's high operations tempo, however, makes its service members' learning environments less than ideal. It would be far more effective to produce language and regional experts in university classrooms, without recourse to the Defense Language Institute or other military programs.

By fostering the study of key languages and cultures at American universities, the military can improve the quality of its recruits. In many cases, potential service members would be able to avail themselves of preexisting language resources at their respective universities. Depending on the need, the military could even go so far as to increase the universities' capacity for instruction by sponsoring relevant professorships at certain schools. Given the Army's sponsorship of NASCAR drivers, the funding of university chairs in Middle Eastern Studies is not too farfetched. The federal government promoted domestic science education during the Cold War in response to perceived Soviet advances. Likewise, the military can strive to increase the number of college students who are proficient in much-needed skills and, through well-targeted recruiting, facilitate these students' transition into uniform.

Second, as the military is helping to mold the student body's programs of study, the defense community can focus on increasing the points of intersection between itself and students. Many young people at schools such as Harvard and Yale have had little if any exposure to the possibility of military service. Without knowing individuals in their peer group who have enlisted or are contemplating enlisting, these students face significant barriers to understanding the military lifestyle. Recruiters can continue to identify and work with student groups, such as the Yale Student Military Organization and the Semper Fi Society, whose members might be especially inclined to represent the military's interests on campus and, eventually, enlist. Moreover, the armed services can position representatives at every career fair and in every round of on-campus interviews. The military should not leave the possibility of enlisting to students' imaginations.

Given the relative scarcity of recent veterans from universities such as Yale and Harvard, it is necessary to provide role models to whom students can relate. The military could continue to work with like-minded student organizations to bring charismatic service members to speak on campus. Granted, students at the country's most selective universities often have lucrative job prospects in the private sector, and the privations of military life initially may be daunting. In order to demonstrate that military service and financial well-being are not mutually exclusive, recruiters could introduce students to veterans who,

after honorably fulfilling their military commitments, have succeeded in business, medicine, law, or politics. Alumni groups, such as "Advocates for ROTC," are already poised to provide such representatives.

Third, the military should reassess the availability and existence of ROTC programs at the schools in question. An on-campus ROTC program is an important symbol of legitimacy for the military, as well as a portal to its ranks. In reestablishing ROTC programs at highly selective schools, the military should take a long-term view: the possibility of low initial participation rates would be offset by the quality of the cadets and the creation of a foothold on these campuses.[42] Furthermore, as has been the case at Harvard, interested alumni may be more than willing to fund ROTC programs out of their own pockets. Today, as in years past, keeping the military a competitive career choice requires flexibility.[43]

In waging a campaign to restore the awarding of academic credit for ROTC classes, the military should be prepared to face the same attacks that proved fatal to the program in the late 1960s. Even today, Yale and Harvard professors with reputations for the most advanced scholarship could claim that standard ROTC courses, taught by military officers, do not deserve the same credit as courses taught by the school's more traditional instructors. To answer this criticism, the military could certify existing faculty members to teach certain ROTC courses; less preferably, and with a nod to the Military Science Core Curriculum of 1970, the military could recognize more existing classes as applicable toward ROTC.[44] In pursuing the first option, the armed services could reach out to educators who might be willing to add sufficient scholarship components to standard ROTC courses so as to qualify them for credit at otherwise exacting academic institutions.[45]

In any case, the vocational-content arguments that carried the day in 1969 bear less weight now. The academic landscape has undergone a sea change. Increasingly, undergraduates can take courses for credit at professional schools within the university. For example, students can now participate in Yale's Teacher's Certification program for academic credit. Furthermore, a student can earn undergraduate credit for completing up to four courses in Yale University's M.B.A. program. It would be difficult to argue that troop-leading procedures are less intellectually challenging than double-entry bookkeeping. The idea that ROTC classes are too vocational has become attenuated as the liberal arts education has itself become liberalized. Indeed, as Yale President Arthur Twining Hadley had anticipated in the early 1900s, "the content of a liberal education [is] now so uncertain that the [inclusion of military instruction] would make no difference."[46]

The question of awarding academic credit will still largely fall within the province of university faculty members, some of whom are secure in their tenure and continue to exhibit great antipathy toward the military.[47] Although the

accreditation of ROTC courses would go a long way toward dispelling the current disadvantages of participation in the program, ROTC could, in the alternative, exist on selective university campuses as an extracurricular organization. Cadets, like those few at Yale today, already commit much of their time to traveling off campus to participate in ROTC. Academic credit or no, an on-campus program's proximity to students would constitute a significant attraction. In the short-term, the military could treat extracurricular ROTC as a halfway house for the eventual reestablishment of full accreditation. Princeton University, whose faculty also voted to end the awarding of academic credit for ROTC in 1969, still boasts an on-campus, albeit extracurricular, ROTC program.

Without ROTC on campus, students who are considering becoming military officers may look to attending Officer Candidate School after graduation. With private universities often costing more than $30,000 a year, however, college graduates can easily leave school with six-figure debt. While enlisting offers the possibility of student loan repayment, Officer Candidates do not qualify for this benefit, discouraging some otherwise qualified individuals from pursuing military careers in general and the officer track in specific. In the absence of ROTC programs on campus, increased eligibility for student loan repayment would attract prospective officers from the country's most selective schools.

Conclusion

In recent years, the military has been able to expand its presence at the country's most selective universities. Moreover, student attitudes toward the military have vastly improved since the Vietnam era. The Supreme Court's *Rumsfeld v. FAIR* decision has removed remaining restrictions on recruiting and has opened the door to the possibility of reinstating ROTC on American campuses. In consideration of these changed circumstances, the military should press to take full advantage of the high human capital available at these institutions.

NOTES

1. USAREC Manual No. 3-0, April 2005, 1-1.

2. 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).

3. The federal funding sources now covered by the Solomon Amendment are as follows: Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy. 10 U. S. C. A. §983(d)(1) (Supp. 2005). The Amendment was named for its original sponsor, Representative Gerald Solomon.

4. 10 U. S. C. A. 983(b) (Supp. 2005).

5. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. did not participate in the deliberations because he was not a Supreme Court Justice at the time of the parties' oral arguments.

6. Brooks Mather Kelley, *Yale: A History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1974), p. 348; George Henry Nettleton, *Yale in the World War: Part One* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1925), p. 365.

7. Kelley, p. 350. A total of 24 abstentions, however, suggested the outline of the opposition that would develop in later years.

8. Nettleton, "Memorandum on the Attitude of the University in the Present Crisis," 27 March 1917, p. 368.

9. Gaddis Smith, "Yale and the Vietnam War," draft paper, University Seminar on the History of Columbia University, 19 October 1999, http://beatl.barnard.columbia.edu/cuhistory/yale.htm. Yale President Arthur Twining Hadley commented in 1919 that "the men of Yale who had died in the Great War were the fortunate ones, for they had fulfilled the ultimate purpose of the University in service to the nation."

10. Arthur T. Coumbe and Lee S. Harford, *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History* (Fort Monroe, Va.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 14.

11. Kelley, p. 396.

12. Ibid., p. 397.

13. Jeremy Kutner, "Panel Urges Ties Between Yale, Military," *Yale Daily News*, 10 April 2003, http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=22506.

14. Coumbe and Harford, p. 20.

15. Michael Neiberg, *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), p. 36. Former Harvard President Nathan Pusey recalled that in the 1950s, ROTC units "were sought often by many institutions, and where awarded, were welcomed by administrators and students alike." Ibid., p. 44. And as late as 1960, Harvard College Dean John Monro wrote that "[t]he powerful reason why the ROTC should stay in the colleges is that our national defense requires it. . . . [N]o responsible college administrator of my acquaintance argues that we should deprive the armed services of their most-favored recruiting position on our campuses."

16. Likewise, university officials petitioned for more ROTC units, fearful that non-participating students would be conscripted and student bodies would dwindle.

17. Coumbe and Harford, p. 26. Under the new curriculum option, students who had not participated in ROTC during their first two years of college could catch up to their peers by attending a six-week basic camp during the summer before their junior year

18. Neiberg, p. 118. In a February 1969 report to alumni, Yale President Kingman Brewster remarked that these student draft exemptions had resulted in "sourness" toward both the military and universities.

19. Gaddis Smith, "Time and Change – Yale 1952 – The 50th Reunion," quoted in Joseph Callo, "ROTC and Yale: Which is the Four-Letter Word?" *The Yale Free Press*, December 2005, http://www.yalerotc.org/YFPCallo.html.

20. Jennifer Wang, "Student Activism Resurfaces at Yale," *Yale Daily News*, 26 April 2000, http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=12259.

21. Coumbe and Harford, p. 34. A month after Yale's trustees ended the awarding of academic credit for ROTC, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird appointed George C. S. Benson, former president of the Claremont Colleges, to chair a committee whose purpose was to review ROTC and suggest ways in which to redesign the program. Even before the publication of the Benson Committee report, the Army introduced the Military Science Core Curriculum, also known as Option C. Option C integrated military instruction into regular academic departments and relegated the more vocational areas of training—those arguably unworthy of academic credit—to summer sessions. This compromise came too late, however, to satisfy ROTC's critics at Yale.

22. Neiberg, p. 116. ROTC enrollments fell from 218,466 in October 1968 to 161,507 a year later.

23. "Yesterday's News," *Harvard Magazine*, July-August 2006. By 1973 the *Harvard Crimson* had analyzed the military's presence throughout the Ivy League and concluded that "the ROTC program is . . . dead and buried at Harvard, Yale, Brown, Columbia and Dartmouth." The newspaper also commented that "ROTC is so far gone at Yale that even the administrators no longer remember clearly when it began, when it ended or who was in charge of it." "A Survey of ROTC's Status in the Ivies," *Harvard Crimson*, 28 September 1973, http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=118807. The Harvard faculty even forbid students from participating in ROTC, a ban which the school only lifted in 1976.

24. Coumbe and Harford, p. 36.

25. In 1971, Congress raised cadet subsistence allowance from $50 to $100 per month in and increased scholarship authorizations from 5,500 to 6,500.

26. Training options included Air Assault and Northern Warfare Courses (1979), Flight Orientation/Training (1982), and the Russian Language Course (1983). In 1980 Congress increased the number of available ROTC scholarships to 12,000.

27. Coumbe and Harford, p. 41.

28. "Military's Ban on Gays Protested Nationwide," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 17 April 1991, http://chronicle.com/che-data/articles.dir/articles-37.dir/issue-31.dir/31a00202.htm. In 1991, more than 100 schools nationwide held protests against the military's ban on homosexual service members.

29. "University Should Reinstate ROTC," *Yale Daily News*, 3 December 2001, http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=17416. Its editorial concluded: "a new generation of Yalies should tirelessly push the University to reinstitute the program and provide the opportunity for men and women to serve their country and obtain a world-class education in the process."

30. William M. Rasmussen, "Summers Expresses Pride in ROTC," *Harvard Crimson*, 9 October 2001, http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=121544. In October 2001, Summers commented: "We need to be careful about adopting any policy on campus of non-support for those involved in defending the country. . . . Every Harvard student should be proud that we have in our midst students who make the commitment to ROTC."

31. Yale and Harvard each have established chapters of the organization. Harvard alumni activists gathered hundreds of signatures, including that of former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in an attempt to bring ROTC back to campus. Yale alumni followed suit, gaining the support of such alumni as New York Governor George Pataki. At its 65th reunion, Yale's Class of 1937 even called for the restoration of ROTC to the campus.

32. "A Nation at War: Campuses; With Current War, Professors Protest, As Students Debate," *New York Times*, 5 April 2003, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60A13FF3E5C0C768CDDAD0894DB404482. As *New York Times* correspondent Kate Zernike noticed, the military's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq was "disclosing role reversals, between professors shaped by Vietnam protests and a more conservative student body traumatized by the attacks of September 11, 2001."

33. Jessica Marsden, "Return of ROTC Is Debated," *Yale Daily News*, 21 January 2005, http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=27897. Other Yale faculty members, such as law professor Peter Schuck, publicly asked themselves: "Should universities like Yale, where I teach, place extra obstacles to military recruitment on campus? In shielding students from military recruiters, universities disserve both their students and the military whose policies they hope to liberalize." "Fighting on the Wrong Front," *New York Times*, 9 December 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/09/opinion/09schuck.html?ex=1291784400&en=7e4bed1c235280c9&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss.

34. "Bring In ROTC as Soon as 'Don't Ask' Is Out," *Yale Daily News*, 28 January 2005, http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=28076. The *Yale Daily News*, which only three years prior had come out as a staunch supporter of the reinstatement of ROTC on campus, now editorialized that ROTC should return when the military abandoned its "don't ask, don't tell" policy.

35. Interview with Yale ROTC Advisor, Commander Jerry Hall, US Navy Retired, 25 July 2006. Undergraduate participation has remained relatively constant for the past three years: 2004-2005, two Army cadets, three Air Force cadets; 2003-2004, three Army cadets, three Air Force cadets. By contrast, Princeton's on-campus Army ROTC program generated eight commissions in 2006 alone.

36. Caroline Massad, "In Small ROTC Corps, Focus and Discipline," *Yale Daily News*, 3 March 2003, http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=22082. ROTC conflicts with Tuesday-Thursday and Monday-Wednesday-Friday lecture schedules, the two most common at Yale.

37. Maureen Miller, "The Next Battle: ROTC at Yale," *The Yale Herald*, 21 January 2005, http://www.yaleherald.com/article.php?Article=3919.

38. Jessica Becker, "Marines Bring Message to Campus," *Yale Daily News*, 23 February 2006, http://www.yaledailynews.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=31986. The student aspect of the Semper Fi Society's founding quieted administration misgivings about hosting the military on campus. "The table in the Cross Campus is not set up by the military – it's set up by an organization," Yale Dean of Student Affairs Betty Trachtenberg said. "Every organization has the right to set up their wares, so to speak, on Cross Campus."

39. Nicholas Confessore, "Offering ROTC a Truce: Uniforms Losing Stigma on Elite Campuses," *New York Times*, 1 May 2005.

40.Harold Koh, "A Message From Dean Harold Hongju Koh: Fair Forum at Yale Law School," 3 October 2006, http://www.law.yale.edu/news/3568.htm.

41. A soldier can now earn up to $1,000 per month for maintaining proficiency in such languages as Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Korean, and Pashtu.

42. Marsden, http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID=27897. As Lieutenant Colonel Brian Baker, the commander of the Army ROTC battalion at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, commented, "There is a renewed focus on bringing in a higher-caliber officer. . . . So it's conceivable that if you go to the schools with the best and brightest in the country, you might do that."

43. Coumbe and Harford, p. 13. Even in 1915, the General Staff acknowledged that imposing a "uniform program of military instruction on the nation's highly diversified system of higher education . . . would be difficult in the extreme."

44. Summer and weekend training could provide the necessary military indoctrination outside of the classroom.

45. To this end, the military could begin by making overtures to professors, such as Yale law professor Peter Schuck and history professor Donald Kagan, who have already gone on the record about the positive benefits of the reintroduction of ROTC to campus.

46. Kelley, p. 348. "President's Report, 1915," pp. 13-16.

47. "Alumni Seek ROTC's Return," *Yale Alumni Magazine*, April 2002, http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/02_04/l_v.html#2. Current Yale President Richard Levin has declined to take a stand on the issue of credit for ROTC courses, deferring to the Yale faculty.

Special Operations Forces a Strategic Resource: Public and Private Divides

CHRISTOPHER SPEARIN

Since the late 1980s, and especially since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, two phenomena, both known for their pragmatic and controversial nature, have come together to pose challenges for US policymakers. The first phenomenon is the rise in importance of special operations forces (SOF). This is evident in the 1987 creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) later followed by the Bush Administration's 2004 decision, through the Unified Command Plan, to assign USSOCOM the primary responsibility for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. In light of the need for anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency expertise and the asymmetric nature of many current threats, SOF have been described as a "logical military response," one that, for General Peter Schoomaker, provides "an array of expanded options, strategic economy of force, [and] 'tailor to task' capabilities."[1]

Despite the logicality, however, such an approach threatens to exacerbate divides, real and perceived, between the conventional and unconventional military communities. In addition to aggravating concerns related to shares of limited resources, the skimming of individuals with high leadership potential, and differing opinions regarding how military organizations should look and act, there is the possibility of antagonism as SOF are often presented as a panacea or a "silver bullet."[2] In the United States and other Western countries, these concerns regarding the utility and implications of SOF vis-à-vis their conventional brethren have existed since the creation of special units in World War II; it is not surprising that they continue today.

The second, and perhaps more surprising, phenomenon is the reshaping of the assumed state monopoly over the management and ownership of the means of violence. Several studies have examined the supply, demand, and ideational reasons, many linked to the end of the Cold War, which created the marketplace for the modern-day international private security company (PSC).[3] From one standpoint, PSCs represent an economic response in a globalized marketplace at a time when states may not be able or willing to respond promptly to crises due to political or organizational restraints. PSCs can provide, as force multipliers, support to state militaries committed to particular operations. From another standpoint, however, the rise of PSCs is highly controversial because of potential negative implications related to political authority, military command and control, and maintenance of the military ethos. Moreover, many PSC employees were previously members of state security sectors, thus revealing the movement of uniformed personnel to the private sector.

This article draws attention to the fact that as SOF in the United States and elsewhere strain to meet the expanding operational tempo and as the PSC presence increases internationally, the "fortunes" of both state militaries and PSCs are linked to what is becoming a zero-sum game for SOF's expertise. The article argues that to delink public and private actors from this game the US, as the main consumer of PSC services, must treat SOF expertise, whether in public or private hands, as a strategic resource. This is appropriate in order to lessen PSC's focus on SOF personnel and to not aggravate relations between the conventional and unconventional US military communities. To make this argument, the article first describes the decline in SOF personnel and the related proclivity of many PSCs to rely on former SOF operators. It then suggests the rationale for US activism on the basis of increasing SOF demands, the nature of current SOF retention efforts, and consideration of how former SOF personnel are employed in the private sector.

Implications of the Decline in SOF Personnel

Because exit surveys for departing SOF personnel do not determine conclusively the nature of post-military employment, there are no exact statistics

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as to the rate and number of SOF personnel transfers from the US military to PSC employment. Nevertheless, it is clear that two main variables encourage this transfer—remuneration and operational tempo. With respect to remuneration, the Government Accountability Office reported in July 2005 that monthly salaries ranged between $12,000 and $13,000 were likely for former SOF personnel in Iraq; some PSC employees were paid as much as $33,000 per month.[4] Though such amounts are well above that normally paid to those in uniform, Rebecca Ulam Weiner contends this higher private sector remuneration should not come as a surprise because "the true value of labor . . . has been artificially under compensated due to the nation's monopoly on military service."[5] Normatively, one can argue that such high payments are appealing to and accepted by former SOF personnel because charges of mercenarism in the most pejorative sense have not been forthcoming. Whereas such private activities were once taboo due to the rise of the citizen-army in the nineteenth century, the private presence is now increasingly welcomed and valued. For instance, the deaths of four Blackwater USA employees in Fallujah on 31 March 2004 served as one of the catalysts for large-scale US military operations against insurgents in the city the following month. Similarly, US government officials have publicly recognized the contributions and mourned the deaths of private sector personnel. As a result, official sanction, rather than abhorrence, of PSC activities implicitly underscores the apparent acceptability of the high salaries.

As for operational tempo, private employment offers some relief to SOF personnel. Over the course of the 1990s, the activities of US special operations forces gradually increased so that by 1997, approximately 4,760 personnel were deployed abroad every week, a threefold increase from 1991. With the advent of the Global War on Terrorism, USSOCOM personnel have become stretched even further. As an example, a US Navy sea-air-land team (SEAL) member currently spends six months abroad during an 18-month period rather than the previous standard of six out of every 24 months. In recent years, 100 percent of the US Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment and 90 percent of the Air Force Special Tactics Squadrons have been deployed to either Afghanistan or Iraq. In the Iraq case, some 9,000 to 10,000 US special operations forces personnel (including operators, administrators, and support staff) are deployed from a total contingent that is only 49,000 strong. In the face of this demand, one that obviously causes physical and mental strain and is disruptive to family life, PSC employment offers greater choice in assignments, a more flexible work schedule, and ample leave time.

Another complicating variable is that the maintenance of high standards for special operations forces personnel sometimes means that organizations are understaffed to avoid the dilution of expertise, a factor further exacerbated by the private manpower drain. Depending on the SOF tier under

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consideration, only 10 to 30 percent of recruits are successful in their attempts to join. As such, in 2001, US Army Special Forces were at 94 percent. Similarly, US Navy SEALS remained at 89 percent of required enlisted strength in 2005. In many cases, the positions left unfilled are those of operators with critical combat skills.[6] Likewise, quickly filling these billets with experienced personnel is not an option given estimates that it takes five to six years to train and educate a fully qualified SOF soldier.[7] To not respect the necessary growth time would undermine USSOCOM's enduring truths: "Humans are more important than hardware. Quality is better than quantity. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced. Competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur."[8]

In order to handle increasing responsibilities, the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* calls for a gradual expansion of SOF by 15 percent in FY2007. This expansion places particular emphasis on US Army Special Forces, US Navy SEALS, and personnel trained in civil affairs duties and psychological warfare. The challenge, however, is that more senior SOF personnel, those frequently tasked as trainers and mentors, are the individuals seeking earlier than expected release from service. While departure of individuals with only 20 years of service declined during 2002 and 2003, when stop loss policies were in place, the Government Accountability Office reported in 2005 that attrition returned to approximately 2001-levels upon relaxation of these policies. Given that markets for PSC services increased in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere during the stop loss years, and pressures on SOF personnel continue to mount, if not heightened, movement from government to the private sphere can be expected. Already, USSOCOM reports a possible undermining of its enduring truths: "[B]ecause the command is losing some of its most experienced personnel, younger less experienced servicemembers [sic] are being promoted to leadership positions more quickly than in the past."[9] The longer this drain continues the more difficult it becomes to manage and prevents USSOCOM from ensuring that the requisite quantity of skilled personnel are available for its increasing workload.

SOF and Private Actors

Special operations forces personnel have long been linked to private security companies, in some cases even before the end of the Cold War. For example, Sir David Stirling, one of the World War II founders of the British Special Air Service (SAS), formed Watchguard International in 1967, a private security company that Kevin O'Brien labels as "the model for all future" firms.[10] Watchguard International offered security analyses, military training, and personal protection services to government clients, mostly in former British colonies in the Middle East and Africa. In the 1980s, another former SAS member, David Walker, operated the PSCs Saladin Securities Limited and Keeny Meeny Services. The name Keeny Meeny came from the Swahili phrase *keeni meeni*, meaning deadly snake in long grass, and is regularly used by the SAS to describe covert, stealthy, and dangerous operations. Perhaps even more direct in its SOF linkages was Special Advisory Services, a British PSC that functioned in the 1970s under the "SAS" acronym.

Arguably the best-known PSC from the 1990s, Executive Outcomes (EO) based in South Africa, was comprised mainly of SOF personnel (EO closed in 1999). Though many different nationalities rounded out EO's ranks, the bulk of its expertise was South African. With few exceptions, EO's South African personnel came from Apartheid-era counterinsurgency special operations forces, many having extensive operational experience in Southern Africa. A number of these units had been disbanded by 1994: the 1-5 Reconnaissance Commandos (Reccies), the 44th Parachute Brigade (Parabats), the paramilitary unit Koevoet (Crowbar), and the 32d Buffalo Battalion, the most decorated South African combat unit since the end of the Second World War. Of the pool of 2,000 personnel EO claimed it could draw upon for its operations, 70 to 75 percent were from the Buffalo Battalion. The PSC's founder and chief executive officer until July 1997, Eeban Barlow, was the second-in-command of the Buffalo Battalion in the mid-1980s. Other members of EO's hierarchy, Lafras Luitingh and Nic Van den Bergh, had links to the Reccies and Parabats respectively.[11]

In more recent times, contemporary PSCs have advertised their capabilities by highlighting SOF expertise. A partial list of these PSCs includes the following firms, mostly based in the United States and United Kingdom: Aegis Specialist Risk Management, AKE Group, ArmorGroup, Blackwater USA, Britam Defence, Custer Battles, DME Risk Management, Erinys, Hart Security, ICP Group Limited, ISI Group, Meyer & Associates, Mi2International, Olive Group, Pilgrim Elite, Phoenix CP, RamOPS Risk Management Group, SOC-SMG, Triple Canopy, TOR International, Trojan Securities International, and Unity Resources Group LLC. The managers and employees of the US firms

boast expertise garnered from all three tiers of special operations forces, including the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta), Navy SEALS, Army Special Forces, and Army Rangers. Along these lines, Triple Canopy, one of the better known companies, suggests it has "more former Tier One special operations professionals than any organization other than the US military."[12] Similarly, PSCs also garner management and manpower from the SAS, the British Special Boat Service, and special operations forces from countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Overall, the PSC industry possesses a wealth of experience pertaining to counterterrorism, combat operations, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and military training.

One can readily identify three specific reasons for the correlation between SOF and PSCs. The first relates to recruitment and reflects an observation made by James Wood, a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, that PSCs manage by Rolodex.[13] Because the permanent staffs of many PSCs are quite small, they rely heavily on manpower databases consisting primarily of former military personnel from which they can draw manpower to fulfill contractual obligations. While there are a number of ways in which these databases are compiled, such as job fairs and advertising through the internet and print media, informal links and networks often suffice. These informal methods permeate the SOF community and are directly related to the SOF roots of many PSC founders and managers. The tight links that exist amongst SOF operators because of their common experience and training provides additional incentive for joining PSCs.

Second, while some countries, the United States included, have implemented general regulatory policies regarding licensing and contract approval for PSCs, regulation is currently lacking regarding the qualitative standards of PSC personnel. As a result, PSC reliance on SOF-expertise serves as a regulatory surrogate due to the rigorous training and assessment required of uniformed SOF. Indeed, the high recruitment standards for special operations forces are well known throughout the military and recruits that are successful receive additional training to enhance their language skills, cultural understandings, adaptability, and martial capabilities. Additionally, SOF possess great leadership abilities, a point long recognized by conventional forces. For instance, Field Marshal Viscount Slim accused SOF of "skimming the cream" from conventional forces; military historian Philip Warner contends that SOF volunteers "are the most enterprising, energetic, and least dispensable."[14] The issue of dispensability now confronts SOF as one US military official asks rhetorically: "We have always had very capable, experienced, well-trained soldiers. . . . Guess what industry likes?"[15]

The third reason, also linked to qualitative factors, is the intangible benefits that PSCs seemingly accrue through reliance upon an "elite." The se-

"While perhaps a helpful incentive for many SOF operators, the particular emphasis on increased remuneration for continued service cannot halt the transition of SOF personnel to PSCs . . ."

curity marketplace, like any other, is a social construction in which participants place value on certain phenomena for both pragmatic and emotive reasons. In this regard, Eliot Cohen identifies the characteristics leading to elite status: "First, a unit becomes elite when it is perpetually assigned special or unusual missions. . . . Secondly, elite units conduct missions which require only a few men who must meet high standards of training and physical toughness. . . . Thirdly, an elite unit becomes elite only when it achieves a reputation—justified or not—for bravura and success."[16] At present, SOF have obtained this elite status given USSOCOM's aforementioned rise in prominence, a prominence reinforced by the praise from public officials and the generally positive portrayal of SOF personnel in the popular news and entertainment media. For instance, Senator John Kerry, while campaigning in 2004 as the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, called for a doubling of US Army Special Forces. The marketability of elite status that results from such acts is an important factor that PSCs rely on for promotional purposes.

Measures Taken

To maintain the strength of its SOF operators, USSOCOM launched a study in December 2003 to determine how to lessen the loss of such highly skilled personnel. Key issues included educational incentives, bonuses, retirement benefits, and salaries. This process culminated in December 2004 with USSOCOM's announcement of a $168 million remuneration plan. For approximately 7,000 operators of mid-level rank or higher, the plan increased monthly pay by $375 and for senior-level grades the monthly increase was $750. A select number of senior operators—1,500 individuals mostly at the rank of sergeant, petty officer, and warrant officer with a minimum 19 years of service—were entitled to sliding scale bonuses. These ranged from $18,000 for agreeing to two more years of service to $150,000 for six years. This plan hoped to build on the initial investment of between $350,000 and $500,000 to train a SOF operator, an investment magnified through extensive operational experience.

While perhaps a helpful incentive for many SOF operators, the particular emphasis on increased remuneration for continued service cannot halt the transition of SOF personnel to PSCs and may even lead to difficulties within the US military. By way of explanation, assessments have found the incentive program's results to be "modest."[17] As outlined earlier, military pay and allowances will not match those in the private sector where annual salaries for experienced SOF operators may be in the six-figure range. As one former SOF operator explained, "[Y]ou can stay in the military if you are patriotic, but then your ideals are outweighing your pocketbook."[18] What is more, the intangibles of military service—patriotism and recognition by the state—may also now imbue private employment. Consider the words of US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher in response to the deaths of four Blackwater USA employees in Iraq in March 2005: "They played a vital role in our mission to bring democracy, and opportunity to the people of Iraq. We will always remember their courage, dedication, and ultimate sacrifice for their country in the name of freedom. We mourn the loss of these brave men and extend our deepest sympathies to their families."[19] In light of this praise, the line between sacrifice and service to country versus occupationalism, personal gain, and the sufficing of need becomes increasingly indistinct.[20]

Additionally, pressures emanating from the conventional elements of the US military make it difficult for SOF to receive further beneficial treatment. The December 2004 plan was, in fact, a scaled down version of a much more generous SOF package. This reduction was due mainly to charges of favoritism and concerns that conventional forces would want similar treatment.[21] In this regard, Representative Jim Saxton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's Unconventional Threats Panel, asserts that this was the most contentious issue in the debate regarding retention and bonuses: "The fear was we would cause a lot of angst with other enlisted personnel. . . . We were afraid they may have felt pushed aside because special forces were being treated differently. That was the biggest question in the entire process."[22]

These responses are in line with the resistance to institutional change that has long been a feature of SOF's development (in the United States and elsewhere): "Animosity towards special operations forces is engendered as much by the competition for scarce resources as it is by philosophical differences in what constitutes an acceptable approach to military operations."[23] Whereas the money is still not sufficient for the military to compete successfully for the retention of SOF expertise, it already appears to be too much in the eyes of the conventional forces. The thought being that it makes SOF even more "special," it overemphasizes SOF's contribution, and it implies that other military contributions are somehow less remarkable.

"Policymakers should assess the advantages and disadvantages of the public and private sectors in order to measure the degree to which US policy might best benefit from SOF's strategic utility."

SOF Expertise—A Strategic Resource

In circumstances in which conventional expertise is not appropriate because of inadequate skillsets, political restrictions, and financial limitations, there are several functions that directly contribute to SOF's strategic utility: the raising of public morale, the showcasing of military prowess in an effort to deter, the humiliation of the enemy, the reassuring of domestic and international audiences, the prevention of conflict escalation, and the maintenance of stability in strategically important areas.[24] With respect to PSCs, an alternative approach to the above would be to treat SOF not as individuals requiring incentives, but rather as a strategic resource. US policymakers must consider how this resource is best utilized and whether such a resource should be under government or private management. Put differently, policymakers should assess the advantages and disadvantages of the public and private sectors in order to measure the degree to which US policy might best benefit from SOF's strategic utility.

At present, the PSC presence provides flexibility to US policymakers along several lines. In the realm of global strategy, the effective implementation of a preventative war strategy, as detailed in the White House's *2002 National Security Strategy*, requires that the US leadership be able to rely on a pool of sufficient military manpower. This pool conducts both military operations and serves as a deterrent to rogue states and terrorist organizations. Should the US become engaged in an operation where its military manpower is overly committed, US credibility will suffer. PSCs, therefore, serve as an adjunct to US military presence by performing tasks that were once conducted by military members.

Regarding financial and political imperatives, substantially increasing the overall number of Americans in uniform is not currently a policy objective of the US government, and it is not just an attempt to avoid debates related to the reinstitution of the draft or some other form of national service. To quote former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "I am very reluctant to increase end strength. . . . Resources are always finite, and the question is, would we be better off increasing manpower or increasing capability and lethality?"[25] Sec-

retary Rumsfeld's concerns are borne out by Congressional Budget Office statistics that determine the annual price tag of a 100,000-member increase to cost approximately $10 billion. What is more, this amount covers only personnel costs such as housing, medical care, and family benefits—additional training and equipment are not included. These costs are considerable and reflect the longstanding military mantra that with a professional force, "you recruit a soldier, but you retain their families."[26] With the PSC option, though initial costs of employment might be more substantial than the public sector alternative, the long-term costs of a larger force structure do not have to be considered.

Yet, does fulfillment of these various priorities necessitate reliance upon the SOF resource specifically? At present, PSCs conduct a range of contracted tasks including security advising, security sector training, static security, convoy security, and close protection for a variety of clients—states, corporations, international organizations, and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. However, not all SOF skill sets are applicable for these tasks. One might argue that firms with experienced personnel garnered from different segments of the government security sector would more than meet the demand of many of these clients. In other words, given a particular criterion, conventional, rather than SOF, expertise may be more appropriate. What is more, it is important to recognize that while SOF expertise is sometimes interpreted as "generalist" because of its adaptable nature, within SOF community there are specific core missions and operators are trained to task: "The reality is that SOF units are organized, trained, and equipped to carry out one of the core missions, and although they have an ability to move away from their field of specialist capability, that ability is, in reality, limited."[27] In this light, some PSC tasks such as close protection, former SOF personnel may not have received the specific training to carrying out such missions. In other cases, a certain SOF capability may not be relevant. For instance, US Air Force combat controllers are being lured away from the US military by PSCs and were targeted in the aforementioned retention drive. This is despite the fact that their unique speciality of vectoring warplanes onto targets under hostile conditions is not one currently in demand by PSC clients.[28]

US policymakers need to overcome two barriers in order to treat SOF as a strategic resource. First, independent of the PSC challenge, is the fact that SOF have not been used to their full strategic potential. Analysis of recent operations has found a significant emphasis on SOF's more direct combat role.[29] This approach sees the application of highly trained operators in combat roles that might be of great use for propaganda purposes as previously indicated. This is in keeping with earlier studies that suggests the "American Way of War," as coined by Russell Weigley, has difficulty incorporating SOF forces because of the longstanding preference for decisive engagement and the overwhelming application

of force.[30] Not only does this approach neglect other indirect, advisory, and covert capabilities of SOF, it does not take advantage of SOF's strength vis-à-vis conventional forces. There is a need for US policymakers to be educated consumers of SOF—allowing them to appreciate the certain finesse of SOF, rather than solely their mystique—so that their strategic utility is maximized in applicable operations: "[T]hose missions where the penalty for failure is high and only specially selected, trained, and equipped men can succeed—where the national policy demands a tailored response rather than brute force."[31] In short, there is the need for policymakers to understand the complete spectrum of SOF capabilities so they can determine why and what resources should remain under government control.

Second, the savvy of policymakers as educated consumers of the SOF resource has direct implications for PSC contracting. Despite studies suggesting that power and authority are moving away from the state in an era of globalization, characterized by the growth of non-state actors and transnational markets, the particular role of the state in shaping and managing the PSC industry is still important.[32] Authors Norrin Ripsman and T. V. Paul contend, the powerful—states with ample resources and influence—are more likely to be impacted by, and have a greater ability to respond to, international shifts and developments differently: "It makes no sense to assume that transnational phenomena will affect the weak and the small, the strong and secure equally."[33]

Because the United States is such a large player in the PSC marketplace, in terms of being where most PSCs reside and for generating the greatest demand for their services, it is crucial in determining "the market's ecology" related to PSCs.[34] However, to date, the United States has not exercised its market power. It has largely accepted what the PSCs have had to offer—in particular the services provided by former SOF personnel—rather than taking an active role in questioning whether this is the best use of the SOF resources. It has not closely assessed, on a contract-per-contract basis, whether the SOF resource even need be employed to support various contingencies. Of much greater impact is the fact that the United States has not introduced consistent qualitative regulation for US-based PSC personnel or companies that would, appropriately, set the official parameters for professionalism, capability, and human rights observance. Consciously undertaking these steps, rather than allowing the PSC industry to determine what is offered, would permit US policymakers to exercise "the mechanism through which the preferred model of [PSC] professionalism is communicated."[35]

Conclusion

General Schoomaker, the US Army Chief of Staff, warns that while SOF may be the ideal strategic resource for contemporary challenges, SOF

must nevertheless identify the constantly changing nature of said challenges: "USSOCOM faces an operational environment characterized by accelerating geopolitical change, rapid technological advancement, evolving threats, constrained resources, and potential new roles. These factors necessitate innovative thinking and new ways to shape change if we are to maintain the widest array of options for protecting America's interests."[36] PSCs should be added to this list of factors for US officials, military and civilian alike, to consider and manage. This is not to say that the PSC industry should not exist. It will be difficult for the "genie" to be shoved back into the bottle to a point that the state monopoly on violence is again predominant. Moreover, attempting to do so would deny access to the private sector's options on versatility and innovation that is critical to the ongoing Global War on Terrorism.[37] Nevertheless, steps should be taken to assess how the PSC industry functions and sustains itself. Otherwise, other methods implemented by the United States to keep the SOF resource from slipping into private sector hands may not suffice, while adding to the ire of conventional forces. While the United States is experiencing greater reliance on SOF, and as such, is encountering the dilemmas posed by growth of private security companies, it is also in the unique position to act in such a manner as to establish the appropriate balance between the public and private sectors with regard to the future of these organizations.

NOTES

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2. Bernd Horn, "Special Men, Special Missions: The Utility of Special Operations Force – A Summation," *Force of Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations*, eds. Bernd Horn, J. Paul B. Taillon, and David Last (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queens Univ. Press, 2004), p. 17; Bernd Horn, "When Cultures Collide: The Conventional Military/SOF Chasm," *Canadian Military Journal*, 5 (Autumn 2004), p. 5.

3. Thomas K. Adams, "The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict," *Parameters*, 29 (Summer 1999), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99summer/adams.htm; David Shearer, "Private Armies and Military Intervention," *Adelphi Paper 316* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); Peter Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2003).

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The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force Development

GARY FELICETTI

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq has three avenues: the political track, the economic track, and the security track.[1] While the three are mutually reinforcing, the national strategy is largely dependent on significantly improving security. Moreover, security has been "our most important and pressing objective" since the summer of 2003.[2] As noted then by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, "Without security, we can't rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure and protect it from sabotage, nor can we expect Iraqi political life to revive if Iraqis don't feel secure enough to travel, go to meetings, express their views without intimidation."[3]

In July 2003, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz articulated the basic US exit strategy: properly train the Iraqi police, army, and civil defense forces and they will take over the security work being done by Americans.[4] This carried forward into the national strategy, which contains the core assumption that while the United States "can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their security threats over the long term."[5] Prominent critics have repeatedly called on the administration to accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, or quickly finish it.[6] None, however, has challenged the core assumption that US forces are mostly going to train their way out of Iraq.

It would appear, therefore, that training the Iraqi forces is one of our most important and pressing objectives, a key to victory. To that end, some of the world's best instructors have trained over 277,000 Iraqi security forces.[7] Courses have ranged from basic police officer training to special commando training. More than 40 countries have participated in this effort, with billions

of dollars spent.[8] Other coalition forces have "mentored" the Iraqis through field exercises and supervision. Yet despite significant progress, there is nearly universal agreement that Iraqi forces will not be able to take over our security responsibilities any time soon. Why hasn't all of this training solved the problem?

At least part of the answer is that training is the wrong intervention for many of the ills in the Iraqi security forces and society. Training can help solve many human performance issues. It can help make great armies. It is rarely, however, the entire solution, and it is a poor match for many of the problems identified in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. As the painful events of the last three years have shown, more training courses are not going to stabilize Iraq. This article explains why and provides a clearer lens through which to view this key part of the overall mission.

The Power of Training

Training is a form of performance intervention designed to improve the skills, knowledge, and, to some extent, the attitudes of students. This often leads to improved work performance. In the US armed forces, training is used to solve or prevent problems ranging from bad mess hall food to unstable nuclear weapons. It also supports new performances. Training is normally thought of as a specific course of instruction, usually in a classroom or at a training facility. On-line and computer-based courses are also becoming more widespread. Other learning activities such as unit exercises, drills, and individual performance counseling are also sometimes called training; however, the national strategy appears to use the label "mentoring" for these types of programs. Thus, US forces are said to be training and mentoring the Iraqi forces, or helping, assisting, and training them.[9]

A good training program begins with some sort of analysis of the gap between current and desired knowledge and skills. Many programs, however, assume that the incoming students know little about the material and focus on identifying the desired end-state. For more complex matters, the analysis may be called a competency map; that is, a formal effort to identify, list, track, label, and measure the knowledge, skills, attributes, attitudes, and traits necessary for a student to succeed at various levels of an organization.[10] This can

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lead to a blueprint, map, or matrix to drive training, and other key decisions such as personnel selection.

As every military leader knows, the right training can help produce highly effective forces with the skills, knowledge, and attitudes necessary to win conflicts. Training and mentoring can build fighting spirit, aggressiveness, and strong morale, allowing quantitatively inferior forces to prevail.[11] Training and mentoring reinforce unit cohesion, bonding the group together in a way to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and mission.[12] In short, training and mentoring can be a powerful "force multiplier"—just what the Iraqi security forces need, at least if the root problem is a lack of skills and knowledge.

The Limits of Training

Training, however, cannot solve all human performance problems. Some disciplines view training as a last resort, to be employed only when no other means of improving performance will work.[13] Or, as trainers sometimes put it, "If I hold a gun to your head and you can do it, then a lack of training wasn't the problem." In fact, training is rarely the entire solution to a problem or the sole way to realize an opportunity.

Two disparate examples illustrate the universal and timeless nature of this principle. In 1861, Colonel Robert E. Lee, considered by many contemporaries to be the finest officer in the United States Army, declined its command and resigned his commission to serve his home state of Virginia.[14] Lee was a graduate of West Point and a combat veteran who had been mentored by General in Chief Winfield Scott. Lee's training and development was complete with the moment of national crisis at hand. He was devoted to the Union and the Army. He felt strong loyalty and duty as an American citizen and opposed secession, thinking it contrary to the Constitution.[15] Commanding the rapidly expanding US Army offered the ultimate professional accomplishment and challenge. It would have fully satisfied his personal ambitions. General Scott, his long-standing mentor and dear friend, tried to keep Lee in Union service. Yet Lee refused, at great personal cost, giving what has been called "the answer he was born to make."[16]

From the federal perspective, Robert E. Lee failed to perform the duties he had been perfectly trained and mentored to assume. Lee, however, was a Virginian first and foremost. No amount of training, development, or logic could change that.

The limits of training and mentoring are also apparent in far more mundane situations. For example, the Women's Health Initiative Study is a large, long-term study on the effect of diet upon health.[17] One goal is to study

the impact of reducing dietary fat intake on the rates of various cancers. The study selected highly motivated and dedicated participants for assignment to the low-fat diet group. They were to reduce their daily fat consumption to no more than 20 percent of total daily calories.

The study's designers and government sponsors assumed that the eating behavior of these highly motivated volunteers could be changed through training and support. Consistent with this assumption, each member of the low-fat group received 18 intensive dietary counseling sessions in the first year with quarterly maintenance sessions thereafter. Despite this intervention, the group reduced fat intake only modestly, to 29 percent. Training and support had helped somewhat, but the study ultimately failed. In this instance, modern scientists and government officials greatly overestimated their ability to change a fairly straightforward behavior through training.

Root Causes of Human Performance Problems

Both Robert E. Lee's resignation from the federal army and the Women's Health Initiative Study can be described as human performance problems. In each case, the person, or persons, could have done as expected but did not. While one case implicated significant issues of duty and identity and the other involved a series of routine dietary decisions, both involved capable human beings not performing as desired—and as trained.

The relatively new discipline of Human Performance Technology (HPT) takes a systemic approach to human performance issues. It draws upon several other disciplines, including learning psychology and organizational development and change.[18] HPT practitioners have identified four root causes for performance problems at the level of the individual performer: (1) a lack of skills or knowledge, (2) a flawed work environment, (3) flawed incentives, and (4) a lack of motivation.[19] Related factors include the organization's culture and design, along with its personnel selection criteria.

A lack of skills and knowledge is the most straightforward root cause and the only one where training is likely to be a significant part of the solution. For example, if Cadet Lee didn't know how to clean a musket to US Army standards or read a map, training could be an effective intervention. The same is true if a volunteer subject in the Women's Health Study didn't know how to calculate the fat content of her meals. Refresher training, or some type of job aid, may also be appropriate when someone who has been able to perform a task in the past has forgotten how to do so.

A flawed work environment often concerns problems with the tools necessary to get the job done; for example, a lack of horses for an 1860s cavalry company or lack of vehicles for modern soldiers. As every leader knows,

these types of equipment problems can be fatal to mission accomplishment. Training, however, cannot help solve the problem unless a lack of skills and knowledge is causing the vehicle shortage.

A flawed work environment may also concern a lack of feedback or poor leadership. Leaders may say one thing, through training, yet act very differently. Or the environment may send powerful messages that undermine the desired performance. For example, the subjects in the Women's Health Study conducted their "work" while going about their daily lives. Most were undoubtedly bombarded by media images and advertising that encouraged them to eat tasty, convenient, and fast foods that also happen to be high in fat. Some women probably were surrounded by high-fat foods as family members and peers maintained their normal eating habits. Others had very busy schedules. Like many Americans, they probably ate on the go, grabbing the most convenient, and frequently higher fat, offering—notwithstanding the intensive training and counseling. In hindsight this all appears obvious; however, assumptions about training and mentoring blinded the scientists to the importance of fully understanding the root causes of a performance challenge. It is a common mistake.

The flawed incentives category takes a broader look at how the workplace system rewards the desired performance or responds to substandard performance. A stereotypical example of this problem is an organization that "rewards" its best performers with more work, perhaps unpleasant or even dangerous, while promotions and salary increases are based solely on longevity. A system may have few daily incentives for the desired performance. It may even reward negative performance. For example, a woman in the low-fat group of the Women's Health Study who ordered take-out pizza to silence her whining children instead of cooking a low-fat meal was immediately rewarded with silent children, less work, and more time. These types of powerful incentives may be why one of the study's principal investigators now believes that the general population could never reduce fat intake to the desired levels, even with intensive dietary counseling.[20]

The right incentives, on the other hand, can powerfully reinforce desired behaviors. For example, in 1825 the US Military Academy had an elaborate system of both positive and negative incentives for Cadet Robert E. Lee. He earned regular membership in the corps of cadets only by passing first-term examinations.[21] A summer furlough depended upon his grades and conduct. Superior students such as Lee earned extra money and privileges by serving as acting assistant professors of mathematics, and only the top graduates chose their arm of the service. This incentive system, with its capitalistic elements, rewarded those who obeyed the rules and produced the best academic results.

Motivation looks to the internal forces that energize, direct, and sustain an individual's behavior. It helps explain why Cadet Lee worked so hard to excel at West Point while others facing the exact same workplace incentives were far less diligent.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory is one of the most widely used models and is frequently used to diagnose performance problems caused by motivational gaps.[22] It holds that all people have certain needs that they strive to meet. Basic or lower-level needs such as food, safety, and acceptance must be met before the higher growth needs are pursued.[23] As with all generalizations, the model has its limits and even Maslow recognized that not everyone followed his hierarchy.[24] There are also other theories with different needs classifications; however, internal motivation can be viewed as part of a comprehensive systems approach to improving and sustaining desired performance.[25]

For example, all the armed forces of the United States offer a large menu of personal and family support services to active-duty service members and their families. These mostly free services range from financial counseling to basic legal services. The theory behind these programs is that helping service members with their unmet lower-level, or "security," needs will keep them focused on work and motivate them to higher levels of job performance.[26]

Organizational Influences

Beyond the individual worker or small team, the organization in which the performance occurs exerts a powerful, if not controlling, influence on workplace performance. Two of the most relevant contributors to the ultimate success of the Iraqi national security forces are organizational culture and personnel selection criteria.

An organization's culture is commonly described as the shared system of values, beliefs, and behaviors that characterize the group of people.[27] It is the group's norms, practices, and philosophy; in short, the *real* rules of the game for getting along or "how we *really* do things around here."[28] An organization's culture can be changed over time, if fully supported by all levels of leadership. Instant or revolutionary culture change, however, is impossible. It is the shared experience and common history of a group, over time, that changes a culture.[29] Anyone who wants to change the organizational culture must commit to a long-term evolutionary process, especially if the organization's culture flows directly from societal values and practices.

It seems obvious that selecting the right people is critically important to workplace performance. However, this remains a challenge for many organizations—even those making routine hiring and promotion decisions in

stable western societies.[30] Evaluating one's potential is not easy, especially when the new job differs from a candidate's experience. Moreover, evaluating how well a candidate's values align with those of the organization is extremely difficult, if not impossible, absent extensive pre-hiring evaluation. This is true even when both the selection official and candidate speak the same language and there is little risk that the applicant is seeking to infiltrate the organization in order to destroy it from within.

Iraq in 2006: "The Year of the Police"

As a result of persistent problems in the 162,600-member Iraqi police forces, the focus has shifted to improving their performance.[31] Senior leaders in Iraq designated 2006 as "The Year of the Police,"[32] and President Bush has repeated this theme in major speeches on the war.[33]

The Iraqi police are under the control of the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MOI forces, or police, consist of the Iraq Police Service (IPS), National Police, Department of Border Enforcement, and Center for Dignitary Protection.[34] MOI forces comprise over half of all Iraqi security forces and are slated to grow to a final end strength of 188,000 by December 2006.[35]

One goal of "The Year of the Police" is to train the police to provide security in urban settings throughout Iraq.[36] According to the Inspectors General of the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council, and many others, a number of significant obstacles remain.

For starters, police work in Iraq is increasingly hazardous, with nearly 1,500 killed and over 3,200 wounded during 2005.[37] It's a very dangerous job, both for the police officer and his family. This has led to a perception that past training programs, emphasizing quantity over quality, have mostly produced "cannon fodder."[38]

Under Saddam Hussein, all police forces were perceived as the corrupt and brutal implementers of oppression.[39] The regular police, however, were conditioned to be passive, waiting for the secret police to call them out of the station when needed.[40] Moreover, many of the current police chiefs and deputies are accustomed to the culture of the Saddam era, where forced confessions were the primary investigative tool and responsibilities were rigidly delineated.[41]

Today, the Iraqi police are highly decentralized, which has led to some local "fiefdoms" subject to local political maneuvering and divided loyalties.[42] MOI command and control is rudimentary, with the ministry lacking even a basic readiness reporting system for its units.[43] Corruption is widespread and deeply rooted, with local police chiefs said to frequently take a cut of their officers' salaries.[44] The Ministry of Interior was found to have many

"ghost" employees on its payroll.[45] Some payments were for family or tribal members, while others served as an informal retirement program, and this was at a time when some active-duty officers went unpaid for weeks. Due in part to funding problems, a significant number of police academy graduates were not hired as police officers. They were trained by the Coalition and then went home.

The MOI has not accepted ownership of all the various police units.[46] It has provided only grudging support to police forces such as the Emergency Response Unit, the Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and provincial SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams. As such, these units experienced frequent pay problems and high attrition.[47]

The selection and screening of new recruits and leaders has been problematic and often based on cronyism and personal loyalties.[48] Others have been required to pay bribes to obtain an appointment. As late as April 2005, new entrants received only a cursory physical exam.[49] Illiterates made it into basic training, as did some criminals and drug users. There are also widespread reports of insurgent infiltration. Merit-based selection for leadership training, or assignment to special units, is still a foreign concept.

There also have been structural problems with earlier training programs. Iraqi officials had only limited input into standards and curricula, which had not been standardized across the various training sources. Additionally, like most students, Iraqis learn much better through hands-on exercises. Unfortunately, much of the early training emphasized classroom lectures using interpreters. There also was only limited testing to measure student retention, with none in advanced and specialty courses.[50]

On top of all this, Iraq is a tribal society where an individual's identity, and primary loyalty, runs to family, tribe, ethnic group, and religious sect. Political identity is also based on one's tribal or sectarian group.[51] Some elements of the MOI forces, therefore, appear to serve Shi'ite, Kurdish, or Iranian interests, acting as sectarian and ethnic forces that abuse and murder Sunnis. Powerful militias and armed groups, often affiliated with political parties, have infiltrated the police forces. The primary loyalties of Iraqi police are thus so doubtful that members of the Bureau of Dignitary Protection are normally selected from the guarded dignitary's family or tribe.[52] These trusted agents and relatives are then trained to serve in the bureau for the duration of their sponsor's term of service. Reportedly, the former prime minister ordered his own security force to fire on any police that approached his headquarters without advance notice.[53]

Moreover, Iraq is just emerging from three decades of a vicious tyranny where government authority stemmed solely from fear, terror, and brutality.[54] This corrosive misrule stifled initiative and confidence. People

naturally distrust their government, suspect American motives, and look to regional or sectarian powers to protect their interests.

Despite these many challenges, some training efforts have been a qualified success.[55] The Multi-national Security Transition Command has delivered many high-quality courses that have had a real impact on some Iraqi units. But how many of the remaining problems with the Iraqi forces involve a lack of skills and knowledge? Is the needed mission still training, or is it something far more complex?

Applying Human Performance Technology Principles

While the situation has been frequently described as a training challenge, the real goal since 2003 has been to create capable Iraqi security forces to replace our own. As President Bush says, "As they stand up, we'll stand down."[56] While some Iraqi units are highly effective, the overall force still has a long way to go. Yet only a few of the remaining significant problems can be successfully addressed by training.

For example, insurgents frequently use the cover of darkness to plant explosives and conduct operations. Experts agree that nighttime patrolling and intelligence-gathering activities employ very different tactics from daylight operations.[57] However, many graduates of the basic police course received no training in night tactics. Additional training courses to prepare them for nighttime operations against the insurgency should improve performance—assuming that this lack of skills and knowledge is the primary impediment.

Training also can help educate Ministry of Interior officials on the importance of standardized operating and supply procedures. Coalition teams can demonstrate the usefulness of a readiness reporting system to MOI leadership. Training courses also can provide the knowledge and skills to create and run a system to measure unit readiness.

Finally, the methods and techniques used in the courses can be refined to improve the training, or retraining, of future students. Testing, including evaluating performance in hands-on exercises, can be added to ensure that students retain the lessons and have the ability to perform the desired skills. Curricula can be adjusted based on Iraqi needs and standardized across all training sources. Instruction can be done in Arabic and made more culturally relevant and authentic for the average Iraqi. Addressing these issues will undoubtedly improve the skills and knowledge of the Iraqi police forces.

Yet training will not improve police effectiveness in activities such as nighttime operations if the root problem is a flawed work environment such as

a lack of night vision gear or timid leadership. The same is true if individual police officers fear for the lives of their families. Training also won't improve effectiveness if the professional culture is to be passive, avoid risks, and demand bribes. Additional training won't improve nighttime effectiveness in units infiltrated by insurgents, loyal to the local militia, or staffed by physically disabled police officers who joined the force out of financial desperation.

More training will have only a small effect on performance if Iraqi police officers are not paid regularly in order to support ghost employees at the Ministry of Interior. It also won't improve performance in units where the only "reward" for following the trained procedures is to always get the most dangerous assignments while poor performers from certain tribes or families face no negative consequences.

In fact, most of the security challenges identified in the 2005 joint Defense and State Department police training assessment, the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, and a host of other reports are not training problems. Instead they go to improper selection of police candidates and leaders, a poor organizational culture, flawed work environments, divided loyalties, and officers focused on basic survival. These are the root problems in many units, and Human Performance Technology principles tell us that more training courses will not solve them.

Viewed in this light, the Coalition training courses have been merely the foundation for the hard work the Iraqis must do to address root issues such as sectarian identity and strife. We have taught thousands to shoot straight and true, but many Iraqis still must decide whom they will shoot at and why. Future courses might even be considered part of the background, or supporting cast, for this broader Iraqi effort. Assuming some level of success, the skills and knowledge gained through training can then be put to good use.

Moving forward, the US plan appears to be a more comprehensive engagement with the Iraqis to help them change behaviors while building Iraqi institutions to address the root problems. The Center for Military Values, Principles, and Leadership, which opened in Rustamiyah, Iraq, in July 2006, is an example of these new institutions.[58] Its ambitious goal is to identify, build, and enforce Iraqi military values and ethics. While the program is currently run by Coalition trainers, Iraqi staff members are scheduled to take full control of it by July 2007.

Over time, these new institutions and behaviors might eventually change values. These values eventually might become part of the professional culture, helping members of the security forces to see themselves as guardians of the state and all the Iraqi people. It is a very ambitious goal. Yet even long-standing critics think the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq can still work, notwithstanding skepticism over any nation-building effort.[59] It re-

mains unclear, however, if the Iraqis are willing or able to reinvent their security forces and society. Moreover, advisors on the ground know that this process "can take decades" and "is a generational goal."[60] Another American commander put it this way:

> We've had a tremendous impact shaping behavior, and I think that we're making strides toward changing values. But the fact is most of the people in this country [Iraq] have learned and operate the way they do based on 35 years of experience. . . . Right now we're shaping behavior, we're starting to affect values, but changing values is going to take a long time.[61]

Conclusion

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and much of the public debate surrounding it leaves the impression that additional training will go a long way toward solving the security problem and bringing our troops home. This focus on training, which most people think of as a relatively short-term effort involving courses, presents an unrealistic picture of the mission. It also may have undermined domestic support for the holistic, longer-term effort required to address all aspects of Iraqi force development and implement the new counterinsurgency doctrine.[62]

Training cannot improve the long-term performance of Iraqi national security forces unless the lack of skills and knowledge are the root causes of their problems. Intensive training, including regular refresher training and support, was unsuccessful in getting a group of highly motivated western women to eat a low-fat diet. We cannot expect it to change the culture of the Ministry of Interior police forces in a few years. Decades of training, mentoring, and development did not turn Robert E. Lee's ultimate loyalty away from Virginia and toward the United States. Similarly, it will not end regional ethnic divides in Iraq or change tribal values and identity.

The security portion of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq is a multidimensional and nuanced document. However, training, or something akin to training, is the dominant label used for the means by which US forces are to accomplish the mission. This may be the result of institutional resistance to the more comprehensive term "nation-building" or the difficulty of succinctly explaining the counterinsurgency strategy.[63] Whatever the cause, national leaders emphasized training, leaving the impression that we were going to train our way out of Iraq.

These words have continuing power, with President Bush discussing a revised Iraq training strategy in late October 2006.[64] It's time to more accurately describe what US forces are attempting to accomplish in Iraq. Clearly, it's much more than just training and mentoring. Call the task nation-building,

culture change, or societal reform. Any realistic label will do, provided it reflects a far more complex task and recognizes the limits of our ability to control the outcome. Just don't call it a training program—unless failure *is* an option.

NOTES

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US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward

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Editor's Note: Article is derived from General Gilani's Strategy Research Project completed during his attendance at the US Army War College during Academic Year 2006.

The 58-year history of relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been marked by periods of courtship and phases of distrust. Since 9/11, these relations have again entered an era of close ties with shared interests. However, there is a perception that the renewed friendship is being driven solely by America's need for Pakistani cooperation in the "War on Terrorism" and is dependent upon the continued presence and leadership of President Pervez Musharraf. The perception, if true, portends severe consequences for both the United States and Pakistan. This article examines the fidelity of this perception in view of the history of US-Pakistan relations. It reviews the major factors currently influencing this relationship and proposes an approach to build upon this foundation to enhance future US-Pakistan cooperation.

A Historical Review

Under the leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan became independent on 14 August 1947 after a long struggle by the Muslims of British India. Jinnah is considered the father of Pakistan; he set in motion many political initiatives that became the foundation for Pakistan's society.

Jinnah was influenced by both his life experiences and the challenges he overcame. A Muslim from Karachi, Jinnah received most of his higher edu-

cation in legal studies in London. As a barrister, he soon became the leading lawyer of Bombay, India. As a politician, he was known for his commitment to the western style of democracy. Jinnah initially joined the Indian National Congress and launched the struggle to free India from the British, joining hands with the prominent Hindu leaders, especially, Gandhi. He eventually found himself at odds with the Hindu majority as he was convinced that the caste-centric Hindus did not intend to recognize the Muslims as equal citizens in India.[1]

He then led the struggle for creation of an independent Muslim state located within the Muslim majority areas of India. Jinnah died on 11 September 1948, just one year following India's independence from Great Britain. Newly independent states at the outset of the Cold War, India and Pakistan were soon faced with the dilemma of aligning either with the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Although India promptly entered into favorable relations with the USSR, Pakistani leaders, mostly groomed in Western institutions, opted for aligning with the West. Correspondingly, Liaqat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, turned down Stalin's invitation to visit Moscow and instead visited Washington in 1950.[2] President Harry S. Truman generally remained indifferent toward Pakistan from 1947 to 1952. When the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953, the US government became increasingly anxious about the spread of communism to Asia and started to take an interest in Pakistan. This recognition culminated in the 1954 Mutual Defense Agreement.[3]

The US-Pakistan relationship continued to improve as Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1956. A main pillar of the relationship was the military cooperation between the two countries, which blossomed through an active training exchange program and the fielding of US weapons and equipment within the Pakistan military. Additionally, Pakistan gave the United States access to the Bataber Air Force Base near the Afghan border for U-2 reconnaissance flights over the USSR—at substantial risk to its own security.[4] Meanwhile, in 1965 Pakistan fought a major war with India over the state of

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"In 1979, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, renewed American interest in improving the US-Pakistan relationship."

Kashmir. A smaller but well-trained Pakistan Army equipped with US weaponry, was able to defend the country against a larger force.

Pakistan also played a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the United States and China when, President Richard M. Nixon, decided to begin the process of normalizing relations with Beijing. In July 1971, Pakistan facilitated the secret mission to China undertaken by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. Actually, the first meeting between the two countries took place aboard a Pakistan Airlines plane flying to Beijing.[5] Pakistan soon paid the price for this diplomatic activism: India, exploiting the political turmoil after the 1970 Pakistani general elections, attacked Pakistan's eastern wing (now Bangladesh) with support from the USSR. In the midst of this crisis, Pakistan turned to the United States for assistance, but was met with a distressing refusal. The war resulted in the division of Pakistan: West Pakistan became Pakistan and East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh. In 1972 as a consequence of this strategic loss a socialist democratic political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, came to power. Accordingly, US-Pakistan relations, which had already deteriorated because of the lack of US support in the 1971 war, declined further as the United States did not favor a socialist government in Pakistan.

Twin events in 1979, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, renewed American interest in improving the US-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan suddenly became a key geostrategic player as it served as a buffer between the USSR and the Persian Gulf. The United States then decided to fight a proxy war in land-locked Afghanistan, and America sought Pakistan's support to spearhead this fight. General Zia ul Haq who had assumed control of Pakistan in a 1977 military coup offered America Pakistani support in the effort to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan. Pakistan more than served the US aims and was instrumental in forcing the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan in 1988.

In retrospect, the period from 1979 to 1988 was a golden period in US-Pakistan relations. Unfortunately, both the governments remained fo-

cused on narrow national interests relevant to their own security issues. Indeed, the American interest focused almost entirely on unrestricted support to the Afghan jihad. Although successful, it accomplished only a relatively short-term and limited strategic aim, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The interests of Pakistan were also myopic, characterized by limited modernization of the armed forces and US political support for the Pakistani military government. No worthwhile long-term economic policy was pursued, nor was any major economic infrastructure developed. Overall, positive US-Pakistan ties of the 1980s were shaped by military interactions. However, they did not include any projects designed to serve the long-term interests of either country.

Although it forced the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the war effort also produced many negative consequences in the region. An immediate effect of the US policy was a sharp rise in the number of madrassas (religious seminaries) in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). These madrassas were configured to indoctrinate young Muslim students from Afghanistan, Pakistan's tribal areas, and some Arab countries. The students were also given military training and were recruited in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. The indirect effects of US policies in Pakistan in the 1980s included the spread of what has been called the "Kalashnikov culture." Thus, the United States indirectly supported many of the less desirable policies of the Zia regime: suppressing freedom of the press; a rise in ethnicity and sectarianism; and the deterioration of Pakistani domestic institutions. Overall, the joint policies of the American and Pakistan governments, with active support from some Arab countries, resulted in the militarization of a number of the Muslim youth, with far-reaching consequences related to the growth of terrorism.

During this period Pakistan suffered extreme internal instability thanks to the joint efforts of the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) and its Indian equivalent, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Pakistan endured thousands of bomb attacks on trains, bus and railway stations, shopping centers, and other public places resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. There was also a rise in political polarization due to the continued governance by the military, and increased instability due to an unprecedented rise in ethnic and sectarian violence. This internal strife was fueled by an influx of cheap Soviet weapons, including Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, and many other weapons.

At the same time, Pakistan responded to India's nuclear development program by beginning the development of its own nuclear capability. Although the United States was strongly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it effectively turned a blind eye to these developments because Pakistan was its most important ally in the containment of Soviet

southward expansion. When the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in 1988, the US interest in South Asia began to wane. Afghanistan, at that time, was in deep turmoil as a result of a decade of Soviet occupation and civil war. Against the advice of Pakistani leadership, America left Afghanistan.

America's treatment of Pakistan was not much better. Not only was its promised aid of $4.02 billion to Pakistan withdrawn, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan for pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. The "blind eye," no longer obscured by the threat of Soviet expansion, began to see. It was at this time that President Zia ul Haq, along with some of his top military generals and the US Ambassador, were killed in an airplane crash in what many believed was an act of terrorism. There were no "smoking guns," but the list of possible perpetrators included the RAW, KGB, and the Pakistan Peoples Party (the political party in power at the time of Zia ul Haq's coup). Some within Pakistan even speculated that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) may have been involved on the premise that President Zia ul Haq had become a liability for the United States. The mystery of the air crash was never solved, but the resultant uncertainty cast another shadow over the US-Pakistani relationship.

Thus, the courtship between the United States and Pakistan during the final decade of the Cold War was followed by a decade of declining cooperation highlighted by sanctions in the Pressler Amendment that prohibited US aid to Pakistan unless the President certified that Pakistan was not in possession of nuclear weapons. Although there were four democratically elected governments in Pakistan during the 1988-98 period, they focused mainly on petty internal politics to the strategic detriment of the country. In many respects, it was a lost decade for Pakistan. In May 1998, Pakistan again seized center stage in South-Asia when it exploded six nuclear devices in response to the Indian nuclear explosions in Pokharan. The United States responded by further tightening sanctions against Pakistan. As a consequence, Pakistan's economic condition worsened while ethnic and sectarian extremism began to build. During this period, the newly liberated Central Asian Republics (CARs) provided the majority of economic and trade opportunities for Pakistan. However, the instability in Afghanistan continued to impede Pakistan's relations with the CARs. Starved for energy resources and hoping to access Central Asian markets via the shortest route, Pakistan initiated its relationship with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.[6]

Growing discontent among Pakistan's masses along with successive corrupt governments and the immediate fallout of the conflict with India in Kashmir, served as catalysts for the bloodless coup of October 1999. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Pervez Musharraf, assumed administrative control of the country with an agenda for reform, economic revival, and eradication of

extremism. President Musharraf's approach to governance was essentially different from previous military regimes. He did not impose martial law, did not limit freedom of the press, and did not attempt to appease the religious right. His rule also differed from that of the four previous civil governments that lost credibility due to their corrupt practices. By way of contrast, President Musharraf rid his own administration of the corrupt elite; this included bureaucrats, politicians, and even senior military officers. Regarding the situation in Afghanistan, President Musharraf endeavored to convince American leaders of the threat posed by al Qaeda and offered Pakistan's support to counter it.[7]

Post 9/11

The fateful events of 11 September 2001 had a dramatic impact on US-Pakistan relations. President Musharraf was prompt in extending full support to America in the ensuing war against terrorism. He readily agreed to all requests by Secretary of State Colin Powell. According to a number of sources, his positive response exceeded expectations.[8] Indeed, President Musharraf has been frequently criticized within Pakistan for cooperating too readily and conceding too much to the United States without adequate recompense.[9] The most probable reason for his forthright response was his recognition that America and Pakistan could join in quelling the radical religious and terrorist elements growing within the region. President Musharraf had already been moving along that path. His whole-hearted support to the United States subsequently helped build a strong relationship between the two nations.[10] Pakistan has assumed a central and active role in the war on terrorism.

There are those who contend that Pakistan's support for the war on terrorism is being sustained solely by the force of President Musharraf's personality alone—that it does not reflect the true priorities of the country's populace and is not in accord with Pakistan's national interests. Interestingly, this argument is used by Musharraf's political foes as well as some of his supporters. His political opponents and the anti-US lobby try to imply that supporting the war on terrorism is extremely unpopular in Pakistan. They argue that President Musharraf is fighting an unholy war to please the Americans and that he should be removed from power. On the other hand, the President's supporters, assert that it is only President Musharraf who can provide unrestricted Pakistani support to the war on terrorism. If this is true then his continuation as president is crucial to the interests of the United States. Both arguments miss the mark and undermine President Musharraf's personal security. It should be obvious that the perception that this policy is dependent on the individual has led to multiple attempts on the President's life, at least two of which nearly succeeded. In fact, President Mushaffaf's opposition to religious extremism began well before 9/11.

President Musharraf began to strike at the roots of extremism long before being approached by the United States following 9/11. Moreover, a large majority of Pakistanis do not share the Islamists' vision of the future of the country and are concerned about the growth of extremism. Consider, for example, Pakistan's 2002 general election: The Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) and its allied parties that supported President Musharraf's political ideology, won in three of the four provinces and were able to form a central government as well as three provincial governments. Conversely, the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), a grouping of six religious parties, running on anti-Musharraf and anti-US platform, won its seats primarily within the Pushtun area of the tribal-dominated NWFP. According to Hussain Haqqani, "Despite the MMA's unprecedented electoral performance in 2002, the alliance (MMA) garnered only 11 percent of the total votes cast; the Islamist vote as a percentage of total registered voters has been more or less stagnant since the 1970s."[11] The results of the election also reflect the pattern of support within the country for the war on terrorism; with a decisive majority supporting President Musharraf's hard-line approach.

Not only does the ruling Pakistan Muslim League support the war on terrorism, many of the opposition leaders, who sometimes criticize President Musharraf on other issues, support him on countering terrorism. Notwithstanding the force of his own personal commitment to the war on terror, President Musharraf's policies are well accepted throughout much of Pakistan at large as well as within the political and military leadership.

In contrast to the relationship between the United States and Pakistan in the 1980s, current cooperation, although initiated as a result of the 9/11 attacks, has developed along a more sophisticated agenda. Instead of a one-item agenda focused on the war on terrorism, Pakistan has used the current situation of improved relations to pursue a broad series of issues. The policies pursued by the government of President Musharraf have proven to be in the best interest of both Pakistan and the United States in both the short- and long-term.

This comprehensive approach consolidates national views related to globalization, the eradication of militancy, economic development, and democratization. The US government has also genuinely sought to reduce Pakistan's foreign debt. Besides using its influence on G-8 countries for economic cooperation, the United States' was facilitated Pakistan's negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). America has also removed all sanctions imposed on Pakistan and has reassured the country's leadership that its nuclear weapon capability is acceptable and will not result in future roll-backs. The United States and Pakistan are also cooperating on matters related to nuclear nonproliferation, agreeing to resolve the proliferation issues involving Dr.

Qadeer Khan founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, in a mutually acceptable manner.

With regard to Pakistan's economy, President Musharraf has enacted macroeconomic measures to remove the country from its long-term debt trap. According to the CIA Fact Book, "IMF-approved government policies, bolstered by generous foreign assistance and renewed access to global markets since 2001, have generated solid macroeconomic recovery in the last three years. The government has made substantial macroeconomic reforms since 2000. . . . While long-term prospects remain uncertain, given Pakistan's low level of development, medium-term prospects for job creation and poverty reduction are the best in nearly a decade."[12] Additionally, "Islamabad has raised development spending from about 2 percent of GDP in the 1990s to 4 percent in 2003, a necessary step towards reversing the broad underdevelopment of its social sector. GDP growth, spurred by double-digit gains in industrial production over the past year, has become less dependent on agriculture. Foreign exchange reserves continued to reach new levels in 2004, supported by robust export growth and steady worker remittances."[13]

Pakistan is enjoying an economic upturn. The past fiscal year has indeed been fruitful for Pakistan's economy, recording several multiyear "firsts." Pakistan's real GDP growth of 8.4 percent in 2004-05 is the most rapid in two decades. Pakistan has positioned itself as the second fastest growing economy after China in 2004-05. It witnessed the largest expansion of private sector credit in the 2004-05 timeframe. Pakistan's exit from the IMF Programme marked an important milestone; and the country's public and external debt burden declined to their lowest levels in decades.[14]

Besides the improvement in macroeconomic indicators, Pakistan has enjoyed marked improvements in social and living conditions. Key indicators such as the literacy rate; gross and net enrollment in primary, middle and high schools; access to sanitation and safe drinking water; use of electricity and gas as sources of lighting and cooking fuel; various health indicators such as child immunization and treatment of diarrhea—all have shown marked improvements over the past four to seven years. While Pakistan's socioeconomic and macroeconomic polices have facilitated these positive developments, an increasingly broad and dynamic global recovery has also aided the nation.[15]

The government has also launched some mega-projects to improve the macroeconomic situation of the country. The port of Gwadar is being constructed in the relatively underdeveloped province of Balochistan on the Arabian Sea and is near completion. The project had been on the drawing board since the early 1990s but could not be initiated earlier due to politico-economic disconnects. Finally, initiated in 2002, this deep-sea port will pro-

vide docking for large cargo ships, offering the shortest access to the land-locked regions of Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Western China.

The Thar Coal Project likewise promises significant economic gains. The Thar coalfield contains 175 billion tons of coal covering an area of 9,000 square kilometers in the Tharparker District of the Sindh province. This project will be providing a total of 500 megawatts of electricity for at least the next 30 years. Pakistan will be able to significantly reduce its reliance on imported oil.[16]

The Pakistani government is negotiating participation in the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline projects.[17] If these projects succeed, they will completely fulfill Pakistan's energy requirements. Current plans to extend these projects to India will provide additional revenues from transit fees. The gas pipelines are also likely to bring India and Pakistan closer politically and economically.

Pakistan has become the United States' most trusted ally in the global war on terrorism. This war cannot be won without winning the hearts and minds of the Pakistani populace and denying terrorists their support base. As Pakistan's border with Afghanistan is being cleansed of terrorist cells, large-scale economic and development projects have been launched in the tribal areas in an effort to curtail future terrorist activities. The construction of roads, schools, and hospitals in previously inaccessible regions has helped bring local inhabitants into the mainstream of national life. This two-pronged strategy was developed to achieve both the short-term goal of defeating the terrorists and the long-term objective of eliminating the conditions that foster terrorism. A political initiative is underway to integrate the Maliks (elders) in this process. Operations by law enforcement agencies are opening the border region and denying access and support to terrorists and other miscreants.

Development work and political engagement in previously inaccessible and unfriendly regions has benefitted the GWOT. Pakistani security forces have captured many al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists, including such top leaders as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Abu Zubaydah, and Abu Faraj al-Libbi.[18] The Pakistan Army has killed over 300 terrorists and apprehended approximately 700 terror suspects in the Afghan border region. Civilian law enforcement agencies have conducted more than 194 raids throughout the country, resulting in the apprehension of some 573 terrorists. In these efforts the Pakistani security forces have suffered more casualties than any nation except the United States. More than 300 soldiers have lost their lives and some 600 have been wounded in these operations. Through a combination of constitutional reforms, enactment of anti-terrorist laws, and cooperation with international law enforcement organizations, the terror suspects involved in such attacks as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade

Center (WTC), the assassination of two CIA officials in Virginia, and the bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were captured and deported to America.[19]

In addition to its ongoing campaign against terrorism, Pakistan is in the process of improving its educational system and increasing the nation's literacy rate. Almost half of the Pakistani population is currently illiterate. Young illiterate boys from poor families, who either cannot afford schooling or do not have access to a school, are recruited into small Masjid (mosque) schools or madrassas. Unfortunately, the madrassa system is generally perceived in a negative light and considered a breeding ground for terrorism. This perception is not correct. Indeed, madrassas form one of the largest non-government organizations in the world. These religious schools provide succor to the poor and the needy. Madrassas provide food, shelter, and education to children whose parents cannot afford these basics. Education in such schools is generally limited to the tenets of religion. The Pakistani government neither funds nor exercises control over the curriculum of these schools and does not monitor the quality of the religious teachers—Imams. These schools are run by local communities and the Imams are hired locally. More than 95 percent of madrassas are politically moderate providing a strong moral foundation for their students.[20] Unfortunately, some madrassas are controlled by hard-line and militant organizations, including a few with foreign sponsors. These schools expound extremist views and indoctrinate their students against the greater society. Although the government has initiated a strict crackdown against extremist madrassas, it has also developed a thoughtful and comprehensive strategy to bring these institutions into the mainstream. Steps initiated by the government include monitoring the recruitment of teachers, provisions for training workshops, government funding, control over outside sources of funding, audits of organizational accounts, and regular monitoring and evaluation by the Department of Education. The government has also introduced standardized subjects in 8,000 Madaris in an effort to bridge the gap between madrassas and the formal education system. The government's involvement is designed to strengthen the lines of communication between the madrassas and the government, educate over 1.5 million students, and help eradicate extremism throughout the country.[21]

Education reform has been a major priority of the Pakistan government for the last five years. These reforms included measures such as the separation of the general, higher, and special education ministries; provisions for free education through high school; and unprecedented increases in funding, especially in the sciences and technology. Curriculums are being revised in an effort to rid them of extremist ideologies and make them compatible with

international standards. These revisions are critical to Pakistan's efforts to have Pakistani degrees accepted in the West. The government's endeavors have borne positive results. The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) for primary schools (ages 5-9) has increased from 72 percent in 2001-02 to 86 percent in 2004-05. The increase of the Metric Level (age 13-14) in the GER was a moderate 42 to 44 percent. The real impact will be observable in four to five years when the existing primary-level cohort will reach high school.[22] The US government is taking a keen interest in supporting Pakistan's education reforms; having already invested about $100 million. According to the State Department, the United States has a long-term vision for Pakistan's education system and also plans to support modernization of Pakistan's engineering and high-technology sectors.[23]

Additionally, the government of Pakistan has made a commitment to democratization. The government is now in the hands of elected representatives who serve in a legitimate parliament. An extremely courageous and ultimately popular step by the leadership has been the transfer of control of local government to elected representatives. These and other initiatives by President Musharraf as part of his policy of modernization and enlightened moderation are not only important for Pakistan's long-term goals; they also serve the long-term interests of the United States related to globalization, eradication of extremism, and democratization. President Musharraf's sincerity in such matters has attracted critics because he continues to don his military uniform. He has made it quite clear, however, that his rationale for not removing the uniform is that the democratic reforms he initiated have not yet taken root. Suggestions that he resign as President would almost certainly result in those programs and initiatives not being completed. A majority of the Pakistani people who have witnessed the improved economic activity and the transition to a less corrupt environment believe him. They prefer that he continue to oversee the government and sustain his strategic direction for the modernization of Pakistan. The PEW Global Attitudes Project in its "Gauging National Satisfaction" survey reports that: "Pakistan, despite continued conflict in neighboring Afghanistan, also weighs in on the positive side, with 57 percent of the public content with the country's current course, compared with 39 percent who are not. This represents continued improvement over the 54 percent to 41 percent margin recorded a year ago and a sharp reversal from the 29 to 67 percent balance of dissatisfaction recorded in May 2003."[24]

Opportunities for Expanding US-Pakistan Interests

Continued improvements in the US-Pakistan relationship provide unique opportunities for both countries. A country of more than 150 million

people, Pakistan is the sixth most populous nation on the planet and the second largest in the Muslim world. Among Muslim countries, it has the most promising and technologically sound population. English is widely spoken and understood across the country. Located on the mouth of the Persian Gulf at the strategic junction of the Middle East, Central Asia, China, and South Asia, Pakistan provides the shortest route for the CARs and China to reach the Arabian Sea. It also serves as a land-bridge between energy-starved India and the energy-rich CARs and Iran. Located at the cross-roads of competing economic routes and strategic interests, Pakistan is also a nuclear power. An important player in the region, it holds a very respectable position in the 54-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). All these factors and its proximity to China, India, Afghanistan, and Iran make Pakistan an extremely lucrative geopolitical ally.

Pakistan was created through a democratic constitutional process assuring freedom of religion.[25] Although it has periodically resorted to the imposition of martial law and lapsed into military dictatorships, it continues to maintain a pluralistic character and is moving inexorably toward full democracy. Its non-Muslim minorities enjoy complete freedom of religious practice and are represented in all tiers of democratic institutions. Among the 342 representatives in the national assembly of Pakistan, a minimum of 10 seats are reserved for non-Muslims. Likewise, 73 women currently serve in the assembly—13 above the minimum of 60 prescribed in the constitution. In addition, non-Muslims have reserved seats in provincial assemblies and local bodies. Women, besides having genuine equal opportunities in all walks of life, have 33 percent of the seats in local government reserved for them.[26] Today Pakistan serves as a shinning example of a modern democratic Muslim state.

Given the aforementioned developments and a strong, if uneven, tradition of US-Pakistan friendship, Pakistan remains extremely relevant to US national interest on several levels, to include national security, access to the energy-rich regions of the Middle East and the CARS, and the politico-economic goals of democratization and globalization.

It is also in Pakistan's national interest to mold the nation into a modern Islamic state capable of attaining its national goals of economic autonomy, political sovereignty, and widespread prosperity. As a leading Muslim country, Pakistan has an obvious interest in countering the growing global perception of a breeding-ground for conflict between the Western and Islamic worlds. The emergence of a violent, terrorist-based Islamic movement is as much a threat to Pakistan as to Western countries. If Pakistan is to be successful in modernization initiatives, it needs to exploit the West's technology. It also needs to capitalize on the institutional reforms

used by established democracies to eliminate corruption, especially with regard to the accountability of democratically elected and appointed government officials.

Improving the Substance and Visibility of US-Pakistan Cooperation

While the cooperation between nations has dramatically increased since 9/11, residual distrust has only been marginally reduced. According to the PEW survey, while 57 percent of Pakistanis favor the current government policies and 52 percent consider Islamic extremism a threat, only 23 percent view the United States favorably. Although this is an improvement over the 17 percent reported two years ago, it is still well below acceptable standards.[27] What is needed is a deliberate strategy for improving the US-Pakistan relationship. A concentrated effort to debunk the perception that the relationship is based on the vested interests of the United States and the power-base of President Musharraf. It is reassuring that the US government has declared its policy regarding Pakistan is based on the following five goals:[28]

- Winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
- Nonproliferation of WMD.
- Promoting a peaceful Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.
- Improving the Pakistan-India relationship.
- Promoting Democracy.

While these goals appear to focus mainly on security, there are a number of other areas where the United States and Pakistan can work together to improve their current relationship.

Literacy and Education

The Pakistan government, with the financial and technological support of the United States, needs to improve the regulation of private schools; to include monitoring the qualifications and selection of its instructors, in addition to a standardizing of curricula. The influence of ideological extremism needs to be halted at its source and prevented from infecting Pakistan's youth. Pakistan, with continued financial and technological support from the United States will successfully accomplish this important goal.

A mass literacy drive needs to be launched, this will require increased funding from the government and the involvement of relevant NGOs. In the region, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have made tremendous strides in the eradication of illiteracy. Pakistan certainly could learn from their experience. The United States needs to visibly contribute to this effort by offering scholarships to promising young people based on their academic credentials, and

through the sharing of new technologies and distributed learning approaches. To be successful, however, all Pakistani and American efforts need to take into consideration the culture of both nations and the Islamic ethos. No matter how good the intentions, culturally insensitive initiatives are likely to be counter-productive, especially if "hidden agenda" caveats are attributed to such efforts.

The Pakistan Millennium Conference on Higher Education, organized in 2002, sought to identify a number ways to enhance the quality of higher education—this was certainly a step in the right direction.[29] The conference's recommendations deserve serious consideration:

- There is no one right model for achieving quality; therefore universities must be given autonomy to set their own directions to achieve quality, with some minimal standards set by a monitoring body. Government control over universities must be eliminated.
- In order to promote responsible institutional discourse, faculty must be given guaranteed autonomy to conduct research and debate issues. Institutional autonomy and intellectual freedom are fundamental imperatives.
- The financial management system as well as models of accountability of the universities for using allocated funds should be radically restructured.
- In the short-term, public funds should be raised by eliciting the support of people who are widely trusted and reputable. In the long-term, the universities should build credibility by efficient and visible utilization of donor funds to harness non-governmental fiscal resources.
- Universities must undertake initiatives to lower the cost of education by utilizing new technologies. They should capitalize on the many available opportunities, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) open-courseware initiative to enhance instruction.

Building of National Institutions

Despite a strong desire among Pakistanis for an effective democratic order, the nation's democratic governments have persistently failed to perform well primarily due to poor governance. The weak performance of elected governments has prevented democracy from establishing solid roots in the country. Every day that these conditions persist serves to reinforce the opinion that governance within a democratic framework is inherently corrupt and inefficient. There is a need for immediate and highly visible actions to change this perception if there is to be any reform at Pakistani institutions. The United States, as the most established and successful democracy in the world, should assist in developing Pakistani democratic institutions and the

education of its politicians and legislators. In the long-term, such support may constitute America's greatest contribution to Pakistan. Other major institutions like the judiciary, police, tax structure, and state bureaucracy also need reform. Again, an approach embedding sound policies and processes within the Pakistani bureaucracies need to be consistent with culture and religion. Nevertheless, an innovative program of US-Pakistan exchanges at every level of government, including independent assessments of governmental agencies by combined teams of experts, with follow-up action plans for short- and long-term reforms, ought to be initiated. The establishment of permanent oversight organizations (inspector generals, governmental accounting offices) empowered and trained to conduct organizational assessments and recommend reforms would go a long way toward improving Pakistani institutions. The United States, with the help of European nations, is already engaged in reforming important institutions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The same type of investments, at a fraction of the cost, in Pakistan where there is already a fairly well developed infrastructure would almost certainly result in success.

Economic Assistance and Technology Transfer

Although Pakistan has an extremely promising young population with a fairly large pool of information technology (IT) experts and nuclear scientists, it is striving to enter the industrial age and has yet to challenge the information age. Even its modest consumer-based industries that have continued to grow have come under tremendous pressure as markets are flooded with cheap Chinese goods. Pakistan's economy could be bolstered through direct foreign investment in the industrial infrastructure or by means of the transfer of crucial technologies to the manufacturing sector. The United States is in a position where it could take highly visible and meaningful actions to enhance Pakistan's exports to American markets. Similarly, Pakistan needs to invest in making its industrial output more competitive on the international market. American involvement in Pakistani economic development could provide a highly visible means of gaining the confidence of both the Pakistani people and the international community, bringing added value to the US-Pakistani relationship.

Kashmir

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has remained unresolved; it provides both risks and opportunities for the US-Pakistan relationship. The dispute has absorbed huge amounts of Indian and Pakistani resources over the last half-century, and it continues to bleed both countries

of valuable resources that could be better applied to economic and social programs. India insists on a bilateral resolution of the dispute, however, this is unrealistic from the Pakistani viewpoint since the resolution would entail the ceding of disputed territories. Involvement of the international community, especially the United States, could help promote an early resolution of the dispute. The dispute has worked a severe economic hardship on Pakistan because the country is compelled to maintain a large military, far greater than normal regional security threats require. Further, the continuing insurgency in the Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK) has aroused a militancy among the Muslim youth. These young people are not only motivated to fight the Indian occupation forces in IHK, but are further inclined to take up arms against perceived injustices anywhere in the world. Fair resolution of the dispute would help quell this militancy among the youth and would go a long way in reducing popular support for such behavior. The United States should lead an effort leveraging India's economic dependency on America. This effort should focus on the United Nations resolution based on granting the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir. To ensure future security between the two nuclear rivals, America could enter a trilateral security arrangement designed to enhance nuclear command and control arrangements in South Asia. Perhaps, no other US action would receive so positive a response from both the Pakistani populace and the international community as the peaceful resolution of this divisive issue.[30] Even incremental progress would receive regional visibility and dispel the perception that the US-Pakistani relationship is Musharraf-dependent or War-on-Terrorism centric. Moreover, progress in resolving this security issue would allow for the reduction of Pakistani armed forces, in addition to freeing up significant forces for security operations against terrorists.

Global War on Terrorism and Military Cooperation

Military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has stood the test of time and has developed into a close relationship. The Pakistan military is a well-trained and highly motivated force; it has played an important role in national decisionmaking. Additionally, the bulk of the Pakistani military equipment is of US origin. Also, many senior military officers have attended professional courses in US military schools and have enjoyed positive exposure to American culture. Despite this long military relationship, the US military recently lost touch with the Pakistan armed forces. During a meeting with some middle-ranking Pakistani Army officers prior to 9/11, the Commander in Chief of US Central Command was surprised to find that none of the Pakistani officers present had attended a US military school. He then re-

marked that the United States had lost a relationship with a complete generation of Pakistani military officers due to the Pressler sanctions. At that time, he made a commitment to correcting that mistake. Consequently, literally hundreds of Pakistani military officers have interacted and trained with their US counterparts over the past five years. Certainly, the training of Pakistani military personnel with the US military should be maintained, however, there are areas for improvement:

- Operations against terrorists are more successful when conducted by means of timely information sharing between US and Pakistani agencies; while still respecting one another's sovereignty and values. Many of the top leaders of al Qaeda have been captured or killed by Pakistani security forces or law enforcement agencies based on information provided by US intelligence. Conversely, on some occasions US forces have acted unilaterally inside Pakistani territory. These incidents, which have mostly failed to achieve their intended objectives, often produced civilian casualties and loss of property resulting in intense politico-diplomatic backlashes. For example, on 13 January 2006, 13 innocent people (3 men, 5 women, and 5 children) were killed in four houses in Pakistan by a US air or missile attack.[31] Besides the loss of innocent lives, the incident resulted in a diplomatic rebuke by the Pakistan government, public unrest in Pakistan, and a plethora of problems for Pakistani security forces operating in the area. America should not act unilaterally with disregard for the territorial integrity of an ally; violation of sovereignty does not serve the long-term interests of either nation. Further, such acts have a negligible impact on the easily replaceable leadership of al Qaeda. Information-sharing has produced the best results and should be relied upon in the future.
- The United States needs to provide Pakistan forces with technologically advanced equipment—including sensors, surveillance and acquisition means, telecommunication equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles for monitoring movements and conducting search and destroy missions in the border areas.
- Through active socioeconomic measures, Pakistan needs to bring its tribal areas into the mainstream of the national political structure, thereby eliminating terrorist sanctuaries. The US government and NGOs can provide much needed financial and technological assistance to Pakistan in an effort to bolster regional economies.
- Pakistan can enhance jointness among its military services, benefiting from the rich US experience.
- The US could, on a limited basis, allow the licensed production of US military equipment in Pakistan.

Conclusion

Pakistan's support to the United States in the war on terrorism is buttressed by a consensus from within the Pakistani nation and actively led by President Musharraf. Liberated through a democratic process, Pakistan has strong traditions of pluralistic attitudes in religion, politics, and freedom of speech that are compatible with US values and strategic objectives. Although the events of 9/11 have served as a catalyst for bringing America and Pakistan closer, US policy with regard to Pakistan is not limited to the Global War on Terrorism. Although both nations have their respective national interests and security concerns, most long-term US objectives are shared by Pakistan. Importantly, there are no areas of significant divergence regarding the national interests of both nations.

Historically, some issues and isolated incidents have led to mutual distrust. Both countries have worked through these and acknowledged major areas of coincident interests, deliberately pursuing a closer relationship for the benefit of all. Nevertheless, there are additional opportunities for improving this relationship. An improved US-Pakistani relationship will solidify Pakistan as a reliable regional partner and strengthen the overall conduct of the global war on terrorism, further stabilizing a region that at one time was fraught with danger.

NOTES

1. Shahid Javed Burki, *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan*, (2d ed.; London: The Scarecrow Press, 1999), p. 186.
2. Ibid., p. 336.
3. Ibid., p. 336-37
4. Ibid., p. 337
5. Ibid., p. 98
6. There were also other reasons meriting Pakistani support to the Taliban. The Afghan civil war had two distinct groupings based on their historic affinity: the Taliban, who were mostly Sunni Pushtoons, had actively fought for the liberation of Afghanistan from the Soviets and had been supported by the West, the Arab countries and Pakistan; the Northern Alliance was a collection of various minority ethnic and sectarian groups living in the northern and western parts of Afghanistan, their support base being in the Soviet Union, Iran, and India. Peaceful Afghanistan was also a strategic necessity for Pakistan due to Pakistan's threat perception vis a vis India and Afghanistan's role as a state capable of providing strategic depth. The Taliban held fundamentalist religious ideology, but were extremely honest and, at the time, were the only hope for bringing peace to the war-torn country.
7. Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), pp. 214-15. It is generally thought that due to lack of engagement with Pakistan, the US did not understand Pakistan's economic hardships and compulsions vis a vis Afghanistan. However, the conversation between General Tommy Franks, then Commander in Chief of the US Central Command, and George Tenet, former Director of the CIA, before the former's visit to Pakistan in 2001, revealed the US understood the situation in Afghanistan and reflects an understanding of the ground realities of the time: "As a practical matter, Pakistan will continue an accommodation with the Taliban until we are able to offer a better alternative. Musharraf is between a rock and a hard place—India and the Pressler Amendment" . . . "Afghanistan offers the Pakistani's what we call 'strategic depth.' That's battle space to maneuver and support Pakistani combat forces in the event of another war with India." Tenet responded, "That's what my people tell me also." In his meeting with President Musharraf, General Franks was told: "We have no choice but to work with the Taliban" . . . "I can assure you that we dislike their extremism, but they brought stability to Afghanistan and ended the bloodshed after the Soviets left. We must have stability on at

least one border. . . . The Taliban is isolated. We have some influence with them, but we don't control them. I will do my best to help, but we need help from the international community. . . . Pakistan would like to help with the problem of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. If we can increase our influence with the Taliban, it is possible they would agree to expel him to some neutral state for either exile or to be put on trial." General Franks then said he could not grant concessions, but indicated that he would carry the message to Washington.

8. Ayaz Amir, "A Passion for Selling Ourselves Cheaply," *Dawn*, 21 September 2001, http://66.201.122.226/weekly/ayaz/20010921.htm.

9. Ibid.

10. John A. Gastright, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, US Department of State, interview by author, 13 December 2005, Washington, D.C.

11. Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan–Between Mosque and Military* (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 326.

12. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Fact Book: Pakistan*, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html.

13. Ibid.

14. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, "Report on Economic Survey 2004-05," http://www.finance.gov.pk/.

15. Ibid.

16. Daily Times, Pakistan, "Sindh demands Rs. 1 billion for Thar Coal Project," 10 July 2003, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_10-7-2003_pg7_36.

17. Indiainfo.com, "Work on Iran-India Gas Pipeline May Begin by 2007," 30 December 2005, http://news.indiainfo.com/2005/12/30/3012iran-india-gas-pipeline-work.html.

18. Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of the State for South Asian Affairs, "Statement before the House International Affairs Committee for Asia and the Pacific," 14 June 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/2005/47892.htm.

19. Brigadier Ikram Ullah, Pakistan's Senior National Representative, vs. Central Command, (telephone interview), 20 December 2006.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad, "Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (2004-05)," http://www.statpak.gov.pk.

23. US Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, October 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm.

24. The PEW Global Attitudes Project, "Data on Gauging National Satisfaction" http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=805.

25. The introduction to the National Assembly of Pakistan starts with these words: "Pakistan was created entirely through a democratic and constitutional struggle. Islam is the anchor-sheet of Pakistan and democracy is ingrained deep into the Muslim psyche. Islam permits no 'hero worship.' Pakistan's record of parliamentary democracy may be checkered but its return to this form after each pause and break more than vindicates the fact that democratic traditions are deep-rooted in Pakistan's polity," http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/.

26. Asia Pacific Online Network of Women in Politics, "Women in Pakistan," http://www.onlinewomeninpolitics.org/pakistan/pakmain.htm.

27. PEW Global Attitudes Project.

28. Gastright.

29. Pak-Millennium Conference 2002, Higher Education in Pakistan: Challenges for Reform held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Boston University, "Conference Report on Fiscal Solvency and Financial Management," 13-14 April 2002, http://web.mit.edu/bilal/www/education/pmc2002report.pdf.

30. Although beyond the purview of this article, following are a few thoughts on resolution of this long standing dispute, which has aptly been termed as the nuclear flash point: US mediation can greatly facilitate Pakistan—India negotiations keeping them focused. The position that USA cannot mediate between these two countries is fallacious, because the US has mediated between them on two recent occasions, during the Kargil conflict in 1999 and the standoff in 2002. In the short term, the emphasis has to be on reduction of forces on both sides of the Line of Control and bringing peace to the people of Indian-Held Kashmir. For ultimate resolution of the dispute, the model of entire Kashmir being one constituency for plebiscite can be modified to allow self determination on regional basis and a realignment of the border to accommodate the wishes of the people of Kashmir. This would not only allow self determination for the Kashmiri people, but also allow face saving to both Pakistan and India. Management of the dispute through purely bilateral measures, without substantive external efforts for its resolution is unlikely to be successful.

31. Amnesty International, "Pakistan: US Involvement in Civilian Deaths," http://www.amnestyusa.org/regions/asia/document.do?id=ENGASA330022006.

Commentary & Reply

Beware of Boldness

To the Editor:

Conrad Crane's article "Beware of Boldness" (*Parameters*, Summer 2006) profoundly illustrates that the devil, is in deed, in the definition. The author urges the reader to contest the Army's use of the word boldness as a positive character trait as it encourages a culture of daring risk-taking, especially, at the senior level. He uses his personal dictionary and a decidedly subjective analysis of American military history to put forth his case.

Generally, defining a word and historical research would work well to establish meaning. Unfortunately, as in this case, we also know that dictionaries differ and history has a way of censoring contemporary values if not applied appropriately. Continuing the author's analytical process by taking into account definition variances and by applying a more circumspect application of history will bring us closer to the correct answer.

To determine whether boldness is a positive or negative trait, one must take into account how the institution in question supports its application. The US Army War College takes a historical teaching approach. Unquestionably, one of the most studied military personages within the higher levels of the US Army education system is General Carl Von Clausewitz.

In *On War*, Von Clausewitz writes that boldness "from the train-driver and the drummer up to the general, is the noblest of virtues, the true steel which gives the weapon its edge and brilliancy." However, we also learn from him that it must be tempered with "a reflective mind, that it may not be a mere blind outburst of passion to no purpose; for with increase of rank it becomes always less a matter of self-sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation of others, and the good of the whole." To the Army, therefore, boldness is a positive trait as a creative power "that only when it encounters cautious foresight that it is at a disadvantage. . . ."

Next, consider the definition of "boldness." Numerous references in book form and over the Internet vary significantly. The author defines the word using the *Webster's New World Dictionary*. He cites the definition as "daring, fearless." He then cross-references "daring" which his dictionary defines as "having or showing a bold willingness to take risks." A quick review of other civilian dictionaries confirms that there are assorted definitions for both words. For example, the *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* defines "bold" as "fearless before danger" and "daring" as to have the "courage to contend against. . . ." In addition, boldness has been historically defined with synonyms such as courage, bravery, intrepidity, dauntlessness, hardihood, and assurance. The word, "daring," is also a decidedly positive historic military trait when defined as "fearlessness and adventurousness."

The determination must be made as to which of the definitions most closely represents the general understanding of the terms when used in the context presented. To accomplish this, exchange the author's definition of "bold" with one from a rival source. Case in point, the author cites Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld addressing units at Fort Carson in October 2003 extolling them to be "bold, courageous, and innovative." By using "bold" as the author suggests, it would have the Secretary of Defense urging soldiers to be "reckless." However, if one uses a different dictionary, the statement could just as well mean, "to be fearless before danger."

Moreover, by applying the latter, the Secretary's words are well in line with the author's portrayal of Christopher "Kit" Carson's legacy as a brave, yet not reckless, leader. One should have little trouble determining which definition Secretary Rumsfeld wanted the audience to understand.

That argument can be taken further. What would a reasonable person, notwithstanding a particular definition, presume the statement to illustrate? For this scrutiny, we can use General Tommy Frank's first slide for his field commanders. The author tells us it read, "Take as much risk coming out as you took going in." The author implies that General Franks, with that one slide, sought to change the focus of the war from deliberate yet daring planning to accepting a great deal more risk as the military objective was met. Unfortunately, for the reader, there is little evidence provided to support such an assertion. On its face, it appears instead that the commanding general was actually harkening his troops not to accept additional risks.

General George S. Patton, Jr. is reported to have suggested that a good plan, violently executed, now, is better than a perfect plan next week. To many, those words are a decidedly bold choice from a very bold leader. However, using the author's dictionary and history, Patton was not a bold leader at all. Furthermore, in the article, MacArthur was bold, Eisenhower was not, but Pershing was, sort of. Nevertheless, all were successful in battle. This diminishes the author's argument that boldness in leaders produces negative results.

The author suggests that without bold leaders we would have leaders with better decisionmaking skills. However, soldiers having served under such leaders might disagree. If we consider the antonym of "boldness" we would have instead leaders who are doubtful, insecure, distrustful, and uncertain.

Words have differing meanings as determined by the context in which they are used. We should not engage in dueling dictionaries and histories to conclude what the Army intended when it adopted "boldness" as one of the key traits desirable in senior leaders. We should keep an open mind and thoughtfully analyze the information from different perspectives.

Army leaders need to continue fostering creative thought by "challenging inflexible ways of thinking, removing impediments to institutional innovation, and underwriting the risks associated with bold change." For the word, "bold" is only as negative as one makes it out to be.

Colonel Brian D. Perry
Stuttgart, Germany

The Author Replies:

My main purpose in writing "Beware of Boldness" was to foster debate about the accepted definition of the term and to get military practitioners to consider its implications. From the many communications I have received, mostly in favor of my arguments, but some against, I think I have been successful in achieving those goals. Critics are correct that there are various definitions in dictionaries, though I contend that a high element of risk is implied in the majority of those definitions. And there is still no doctrinal military definition, though the word often appears in field manuals. The lines between "reckless," "daring," and "bold" are not clearly defined. In a recent presentation on leadership, General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, declared his desire to develop "prudent risk-takers." To this author, that phrasing is right on the mark. I wish I could take credit for helping to inspire it. If General Schoomaker's definition becomes the accepted interpretation for "boldness," I think the military and American society will be well served. The concept also captures the need for judgment that Colonel Perry quotes from Clausewitz.

My overall argument is subtler than Colonel Perry gives me credit. I did not state that boldness always produces negative results. Generals MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Pershing all were great soldiers who made significant contributions to the nation's defense. I consider MacArthur the most brilliant soldier the nation has ever produced. But for both he and Pershing, once they reached the highest levels of command their penchant for boldness waned, eventually contributing to major policy failures that reverberated for decades in the international arena. The author Max Boot recently wrote an opinion piece about Iraq decrying the dangers of "bold ideas, badly executed." I think that description could also cover events at the Chosin Reservoir and Meuse-Argonne. As for the interpretation of General Tommy Franks' slide that I referred to in my article, all those who viewed it knew exactly what the general was saying about risk, especially the postwar planners who realized that dangers were being assumed away.

Colonel Perry is correct about the importance of leadership in setting a command climate that encourages innovation in subordinates and avoids a "zero-defect" mentality that discourages risk. The equation requires a delicate balance, ensuring that subordinates feel they have the "freedom to fail" at lower levels, while avoiding the significant costs associated with overreaching at the more senior levels of command. General Marshall did indeed give a great deal of latitude to subordinates, but their performance could almost universally be described as "prudent risk-taking" or even conservative, based primarily on shared values related to leadership and risk. If there had been significant failures resultant of his style of leadership, I feel certain he would have modified his approach. But that was not necessary since the war generally was conducted well, though not boldly.

Many have argued that boldness means being willing to take great personal risk by displaying the moral courage to advocate politically unpopular positions. That may be true, though I hearken back to Clausewitz's cautions cited by Colonel Perry. With "increase of rank" and responsibility comes an appreciation

for "the good of the whole." That is why equating risk in the civilian sector to that in the military is fallacious. At worst, excessive risk-taking by a chief executive officer might cost workers their jobs and perhaps cause a business to fail. For senior military leaders, the same behavior could cost lives, and perhaps even lead to a nation's decline or demise.

Conrad C. Crane

The Most Professional Military

To the Editor:

In his article "Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities" (*Parameters*, Autumn 2006), Colonel Melillo repeats a contentious assertion that I sometimes encounter in US military writing. He refers to the current US military as the "most highly skilled, best equipped, and most professional military in history" as well as "the most powerful, best equipped, and most highly trained fighting force in the world." While few would deny that the US armed forces today are the most powerful or best equipped, it is surely difficult to claim that the US military is more professional or better trained that any other in the world, let alone in history.

There have been and are today many other standing armies made of volunteers or long-service veterans. Among contemporary ones, some train as continuously and thoroughly as US forces. Again, many have wholly professional officer and noncommissioned officer corps. All of these characteristics represent the upper limit of quality in their dimension. It is not possible to train more than continuously, or study one's profession for more than a lifetime. With the important exception of the combat veteran, it is not possible to be more experienced than a career soldier. (Indeed, if one considers seasoned veterans to be professionals then there have been hundreds of more professional armies throughout history.) It follows, therefore, that all armies which are able to attain this peak of training and professionalism are equally trained and professional. My own observations have convinced me that this is the case. It seems to me that the officers of any NATO army, for example, are more or less completely professional. At the collective level, and among nations with continuously training and deploying volunteer armies, there is little to choose between them.

To be sure, not all professional armies are equally good at everything. Armies reflect the strengths and weaknesses of their societies, and their abilities are shaped by doctrine. Colonel Melillo has noted that the US armed forces have often shown a proficiency at mass war, a proficiency that has been less apparent in so-called small wars. One could argue that the British Army has had the opposite set of talents. It would be bold indeed, however, to assert that one army is more professional than the other.

American forces are genuinely well trained and led. To imagine that there are not other equally expert forces out there would be unimaginative and parochial-characteristics unworthy of a professional army.

Major Raymond Farrell
Canadian Army

The Author Replies:

I appreciate Major Farrell's inquiry into my description of the US military as "the most highly skilled, best equipped, and most professional military in history." My intent was certainly not to imply that this point is unarguable or that other militaries are not also exceptionally professional. I can also understand that my comments may have been perceived as American arrogance or parochialism. While I regret the false implication, I do believe that pride in one's country and service is one of the intangibles that motivate each of us to selflessly serve our nations with professionalism in whatever type of conflict we might face.

Colonel Michael Melillo

Commentary & Reply Submissions

We invite reader commentaries of up to 1,000 words on articles appearing in *Parameters*. Not all commentaries can be published. For those that are, the author of the article will be invited to provide a reply. Commentaries may be edited to meet style and space constraints. Send to US Army War College, ATTN: *Parameters*, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013, or by e-mail to Parameters@carlisle.army.mil.

Review Essays

The Quranic Concept of War[1]

JOSEPH C. MYERS

> The universalism of Islam, in its all-embracing creed, is imposed on the believers as a continuous process of warfare, psychological and political, if not strictly military. . . . The Jihad, accordingly, may be stated as a doctrine of a permanent state of war, not continuous fighting."[2]
>
> — Majid Khadduri

Political and military leaders are notoriously averse to theory, but if there is a theorist about war who matters, it remains Carl von Clausewitz, whose *Vom Kriege* (*On War*) has shaped Western views about war since the middle of the nineteenth century."[3] Both points are likely true and problematic since we find ourselves engaged in war with people not solely imbued with western ideas and values or followers of western military theorists. The Hoover Institution's Paul Sperry recently stated, "Four years into the war on terror, US intelligence officials tell me there are no baseline studies of the Muslim prophet Muhammad or his ideological or military doctrine found at either the CIA or Defense Intelligence Agency, or even the war colleges."[4]

Would this be surprising? When it comes to warfighting military audiences tend to focus on the military and power aspects of warfare; the tangibles of terrain, enemy, weather, leadership, and troops; quantifiables such as the number of tanks and artillery tubes—the correlation of forces. Analysts steer toward the familiar rather than the unfamiliar; people tend to think in their comfort zones. The study of ideology or philosophy is often brushed aside, it's not the "stuff of muddy boots;" it is more cerebral than physical and not action oriented. Planners do not assess the "correlation of ideas." The practitioners are too busy.

Dr. Antulio Echevarria recently argued the US military does not have a doctrine for war as much as it has a doctrine for operations and battles.[5] The military has a deficit of strategic, and, one could add, philosophic thinking. In the war against Islamist terrorism, how many have heard of the Muslim Brotherhood's "Project"?[6] Is the political philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in fact well-grounded in western political theory and rigorously rejected it, studied in our military schools? Are there any implications to his statement in 1981 that "Iran . . . is determined to propagate Islam to the whole world"?[7]

To understand war, one has to study its philosophy; the grammar and logic of your opponent. Only then are you approaching strategic comprehension. To understand the war against Islamist terrorism one must begin to understand the Islamic way of war, its philosophy and doctrine, the meanings of *jihad* in Islam—and one needs to understand that those meanings are highly varied and utilitarian depending on the source.

With respect to the war against the global *jihad* and its associated terror groups, individual terrorists, and clandestine adherents, one should ask if there is a unique method or attitude to their approach to war. Is there a philosophy, or treatise such as Clausewitz's *On War* that attempts to form their thinking about war? Is there a document that can be reviewed and understood in such a manner that we may begin to think strategically about our opponent. There is one work that stands out from the many.

The Quranic Concept of War

The Quranic Concept of War, by Brigadier General S. K. Malik of the Pakistani Army provides readers with unequalled insight. Originally published in Pakistan in 1979, most available copies are found in India, or in small non-descript Muslim bookstores.[8] One major point to ponder, when thinking about *The Quranic Concept of War*, is the title itself. The *Quran* is presumed to be the revealed word of God as spoken through his chosen prophet, Mohammed. According to Malik, the *Quran* places warfighting doctrine and its theory in a much different category than western thinkers are accustomed to, because it is not a theory of war derived by man, but of God. This is God's warfighting principles and commandments revealed. Malik's attempts to distill God's doctrine for war through the examples of the Prophet. By contrast, the closest that Clausewitz comes to divine presentation is in his discussion of the trinity: the people, the state, and the military. In the Islamic context, the discussion of war is at the level of revealed truth and example, well above theory—God has no need to theorize. Malik notes, "As a complete Code of Life, the *Holy Quran* gives us a philosophy of war as well. . . . This divine philosophy is an integral part of the total Quranic ideology."[9]

Historiography

In *The Quranic Concept of War*, Malik seeks to instruct readers in the uniquely important doctrinal aspects of Quranic warfare. The Quranic approach to war is "infinitely supreme and effective . . . [and] points towards the realization of universal peace and justice . . . and makes maximum allowance to its adversaries to co-operate [with Islam] in a combined search for a just and peaceful order."[10] For purposes of this review, the term "doctrine" refers to both religious and broad strategic approaches, not methods and procedures. Malik's work is a treatise with historical, political, legalistic, and moralistic ramifications on Islamic warfare. It seemingly is without parallel in the western sense of warfare since the "*Quran* is a source of eternal guidance for mankind."[11]

The approach is not new to Islamists and other *jihad* theorists fighting according to the "Method of Mohammed" or *hadith*. The lessons learned are recorded

and form an important part of Quranic *surah* and *jihadist's* scholarship.[12] Islamic scholars both Muslim and non-Muslim will find much to debate in terms of Malik's view of *jihad* doctrine and Quranic warfare. Malik's work is essentially modern scholarship; although he does acknowledge the classical views of *jihad* in many respects.[13]

Malik's arguments are clearly parochial, often more editorial than scholarly, and his tone is decidedly confident and occasionally supremacist. The reach and influence of the author's work is not clear although one might believe that given the idealism of his treatise, his approaches to warfare, and the role and ends of "terror" his text may resonate with extremist and radicals prone to use terroristic violence to accomplish their ends. For that reason alone, the book is worth studying.

Introduction

The preface by Allah Bukhsh K. Brohi, the former Pakistani ambassador to India, offers important insights into Malik's exposition. In fact, Brohi's 13-page preface lays the foundation for the books ten chapters. Malik places Quranic warfare in an academic context relative to that used by western theorists. He analyzes the causes and objects of war, as well as war's nature and dimensions. He then turns attention to the ethics and strategy of warfare. Toward the end of the book he reviews the exercise of Quranic warfare based on the examples of the Prophet Mohammed's military campaigns and concludes with summary observations. There are important jus en bellum and jus ad bellum implications in the author's writings, as well as in his controversial ideas related to the means and objectives of war. It is these concepts that warrant the attention of planners and strategist.

Zia-Ul-Haq (1924-88), the former President of Pakistan and Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, opens the book by focusing on the concept of *jihad* within Islam and explaining it is not simply the domain of the military:

> *Jehad fi sabilallah* is not the exclusive domain of the professional soldier, nor is it restricted to the application of military force alone.
>
> This book brings out with simplicity, clarity and precision the Quranic philosophy on the application of military force within the context of the totality that is JEHAD. The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim state, cannot become 'professional' if in all his activities he does not take the 'colour of Allah,' The nonmilitary citizen of a Muslin state must, likewise, be aware of the kind of soldier that his country must produce and the only pattern of war that his country's armed forces may wage.[14]

General Zia states that all Muslims play a role in *jihad*, a mainstream concept of the *Quran*, that *jihad* in terms of warfare is a collective responsibility of the Muslim *ummah*, and is not restricted to soldiers. General Zia emphasizes how the concept of Islamic military professionalism requires "godly character" in order to be fully achieved. Zia then endorses Malik's thesis as the "only pattern of war," or approach to war that an Islamic state may wage.

Battling Counter-initiatory Forces

In the preface Ambassador Brohi details what might be startling to many readers. He states that Malik has made "a valuable contribution to Islamic jurisprudence" or Islamic law, and an "analytic restatement of the Quranic wisdom on the subject of war and peace." Brohi implies that Malik's discussion, though a valuable new version, is an approach to a theme already well developed.[15]

Brohi then defines *jihad*, "The most glorious word in the Vocabulary of Islam is *Jehad*, a word which is untranslatable in English but, broadly speaking, means 'striving', 'struggling', 'trying' to advance the Divine causes or purposes." He introduces a somewhat cryptic concept when he explains man's role in a "Quranic setting" as energetically combating forces of evil or what may be called, "counter-initiatory" forces which are at war with the harmony and the purpose of life on earth.[16] For the true Muslin the harmony and purpose in life are only possible through man's ultimate submission to God's will, that all will come to know, recognize, and profess Mohammed as the Prophet of God. Man must recognize the last days and acknowledge *tawhid*, the oneness of God.[17]

Brohi recounts the classic dualisms of Islamic theology; that the world is a place of struggle between good and evil, between right and wrong, between *Haq* and *Na-Haq* (truth and untruth), and between *halal* and *haram* (legitimate and forbidden). According to Brohi, it is the duty of man to opt for goodness and reject evil. Brohi appeals to the "greater *jihad*," a post-classical *jihad* doctrine developed by the mystical Sufi order and other Shia scholars.[18]

Brohi places *jihad* in the context of communal if not imperial obligation; both controversial formulations:

> When a believer sees that someone is trying to obstruct another believer from traveling the road that leads to God, spirit of Jehad requires that such a man who is imposing obstacles should be prevented from doing so and the obstacles placed by him should also be removed, so that mankind may be freely able to negotiate its own path that leads to Heaven." To do otherwise, "by not striving to clear or straighten the path we [Muslims] become passive spectators of the counter-initiatory forces imposing a blockade in the way of those who mean to keep their faith with God.[19]

This viewpoint appears to reflect the classic, collective duty within *jihad* doctrine, to defend the Islamic community from threats—the concept of defensive *jihad*. Brohi is saying much more than that; however, he is attempting to delineate the duty—the proactive duty—to clear the path for Islam. It is necessary not only to defend the individual believer if he is being hindered in his faith, but also to remove the obstacles of those counter-initiatory forces hindering his Islamic development. This begs the question of what is actually meant by the initiatory forces. The answer is clear to Brohi; the force of initiative is Islam and its Muslim members. "It is the duty of a believer to carry forward the Message of God and to bring it to notice of his fellow-men in handsome ways. But if someone attempts to obstruct him from doing so he is entitled as a matter of defense, to retaliate."[20]

This formulation would appear to turn the concept of defense on its head. To the extent that a Muslim may proclaim Islam and proselytize, or Islam, as a faith, seeks to extend its invitation and reach—initiate its advance—but is unable to do so, then that represents an overt threat justifying—a defensive *jihad*. According to Brohi, this does not result in the "ordinary wars which mankind has been fighting for the sake of either revenge or for securing . . . more land or more booty . . . [this] striving must be [is] for the sake of God. Wars in the theory of Islam are . . . to advance God's purposes on earth, and invariably they are defensive in character." In other words, everywhere the message of God and Islam is or can be hindered from expansion, resisted or opposed by some "obstruction" (a term not clearly defined) Islam is intrinsically entitled to defend its manifest destiny.[21]

While his logic is controversial, Brohi is not unique in his extrapolation. His theory in fact reflects the argument of Rashid Rida, a conservative disciple of the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh. In 1913 Abduh published an article evaluating Islam's early military campaigns and determined that Islam's early neighbors "prevented the proclamation of truth" engendering the defense of Islam. "Our religion is not like others that defend themselves . . . but our defense of our religion is the proclamation of truth and the removal of distortion and misrepresentation of it."[22]

No Nation is Sovereign

The exegesis of the term *jihad* is often debated. Some apologists make clear that nowhere in the *Quran* does the term "Holy War" exist; that is true, but it is also irrelevant. War in Islam is either just or unjust and that justness depends on the ends of war. Brohi, and later Malik, make clear that the ends of war in Islam or *jihad* are to fulfill God's divine purpose. Not only should that be a holy purpose, it must be a just war in order to be "Holy War."[23]

The next dualism Brohi presents is that of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*, the house of submission and the house of war. He describes the latter, as "perpetuating defiance of the Lord." While explaining that conditions for war in Islam are limited (a constrained set of circumstances) he notes that "in Islam war is waged to establish supremacy of the Lord only when every other argument has failed to convince those who reject His will and work against the very purpose of the creation of mankind."[24] Brohi quotes the Quranic manuscript *Surah, al-Tawba*:

> Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.[25]

Acknowledging western critics who believe that Islam is in a state of perpetual struggle with the non-Islamic world, Brohi counters in a clearly dismissive tone by explaining that man is the slave to God, and defying God is treason under Islamic law. Those who defy God should be removed from humanity like a cancerous growth. Islam requires believers "to invite non-believers to the fold of Islam" by using "persuasion" and "beautiful methods." He continues, "the first duty" of a Muslim

is *dawa*, a proclamation to conversion by "handsome ways." It is only after refusing *dawa* and the invitation to Islam that "believers have no option but in self-defense to wage a war against those threatening aggression."

Obviously, much turns on how threats and aggression are characterized. It is difficult to understand, however, based on the structure of his argument, that Brohi views non-believers and their states as requiring conversion over time by peaceful means; and when that fails, by force. He is echoing the doctrine of Abd al-Salam Faraj, author of *Al-Farida al-Ghaibah*, better known as *The Neglected Duty*, a work that is widely read throughout the Muslim world.[26]

Finally, Brohi examines the concept of the *ummah* and the international system. "The idea of Ummah of Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam, is incapable of being realized within the framework of territorial states." This is a consistent view that underpins many works on the concept of the Islamic state.[27] For Muslims, the *ummah* is a transcendent religious and cultural society united and reflecting the unity (*tawhid*) of Islam; the idea of one God, indivisible, one community, one belief, and one duty to live and become godly. According to the Prophet, "Ummah participates in this heritage by a set pattern of thought, belief and practice . . . and supplies the spiritual principle of integration of mankind—a principle which is supra-national, supra-racial, supra-linguistic and supra-territorial."[28]

With respect to the "law of war and peace in Islam" Brohi writes it "is as old as the *Quran* itself. . . . " In his analysis of the law of nations and their international dealings, he emphasizes that in "Islamic international law this conduct [war and peace] is, strictly speaking, regulated between Muslims and non-Muslims, there being, from Islamic perspective, no other nation. . . . " In other words, war is between Muslims and non-Muslims and not in actuality between states. It is transnational. He adds, "In Islam, of course, no nation is sovereign since Allah alone is the only sovereign in Whom all authority vests."[29] Here Brohi is echoing what Islamic scholars such as Majid Khadduri have described as the "dualism of the universal religion and universal state that is Islam."[30]

The Divine Philosophy on War

General Malik begins by categorizing human beings into three archetypes: those who fear Allah and profess the Faith; those who reject the Faith; and those who profess, but are treacherous in their hearts. Examples of the Prophet and the instructions to him by God in his early campaigns should be studied to fully understand these three examples in practice. The author highlights the fact that the "divine philosophy on war" was revealed gradually over a 12 year period, its earliest guidance dealing with the causes and objects of war, while later guidance focused on Quranic strategy, the conduct of war, and the ethical dimensions of warfare.[31]

In Chapter Three, Malik reviews several key thoughts espoused by western scholars related to the causes of war. He examines the ideologies of Lenin, Geoffery Blainey, Quincy Wright, and Frederick H. Hartman each of whom spoke about war in a historical or material context with respect to the nature of the state system. Malik finds these explanations wanting and turns to the *Quran* for explanation, "war could only be

waged for the sake of justice, truth, law, and preservation of human society. . . . The central theme behind the causes of war . . . [in] the *Holy Quran*, was the cause of Allah."[32]

The author recounts the progression of revelations by God to the Prophet that "granted the Muslims the permission to fight . . . ." Ultimately, God would compel and command Muslims to fight: "Fight in the cause of Allah." In his analysis of this *surah* Malik highlights the fact that "new elements" were added to the causes of war: that in order to fight, Muslims must be "fought first;" Muslims are not to "transgress God's limits" in the conduct of war; and everyone should understand that God views "tumult and oppression" of Muslims as "worse than slaughter."[33] This oppression was exemplified by the denial of Muslim's right to worship at the Sacred Mosque by the early Arab Koraish, people of Mecca. Malik describes the situation in detail, ". . . the tiny Muslim community in Mecca was the object of the Koraish tyranny and oppression since the proclamation of Islam. . . . The enemy repression reached its zenith when the Koraish denied the Muslims access to the Sacred Mosque (the Ka'aba) to fulfill their religious obligations. This sacrilegious act amounted to an open declaration of war upon Islam. These actions eventually compelling the Muslims to migrate to Medina twelve years later, in 622 AD. . . ."[34]

Malik argues that the pagan Koraish tribe had no reason to prohibit Muslim worship, since the Muslims did not impede their form of worship. This historical example helps to further define the concept that "tumult and oppression is worse than slaughter" and as the *Quran* repeats, "graver is it in the sight of Allah to prevent access to the path of Allah, to deny Him, to prevent access to the Sacred Mosque, and drive out its members." Malik also notes the *Quran* distinguishes those who fight "in the cause of Allah and those who reject Faith and fight in the cause of evil."[35] In terms of Quranic just war theory, war must be waged "only to fight the forces of tyranny and oppression."[36]

Challenging Clausewitz's notion that "policy" provides the context and boundary of war; Malik says it is the reverse, "'war' forced policy to define and determine its own parameters" and since that discussion focuses on parochial issues such as national interests, and the vagaries of state to state relations it is a lesser perspective. In the divine context of the *Quran* war orients on the spread of "justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere." According to the author war is to be fought aggressively, slaughter is not the worst evil. In the course of war every opportunity for peace should be pursued and reciprocated. That is every remonstrance of peace by the enemies of Islam, but only as prescribed by the *Quran's* "clear-cut philosophy and methodology" for preserving peace.[37]

Understanding the context in which the *Quran* describes and defines "justice and peace" is important. Malik refers the reader to the battle of Badr to elucidate these principles. There is peace with those pagans who cease hostilities, and war continues with those who refuse. He cites the following *surah*, "as long as these stand true to you, stand ye true to them, for Allah doth love the righteous."[38] Referring to the precedent setting Hodaibayya treaty in the ninth year of the *hijra*, or pilgrimages to Mecca, Malik outlines how Allah and the Prophet abrogated those treaties with the pagan Meccans.

Pagans who accepted terms voluntarily without a treaty were respected. Those who refused, the *Quran* directed, were to be slain wherever found. This precedent and "revelations commanded the Muslims to fulfill their treaty commitments for the contracted period but put them under no obligations to renew them."[39] It also established the precedent that Muslims may conclude treaties with non-believers, but only for a temporary period.[40] Commenting on western approaches to peace, Malik views such approaches as not standing the "test of time" with no worthwhile role to play even in the future.[41] The author's point is that peace between states has only secular, not divine ends; and peace in an Islamic context is achieved only for the promotion of Islam.

As the Prophet gained control of Mecca he decreed that non-believers could assemble or watch over the Sacred Mosque. He later consolidated power over Arabia and many who had not yet accepted Islam, "including Christians and Jew, [they] were given the option to choose between war and submission." These non-believers were required to pay a poll-tax or *jizya* and accept the status of *dhimmitude* [servitude to Islam] in order to continue practicing their faith. According to Malik the taxes were merely symbolic and insignificant. In summarizing this relationship the author states, "the object of war is to obtain conditions of peace, justice, and faith. To do so it is essential to destroy the forces of oppression and persecution."[42] This view is in keeping with that outlined by Khadduri, "The *jihad*, it will be recalled, regarded war as Islam's instrument to transform the *dar al-harb* into *dar al-Islam* . . . in Islamic legal theory, the ultimate objective of Islam is not war per se, but the ultimate establishment of peace."[43]

The Nature of War

Malik argues that the "nature and dimension of war" is the greatest single characteristic of Quranic warfare and distinguishes it from all other doctrines. He acknowledges Clausewitz's contribution to the understanding of warfare in its moral and spiritual context. The moral forces of war, as Clausewitz declared, are perhaps the most important aspects in war. Reiterating that Muslims are required to wage war "with the spirit of religious duty and obligation," the author makes it clear that in return for fighting in the way of Allah, divine, angelic assistance will be rendered to *jihad* warriors and armies. At this point *The Quranic Concept of War* moves beyond the metaphysical to the supernatural element, unlike anything found in western doctrine. Malik highlights the fact that divine assistance requires "divine standards" on the part of the warrior *mujahideen* for the promise of Allah's aid to be met.[44]

The author then builds upon the *jihad* warrior's role in the realms of divine cause, purpose, and support, to argue that in order for the Muslim warrior to be unmatched, to be the bravest and the most fearless; he can only do so through the correct spiritual preparation, beginning with total submission to God's will. The *Quran* reveals that the moral forces are the "real issues involved in the planning and conduct of war."[45] Malik quotes the *Quran*: "Fighting is prescribed for you . . . and ye dislike a thing which is good for you and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not."

The *Quran* instructs the *jihad* warrior "to fight . . . with total devotion and never contemplate a flight from the battlefield for fear of death." The *jihad* warrior,

who dies in the way of Allah, does not really die but lives on in heaven. Malik emphasizes this in several Quranic verses. "Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. . . . Nay, they live finding their sustenance in the Presence of the Lord." Malik also notes that "Not equal are those Believers . . . Allah has granted a higher grade to those who strive and fight . . . ."[46]

The Quranic dimensions of war are "revolutionary," conferring on the *jihad* warrior a "personality so strong and overbearing as to prove themselves equal to, indeed dominate, every contingency in war."[47] This theme of spiritual preparation and pure belief has appeared in the prolific *jihad* writings of Usaman Dan Fodio in the early 1800s and repeated by the Saudi writer Abdallah al-Qadiri in 1992, both emphasizing the role of the "greater *jihad*." Becoming a purer and more disciplined Muslim serves the cause of Islam better in peace and war.[48]

Malik, like Brohi, acknowledges critics who say that Islam has been "spread by the sword," but he responds that Islam is spread through restraint in war and in "the use of force [that] have no parallel." He then argues that restraint in warfare is a "two-sided affair." Where the enemy (not defined) fails to exercise restraints and commits "excesses" (not defined) then "the very injunction of preserving and promoting peace and justice demands the use of limited force . . . . Islam permits the use of the sword for such purpose."[49] Since Malik is speaking in the context of active war and response to the "excesses of war" it is unclear what he means by "limited force" or response.

The author expands on the earlier ideas that moral and spiritual forces are predominate in war. He contrasts Islamic strategic approaches with western theories of warfare oriented toward the application of force, primarily in the military domain, as opposed to Islam where the focus is on a broader application of power. Power in Malik's context is the power of *jihad*, which is total, both in the conduct of total war and in its supporting strategy; referred to as "total or grand strategy." Malik provides the following definition, "*Jehad* is a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral and spiritual to attain the objectives of policy."[50] The power of *jihad* brings with it the power of God.

The Quranic concept of strategy is therefore divine theory. The examples and lessons to be derived from it may be found in the study of the classics, inspired by such events as the battles of the Prophet, e.g., Badr, Khandaq, Tabuk, and Hudaibiyya. Malik again references the divine assistance of Allah and the aid of angelic hosts. He refers to the battles of Hunain and Ohad as instances where seeming defeat was reversed and Allah "sent down Tranquility into the hearts of believers, that they may add Faith to their Faith." Malik argues that divine providence steels the *jihadi* in war, "strengthens the hearts of Believers." Calmness of faith, "assurance, hope, and tranquility" in the face of danger is the divine standard.[51]

Strike Terror into their Hearts

Malik uses examples to demonstrate that Allah will strike "terror into the hearts of Unbelievers."[52] At this point he begins to develop his most controversial and conjectural Quranic theory related to warfare—the role of terror. Readers need to understand that the author is thinking and writing in strategic terms, not in the vernacular

of battles or engagements. Malik continues, "when God wishes to impose His will on his enemies, He chooses to do so by casting terror into their hearts."[53] He cites another verse, "against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts) of the enemies of Allah . . . ." Malik's strategic synthesis is specific: "the Quranic military strategy thus enjoins us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, known or hidden, while guarding ourselves from being terror-stricken by the enemy."[54] Terror is an effect; the end-state.

Malik identifies the center of gravity in war as the "human heart, [man's] soul, spirit, and Faith." Note that Faith is capitalized, meaning more than simple moral courage or fortitude. Faith in this sense is in the domain of religious and spiritual faith; this is the center of gravity in war. The main weapon against this Islamic concept of center of gravity is "the strength of our own souls . . . [keeping] terror away from our own hearts." In terms of achieving decisive and direct decisions preparing for this type of battlefield first requires "creating a wholesome respect for our *Cause*"—the cause of Islam. This "respect" must be seeded in advance of war and conflict in the minds of the enemies. Malik then introduces the informational, psychological, or perception management concepts of warfare. Echoing Sun Tzu, he states, that if properly prepared, the "war of muscle," the physical war, will already be won by "the war of will."[55] "Respect" therefore is achieved psychologically by, as Brohi suggested earlier, "beautiful" and "handsome ways" or by the strategic application of terror.

When examining the theme of the preparatory stage of war, Malik talks of the "war of preparation being waged . . . in peace," meaning that peacetime preparatory activities are in fact part of any war and "vastly more important than the active war." This statement should not be taken lightly, it essentially means that Islam is in a perpetual state of war while peace can only be defined as the absence of active war. Malik argues that peace-time training efforts should be oriented on the active war(s) to come, in order to develop the Quranic and divine "Will" in the *mujahid*. When armies and soldiers find limited physical resources they should continue and emphasize the development of the "spiritual resources" as these are complimentary factors and create synergy for future military action.

Malik's most controversial dictum is summarized in the following manner: in war, "the point where the means and the end meet" is in terror. He formulates terror as an objective principal of war; once terror is achieved the enemy reaches his culminating point. "Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose . . . ." Malik's divine principal of Islamic warfare may be restated as "strike terror; never feel terror." The ultimate objective of this form of warfare "revolves around the human heart, [the enemies] soul, spirit, and Faith."[56] Terror "can be instilled only if the opponent's Faith is destroyed . . . . It is essential in the ultimate analysis, to dislocate [the enemies] Faith." Those who are firm in their religious conviction are immune to terror, "a weak Faith offers inroads to terror." Therefore, as part of preparations for *jihad*, actions will be oriented on weakening the non-Islamic's "Faith," while strengthening the Islamic's. What that weakening or "dislocation" entails in practice remains ambiguous. Malik concludes, "Psychological dislocation is temporary; spiritual dislocation is permanent." The soul of man can only be touched by terror.[57]

Malik then moves to a more academic discussion of ten general categories inherent in the conduct of Islamic warfare. These categories are easily translatable and recognizable to most western theorists; planning, organization, and conduct of military operations. In this regard, the author offers no unique insight. His last chapter is used to restate his major conclusions, stressing that "The *Holy Quran* lays the highest emphasis on the preparation for war. It wants us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost. The test . . . lies in our capability to instill terror into the hearts of our enemies."[58]

Evaluation of The Quranic Concept of War

While the extent and reach of Malik's thesis cannot be confirmed in the Islamic world neither can it be discounted. Though controversial, his citations are accurately drawn from Islamic sources and consistent with classical Islamic jurisprudence.[59] As Malik notes, "Quranic military thought is an integral and inseparable part of the total Quranic message."[60] Policy planners and strategists striving to understand the nature of the "Long War" should consider Malik's writings in that light.

Malik makes clear that the *Quran* provides the doctrine, guidance, and examples for the conduct of Quranic or Islamic warfare. "It gives a strategy of war that penetrates deep down to destroy the opponents' faith and render his physical and mental faculties totally ineffective."[61] Malik's thesis focuses on the fact that the primary reason for studying the *Quran* is to gain a greater understanding of these concepts and insights. The Prophet Mohammed, as the *Quran* attests, changed the intent and objective of war—raising the sphere of war to a Godly plane and purpose; the global proclamation and spread of Islam. This obviously rejects the Clausewitizian politics and policy dyad: that war is simply policy of the state.

Quranic warfare is "just war." It is jus en bellum and jus ad bellum if fought "in the way of Allah" for divine purposes and the ends of Islam. This contradicts the western philosophy of just war theory. Another important connotation is that *jihad* is a continuum, across peace and war. It is a constant and covers the spectrum from grand strategy to tactical; collective to the individual; from the preparatory to the execution phases of war.

Malik highlights the fact that the preservation of life is not the ultimate end or greatest good in Quranic warfare. Ending "tumult and oppression," achieving the war aims of Islam through *jihad* is the desired end. Dying in this cause brings direct reward in heaven for the *mujahid*, sacrifice is sacred. It naturally follows that death is not feared in Quranic warfare; indeed, "tranquility" invites God's divine aid and assistance. The "Base" of the Quranic military strategy is spiritual preparation and "guarding ourselves against terror."[62] Readers may surmise that the training camps of al Qaeda (The Base) were designed as much for spiritual preparation as military. One needs only to recall the example of Mohammed Atta's "last night" preparations.[63]

The battleground of Quranic war is the human soul—it is religious warfare. The object of war is to dislocate and destroy the [religious] "Faith" of the enemy. These principals are consistent with objectives of al Qaeda and other radical Islamic organizations. "Wars in the theory of Islam are . . . to advance God's purposes on earth, and invariably they are defensive in character."[64] Peace treaties in theory are

temporary, pragmatic protocols. This treatise acknowledges Islam's manifest destiny and the approach to achieving it.

General Malik's thesis in *The Quranic Concept of War* can be fundamentally described as "Islam is the answer." He makes a case for war and the revitalization of Islam. This is a martial exegesis of the *Quran*. Malik like other modern Islamists are, at root, romantics. They focus on the *Quran* for *jihad* a doctrine that harkens back to the time of the Prophet and the classical-*jihadist* period when Islam enjoyed its most successful military campaigns and rapid growth.

The book's metaphysical content borders on the supernatural and renders "assured expectations" that cannot be evaluated or tested in the arena of military experience. Incorporating "divine intervention" into military campaigns, while possibly advantageous, cannot be calculated as an overt force multiplier. Critics may also point to the ahistorical aspect of Malik's thesis; that Islam is in a state of constant struggle with the non-Islamic world. There are examples of Muslim armies serving side by side with Christian armies in combat and campaigns are numerous, with Iraq being but a recent example.[65]

Malik's appraisal of the *Quran* as a source of divine revelation for victory in war can likewise be criticized by historical example. Were it fully true and operationalized then the 1,400 years of Islamic military history might demonstrate something beyond its present state. War and peace in Islam has ebbed and flowed as has the conduct of war across all civilizations, ancient and modern. Islam as an independent military force has been in recession since 1492, although the latest *jihadist's* threat of terror against the international system is, at least in part, a possible reaction to this long recession. Malik's thesis essentially recognizes this historical pattern; indeed, Malik's book may be an attempt to reverse this trend. The events of 9/11 may be seen as a validation of Malik's thesis regarding the spiritual preparation and the use of terror. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were intended to seed "respect" (fear) in the minds of Islam's enemies. These acts were not only directed at Western non-believers, but also the Muslim leaders who "profess the faith but are treacherous in their hearts" (allies and supporters of the United States). The barbarity of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and others in Iraq reflect a focus on extreme terror designed to wilt the will of Islam's enemies.

Malik and Brohi both emphasize the defensive nature of *jihad* in Islam, but this position appears to be more a defense of a manifest destiny inevitably resulting in conflict. In their rendering of *jihad* both, not surprisingly, owe an intellectual debt to the Pakistani Islamist theorist, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi. Al-Mawdudi is an important intellectual precursor to the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, and other modern Islamic revivalists. As al-Mawdudi notes, "Islamic *jihad* is both offensive and defensive" oriented on liberating man from humanistic tyranny.[66]

The author's most controversial and, perhaps, most noteworthy assertion, is the distinction of "terror" as an ends rather than as a means to an end. The soul can only be touched by terror. Malik's divine principal of war may be summarized in the dictum "strike terror; never feel terror." Yet, he does not describe any specific method of delivering terror into the heart of Islam's enemies. His view of terror seems to conflict with his earlier, limited, discussion of the concept of restraint in warfare and what actually

constitutes "excesses" on the part of an enemy. It also conflicts with the character and nature of response that the author says is demanded. Malik leaves many of these pertinent issues undefined under a veneer of legitimating theory.

In spite of certain ambiguities and theoretical weaknesses, this work should be studied and valued for its insight and analysis relate to *jihadists'* concepts and the asymmetric approach to war that radical Muslims may adapt and execute. With respect to global *jihad* terrorism, as the events of 9/11 so vividly demonstrated, there are those who believe and will exercise the tenets of *The Quranic Concept of War.*

NOTES

1. Brigadier S. K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War* (Lahore, Pakistan: Associated Printers, 1979). Quranic War or Quranic Warfare refers to Malik's treatment in his book.

2. Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 64.

3. R. D. Hooker, "Beyond *Vom Kriege*: The Character and Conduct of Modern War," *Parameters*, 35 (Summer 2005), 4.

4. Paul Sperry, "The Pentagon Breaks the Islam Taboo," *FrontPage Magazine*, 14 December 2005, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20539.

5. Antulio Echevarria, *Towards an American Way of War* (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004).

6. Patrick Poole, "The Muslim Brotherhood 'Project,'" *FrontPage Magazine*, 11 May 2006, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=22415.

7. Farhand Rajaee, *Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man the State and International Politics*," (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), p 71.

8. Irfan Yusuf, "Theories on Islamic Books You Wouldn't Read About," *Canberra Times*, 21 July 2005, http://canberra.yourguide.com.au/detail.asp?class=your%20say&subclass=general&category=editorial%20opinion&story_id=410105&y=2005&m=7.

9. Malik, pp. I-ii.

10. Ibid., p. 1.

11. Ibid., pp. I-ii.

12. See for example the discussion by Dr. Mary R. Habeck, "Jihadist Strategies in the War on Terrorism," *The Heritage Foundation*, 8 November 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl855.cfm.

13. David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2005). There is approximately 1,400 years of *jihad* scholarship beginning with Mohammed and his military campaigns. Classical approaches to *jihad* as described by Mohammed's successors, Abu Bakr for example, and the challenges presented by the struggles of succession to Mohammed.

14. Malik "Forward."

15. Ibid., "Preface," p. I.

16. Ibid., p. I. Note the Christian concept of the Trinity contained in the Nicene Creed is considered polytheistic according to Islam. The Trinity is not *tawhid*.

17. John Esposito, *Islam, the Straight Path* (3d ed.; New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 12-14, 89.

18. Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 72; Khadduri, pp. 65, 70-72; Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, pp. 35-39.

19. Brohi, "Preface," p. ii.

20. Ibid., p. iii.

21. Ibid., p. iii.

22. Cook, pp. 95-96. Cook places these concepts of *jihad* doctrine in the lineage of contemporary and radical theory.

23. The indexed term for *jihad* is redirected to the term "Holy War" in this classic book of Islamic law or *sharia* by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveller*, ed. and trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller (Beltsville, Md.: Amana Publication, 1997).

24. Malik, "Preface," p. v.

25. Ibid., p. vii.

26. Cook, p. 107; Christoper Henzel, "The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for US Strategy," *Parameters*, 35 (Spring 2005), 69-80.

27. Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

28. Malik, "Preface," p. x. While in the Western tradition the state is viewed as a territorial and political body, based on "temporal elements such as shared memory, language, race, or the mere choice of its members." Khomeini rejected this view, seeing the secular, political state and nationalism as Western constructs of imperialistic design to damage the cohesion of the *ummah* and impede the "advancement of Islam." Rajaee, pp. 7, 67-71.

29. Ibid., p. x.

30. Khadduri, p. 63.

31. Malik, p. 6.

32. Ibid., p. 20.

33. Ibid., pp. 20-21. (Baqara: 190).

34. Malik, p. 11.

35. Ibid., p. 22. (Baqara: 217) and (Nissaa: 76).

36. Ibid., p. 23.

37. Ibid., p. 29.

38. Malik, p. 29. (Tauba: 7).

39. Ibid., p. 31.

40. Khadduri, p. 212. Jurists disagree on the allowable duration of treaties, the operative concept is that the dar al-Harb must be reduced to dar al-Islam over time.

41. Malik, p. 27.

42. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

43. Khadduri, p. 141.

44. Malik, p. 40

45. Ibid., pp. 37-38. (Baqara: 216).

46. Ibid., pp. 42-44. (Al-I-Imran: 169-70) and (Nissa: 95).

47. Ibid., pp. 42-44.

48. Cook, pp. 77, 124.

49. Malik, p. 49.

50. Ibid., p. 54.

51. Ibid., p. 57.

52. Malik, p. 57.

53. Ibid., p. 57.

54. Ibid., p. 58.

55. Ibid., p. 58.

56. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

57. Ibid., p. 60.

58. Ibid., p. 144.

59. Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1996), pp. 44-51, 128.

60. Malik, p. 3.

61. Ibid., p. 146.

62. Ibid., p.58.

63. "In Hijacker's Bags, a Call to Planning, Prayer and Death," *Washington Post*, 28 September 2001.

64. Malik, "Preface," p. iii.

65. Four notable examples are the Crimean War where French, British and Ottoman Forces allied against the Russians; Fuad Pasha of the Ottoman Army served as a coalition partner with French Army during the 1860 Rebellion in Syria; more recently Muslim Arab and Kabyle soldiers served in the Harkis of the French Army in the French-Algerian War; and, of course, today in Iraq. Malik would address some of these events as alliances of convenience serving Islam's interests in accord with the *Quran* and *Sharia* Law, others as *takfir* or treason.

66. Cook, pp. 99-103. Peters, p. 130.

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Review Essay

Asia's Nuclear Dilemma

GEORGE H. QUESTER

These two books, in very different ways, are of great value for anyone who wishes to sort out the complexities of the nuclear confrontations in Asia. Arpit Rajain's hefty monograph, *Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India, and Pakistan*, amounts to an Indian scholar's skeptical questioning of the "mantra" one hears so very often from most Indian and Pakistani strategists (often phrased in virtually identical terms), that South Asian mutual nuclear deterrence can work every bit as well as deterrence between Washington and Moscow. Drawing on a very extensive range of literature, Rajain compares India-Pakistani crisis behavior since the 1998 nuclear tests with the Cuban missile crisis, and with the Sino-Soviet crisis on the Ussuri in 1969, arguing the minimal nuclear deterrence is not at all guaranteed to hold each side to the constraints of limited war.

On such issues of the viability of deterrence, there has always been a debate between the analysts who attach great importance to the ethnic and historical peculiarities of each of the nuclear powers, and those who argued that the nuclear problem basically had to be seen the same way in Moscow and Beijing as in Washington (with the important difference being that the communist dictatorships could pretend to see things differently), and then must again be seen the same way in Delhi or Islamabad.

By the latter view, every serious state has to be aware of the enormous destruction that nuclear weapons could inflict (the "counter-value" impact), and also aware of the possibility that nuclear weapons might under some circumstances facilitate a military victory (the "counterforce" effect). By the former view, one must first read all the statements on strategy issued by any other nuclear power, before concluding that such a power sees things in at all the same way that we do.

Drawing in a lot of Cold War history, Rajain somewhat straddles this kind of debate, noting various arguments that have been made about how Chinese traditions and "strategic culture" might affect Chinese nuclear strategy, but also noting the hard realities of nuclear weapons that Beijing might inevitably have to accept. For anyone wishing a wide-ranging review of the history of nuclear confrontations, as the backdrop for the India-Pakistan standoff, this book amounts to a well-researched and well-written introduction.

The book is intended to cover China as well as South Asia, but one comes away from the book with the impression that Indian policy is not at all fixated on a nuclear confrontation with Beijing (even if the Chinese nuclear arsenal was always the official Indian excuse for moving to the bomb), but instead on the confrontation with Pakistan. While China may have cooperated with Pakistani nuclear development,

Beijing has been surprisingly detached and neutral in recent crises in South Asia, and has markedly improved its relations with India.

Given that China is one of the countries featured in the book, it is surprising that no attention is given to possible nuclear crisis scenarios involving confrontations with the United States over Taiwan, or confrontations arising out of the nuclear plans of North Korea.

China's Nuclear Future is a collection of papers delivered at a conference convened by the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies in 2003, and it offers the deepest publicly-available analysis of Chinese strategic thinking and nuclear program evolution. While a number of the chapters again introduce some of the old assumptions that Chinese thinking might somehow be culturally different, along the lines of the early Maoist statements dismissing the importance of nuclear weapons, the authors move ahead fairly rapidly to demonstrate how nuclear weapons are indeed taken very seriously in Beijing, and the variety of ways that they might be taken seriously. Appropriate note is taken of the possibility that American developments of missile defenses might frighten China into a substantial augmentation of its nuclear forces, and several of the authors closely examine how Chinese nuclear weapons might play a role in a crisis involving Taiwan.

The chapter by Evan Medeiros interestingly shows how the general liberalization and loosening of the regime in China has made a more open discussion of military matters possible, including even suggestions of a deviation from China's long-standing "no-first-use" policy. Yet, setting aside this kind of wider and more open discussion regarding possible "battlefield" uses of nuclear weapons (much of it mirroring decades of similar discussions in the United States), Medeiros concludes that Beijing's policy has not yet moved away from no-first-use.

The final chapter by Brad Roberts offers a very nuanced analysis of some alternatives for the evolution of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, with the choices to an important degree being shaped by what the United States does.

The book was published in 2006, but has relatively little discussion of how China sees the North Korean nuclear program, or of how China might have to adjust to all the outside world moves that may come in response to that program. Does Beijing welcome Pyongyang's nuclear program as a distraction and embarrassment for the United States? Or does it fear the unpredictability of Kim Jong-il's decisions almost as much as the rest of the world, and does it have to fear the possibility that North Korea's actions will lead to further nuclear proliferation in East Asia?

Leaving aside our current distraction with North Korea, the *China's Nuclear Future* collection is extremely valuable for all the arguments it pulls together. Compared to the Rajain book which, reaching over four decades into the past, more broadly and abstractly discusses grand triangles of nuclear confrontation, this collection of very expert authors specifically addresses recent developments in Chinese nuclear choices, offering evidence for both optimism and pessimism.

Both books are valuable for the extensive literature they draw on and cite. And they nicely complement each other in their differences of perspective, not just Indian versus American, but macroscopic versus more microscopic.

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Review Essay

Resolving China and Taiwan's Differences

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Of all the "flashpoints" in today's world, none poses more of a direct threat to international peace than the Taiwan Strait. The plethora of challenges facing Taiwan-China relations are splendidly assessed in two recent additions to the world of books; Richard C. Bush's *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait* and Bernard D. Cole's *Taiwan Security: History and Prospects*.

These books are excellent companion volumes that should be read together by serious students of the political and security dynamics of relations between Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, and the United States. Both authors are established experts in their fields and neither brings partisan or ideological bias to the treatment of the subject.

Richard Bush has devoted a career in policy, law-making, and academic study to the political dynamics among the three countries. He served as a member of a Congressional staff on the House International Relations Committee, studied in Taiwan, served on the National Intelligence Council and Congressional Research Service (NIC/CRS), and was the director of the American Institute in Taiwan. The latter organization is the unofficial representative of US interests in Taiwan established by Congress in 1979, in a bi-partisan reaction to President Carter terminating US relations with the Republic of China (ROC) over Taiwan.

Bud Cole is a career Navy officer with a Ph.D. in security issues who spent much of his career in the Asia-Pacific region. Cole served on Taiwan, has been in the middle of the sometimes tense standoff in the Taiwan Strait on-board US Navy ships, and possesses plenty of experience in military and security relations with the PRC.

As the review will explain in more detail, neither book is really capable of standing alone. They each have enough weaknesses that they should be read together. If the reader is deeply immersed in Taiwan politics and understands the secu-

rity issues well, perhaps Bush's book, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait* should be read first. It is packed with detail on domestic politics related to Taiwan and provides a detailed explanation of the genesis of the political challenges in that democracy. For the reader with a more general understanding of the political and security situation, or who wants a handy primer on the issues, it is best to start with Cole's book.

Bush begins by reminding the reader of an important fact: "People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are socially and culturally the same." The "green" political alliance on Taiwan, made up of current President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and former President Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan Solidarity Union (TRU) at times tend to identify "Taiwanese" culture as unique and different from that of mainland China. They have both advocated the idea of an "independent Taiwan identity" as a factor in domestic politics. Of course, if one travels to Taipei, many of the original treasures of successive Chinese dynasties are sitting in the re-created "Palace Museum." Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek took these things with him when he fled the mainland in 1949, setting up the capitol of the Republic of China in Taipei after the Communists won the civil war. Cynics (and this reviewer is among them) might ask why the articles have not been shipped back to the mainland if the culture and identity of the people on Taiwan is so different and unique.

Bush also reminds the reader that the main problem between the Communists on the mainland and the political parties on Taiwan is the absence of a direct dialogue, which only aggravates mutual suspicion. Today the main parties on Taiwan are the DPP and TSU, generally categorized as favoring a more independent stance or "pro-independence" (from China), described above; the People's First Party (PFP) and the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party (KMT), the two parties that generally favor some future unification or confederation with the mainland; and the New Party, which generally supports the idea that China and Taiwan are one country and should reunite.

Bush's target audience is United States' decisionmakers, whom he believes must understand why the Taiwan situation is so intractable. Ironically, in his 1947 personal statement as Special Representative of the President (Truman) to the negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists after WWII, General George C. Marshall summed up the situation in much the same manner as Bush. Marshall opined, "The greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other."

Bush's explanation of the basis for this mistrust is the nature of politics on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the mainland, "policy is refracted through a personalized leadership system in which the principal officeholders must build a consensus for their initiatives." In Taiwan, the democracy that developed after the brutal dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek is torn by arguments over how Taiwan's sovereignty should be recognized and a deep rift between Chinese who arrived in the 16th and 17th centuries and those who arrived with Chiang and the Nationalists after 1947. Bush provides an excellent account of the history of this process. The author believes, "The political enmity between these two groups is so deep that young Taiwanese, the descendants of the people who got there in the 16th and 17th centuries, refer

to the post-World War Two KMT regime and the newly arrived mainland Chinese as colonial rulers."

Bush examines all of the policy documents and initiatives that are the topic of discussion between China, Taiwan, and the United States. He mentions the "Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA), the "Three Communiqués' (between the United States and the People's Republic of China, when each side outlined its views, and President Reagan's "Six Assurances" to Taiwan about arms sales and US support for the island. He covers the policy proposals between China and Taiwan, like the "1992 Consensus in Singapore" and Chinese President Jiang Zemin's "Eight Points." Unfortunately, the author does not provide these policy utterances in an appendix. Thus, the reader who is not intimately familiar with the history of the region is lost. In addition, although Bush mentions the missile crisis of 1995 and 1996, when the US sent two aircraft carrier battle groups off Taiwan, there is no detailed follow-up regarding the security situation.

His recommendations for US policy are realistic, even if they are not encouraging. Bush suggests that the United State has only a limited role to play in the political dynamic related to the Taiwan Strait. He discourages attempts to act as an intermediary and argues that, at best, Washington can be an "intellectual facilitator" by "privately describing for one side the views of the other." Here, this reviewer believes Bush has reached too far. Both sides have regular contacts at the official and unofficial levels, such as government-sponsored academic institutions, think tanks, and trade and cultural organizations. All of which can explain themselves adequately, in their own language.

At the beginning of his work, Cole includes some of the key wording found in communiqués and bilateral statements between governments. He has a concise description of the Taiwan Relations Act, even if the legislation is not there, and includes Reagan's "Six Assurances to Taiwan" on arms sales from 1982, and Jiang Zemin's "Eight Conditions" for unification from 1995. The book started out as a National Defense University monograph, so it is relatively short. Nonetheless, it provides a comprehensive assessment of the military forces on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Unfortunately, it is a bleak assessment that catalogues significant improvements in the Chinese People's Liberation Army with the accompanying problems for United States forces and for the armed forces of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Regarding naval forces, Cole concludes, "PLA Navy planners are almost certainly planning to overcome not just . . . the Taiwan military but the United States Navy" with a robust submarine force, to which China keeps adding new boats. In his analysis of surface warfare, Cole thinks that the PLA Navy would be effective against Taiwan's forces, even if the United States were to intervene. However, Cole has serious reservations about the PLA Navy's ability to counter enemy air power. The author concludes that the maritime balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in 2005 "rests with the PRC."

As for China's force projection capability, Cole's judgment is that the PLA Navy has not built a robust "underway replenishment" force. It is therefore not a true force projection Navy. Instead, it has secured some potential port facilities in places that could support operations along the Indian Ocean and west of the Malacca Strait.

The author believes it is positioning itself to be able to protect China's major sea lanes of communication, in an effort to support its energy needs.

In terms of air power, Cole's analysis indicates that the PLA Air Force has made steady improvement over the past decade and, probably, has eroded Taiwan's air advantage. As is the case with naval forces, he concludes, "Geography, force modernization, and force size favor mainland airpower." Much of China's recent improvement related to aircraft has been with Russian help, but weapons, avionics, and fire control systems have come from America's European allies.

Despite these advantages, Cole believes "China's ground forces face a significant problem when arriving on the battlefield against Taiwan's Army." Ground combat against Taiwan would require a major amphibious invasion supported by special operation and airborne forces. The author concludes that any ground combat against Taiwan "would be expensive" should Taiwan's forces put up a determined defense.

Unfortunately, Cole is not sanguine about the likelihood of Taiwan's Army and Marine Corps putting up that "determined defense." He raises questions about Taiwan's integration of its forces into a joint organization (something China is currently mastering). The author sees various weaknesses in joint planning and operations on Taiwan. In addition, Cole reports of "low morale throughout Taiwan's military" and a significant reluctance in the civil population to support military spending. He concludes his assessment with the warning that Taiwan's military capability is declining and there is not much popular will for a stronger deterrent force. The author gives the reader an excellent "time-distance" factor chart to show why, even if the United States were to lend assistance, without a much stronger joint-force, Taiwan would be in trouble.

Cole's prescription for Taiwan is to "reverse the decline in its military spending, increase the professional skill of its military, and shore up the will of its civilian government and people."

These are excellent books and they provide the reader with a grasp of the historical, political, and security issues impacting the Taiwan Strait. They are perhaps the best two books this reviewer has seen in a decade. Any American military leader or politician should read both before he or she tries to tackle the many diverse and convoluted issues impacting the region. In addition, as Marshall advised, the two sides must trust each other. It is also critical to remember that the United States should not try to be an intermediary.

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Book Reviews

From Omaha Beach to Dawson's Ridge: The Combat Journal of Captain Joe Dawson. By Cole C. Kingseed. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 272 pages. $29.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bateman**, a strategist assigned to the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

First-person contemporary accounts of war are the bread and butter of the military historian. They sustain us. Such records are among those known as "primary sources," and they are vital to our understanding of the past. More than the staid accounts one finds in the log-books of ships, or the wealth of information one may pull from a regimental operations map overlay stored in the National Archives, both of which are also "primary sources," because they are contemporaneous, it is the archetypical "letters found in an attic" which excites the historian's heart. Such a find is the sort of material which can breathe the humanity back into a larger account of the past. The collected letters of Captain Joe Dawson are a perfect example of just this sort of material, and in this book Cole Kingseed does a masterful job in arranging the letters and placing them in their proper context.

Joe Dawson was the product of the same central Texas towns which produced Ernie Pyle's most famous subject, the beloved Captain Waskow. Raised in a minister's home in Waco, Texas, Dawson was a middle child in a fairly large family. He attended Baylor University. Like many young men with engineering or geology degrees in that state, Dawson went into the oil business upon graduation. He enlisted in 1941, in a bid to control his own destiny in those days of a "peacetime" emergency and draft. By 1942 Dawson was commissioned as a lieutenant of infantry and assigned to the First Infantry Division.

This book is a well-woven synthesis of Dawson's letters home with explanatory narrative from Kingseed. Dawson was writing deliberately with an eye towards posterity. He had even gone so far as to ask that his family keep his letters so that they might form just such a de facto journal in later years. Throughout his service he was a diligent correspondent and wrote home on a great number of topics. Starting out on regimental and division staffs, he served through the North African and Sicilian campaigns as an aide to Major General Terry Allen and Brigadier Teddy Roosevelt. This unique position, and the character of those two particular officers (both of whom regularly spent time under fire at the front with their troops) gave Dawson a grand view of the progress of operations through both campaigns.

Just after the Sicilian campaign, Dawson was assigned to company command of G Company, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry. Although the account of Dawson's leadership as one of the first company commanders to lead his men off the beach and onto the commanding heights overlooking Omaha Beach at Normandy does not begin until page 145, it is apt that the book's title highlights this element of Dawson's story. Dawson was an awe-inspiring, heroic leader. In an era when awards and deco-

rations were difficult to win, Dawson won the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on his first day in combat as a company commander. It is also a measure of how well he commanded the unit to note that not only was the regiment awarded a Presidential Unit Citation (for its role on D-Day), but while under his command this company won the Presidential Unit Citation of its own.

Cole Kingseed, is well suited to the task of bringing Dawson's account back to life. While this reviewer rejects the notion that a historian must have served in the military to write well about the military, he does note that sometimes it certainly helps. In interviewing Dawson some months before his death, (Dawson died in 1998.) Kingseed spoke to Dawson infantryman to infantryman. This shines through, and it also leads to one of the more engaging aspects of the book.

As previously mentioned, Dawson was aware that he was writing what amounted to a memoir in each of his letters, yet he did not spare himself. If there is an intrinsic value here, beyond that of the purely voyeuristic, it is in watching the gradual disintegration of Dawson himself under the strain of combat. In letter after letter sent from the brutal combat of the boscage, across France, and at the gates of Germany, it appears that Dawson knew what was happening to his mind and morale, even as it occurred. Yet instead of concealing it, he self-consciously wrote about the process of mental, physical, and emotional disintegration. Ultimately, after 37 days of holding his unit together during a sustained series of attacks by elements of two different German divisions outside of the Germany city of Aachen, Dawson collapsed. At every level he was spent, but his mission was accomplished and the unit's position retained. In this too, even now, years after his death, Captain Joe Dawson had a lesson to teach Americans about war.

I strongly recommend this book.

The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (3 volume set). Edited by James J. F. Forest. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006. 1,280 pages. $300.00. **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Markel**, a strategist at the Army Capabilities Integration Center.

With *The Making of a Terrorist*, editor James J. F. Forest of West Point's Combating Terrorism Center and his contributors have created a useful and practical reference for commanders, planners, and analysts. As its title suggests, the three-volume set aims to provide an understanding of terrorist phenomena, focusing on the actual mechanics of terrorism. Even the volume on *Root Causes*, whose title suggests a fruitless search for a single, grand strategic solution, actually provides useful insight about where we can anticipate the emergence of terrorism. This volume derives particular strength from its case studies of actual terrorist organizations, an unpleasantly diverse and multitudinous group that includes Islamic extremist organizations, Marxists, nationalists, and racists, just to name a few. What emerges from these studies is a collage of terrorist practices as they are, and not a neat, coherent, and artificial portrait of causes and cures for terrorism. *The Making of a Terrorist*, therefore, provides essential and accessible background reading for the military practitioner in the War on Terrorism. At $300, I would not recommend it to the individual with a passing interest, but

I would recommend its inclusion in operations and intelligence libraries at the division-level and above, and for the whole array of combat developers.

Operational Patterns and Opportunities: Recruitment and Training

While serving in the Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy at Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan, we constantly found ourselves attempting to define our role in counterterrorism. The understanding of basic terrorist methods and inherent vulnerabilities provided by *The Making of a Terrorist* would have expedited our efforts. The volumes on recruitment and training depict case studies of particular terrorist systems in various contexts that relate to lines of operation for campaign planning. The key insight that emerges from these volumes, however, is how vital and fragile sanctuary is to the development of an effective terrorist.

Successful counterterrorism begins with intelligence, of course, and *The Making of a Terrorist* indicates several remunerative areas of concentration in intelligence operations. Those areas of concentration include networks of fundamentalist religious schools (madrassas), prisons, and the Internet. Intelligence professionals may not need a book to tell them to focus on these areas, but intelligence professionals and operational planners should read the essays to fully comprehend their dynamics.

We have long understood that Islamic terrorists rely on a network of radical madrassas to inspire, identify, and recruit potential terrorists. In "Political Islam: Violence and the Wahhabi Commission," contributor Maha Azzam presents a disturbing portrait of a pervasive, radical, and intolerant strain of Islam that is the result of this aggressive proselytization. Zachary Abuza, however, presents a more sophisticated analysis of this aspect of terrorism, noting that most of the 25,000 to 35,000 madrassas in South Asia are relatively benign, if not exactly helpful in preparing their students for the modern world. According to Abuza, the schools to watch are those led by Imams with kinship ties to Abu Bakar Ba'asyr and other leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. Maintaining surveillance on 30,000 madrassas is simply infeasible, but the type of analysis suggested by Abuza would allow for the effective prioritization of intelligence resources.

At the other end of the spectrum from religious indoctrination are prisons, another important venue for recruiting and training terrorists. J. Michael Waller describes the historical role of prisons as incubators for terrorism and revolution, and goes on to depict the startling degree of Islamacist penetration in US prisons. To be sure, such penetration lies outside of military jurisdiction, but the examples Waller cites should encourage close surveillance of prisons in areas where US forces operate. Musab Al-Zarqawi was recruited in prison, and Adolf Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf* while incarcerated. Yet, while felons' propensity for sociopathic violence makes them promising terrorist recruits, their general lack of self-discipline and generally poor coping skills make their employment problematic, as the fortuitously inept performances of shoe-bomber Richard Reid and aspiring dirty-bomber Jose Padilla demonstrate. Those faults also present structural weaknesses that US forces are already exploiting.

Opportunities for intelligence collection and operational exploitation merge on the Internet. Madeline Gruen describes how various types of extremists,

from al Qaeda to the Aryan Nation, use "Video Games, Hip Hop, and the World Wide Web" to identify potential recruits. Gabriel Weiman extends this theme in "Terrorist Dot Com." Both portray the likely recruit and the filters through which they must pass before being recruited. It is important for the reader to remember that terrorists use the Internet to screen potential recruits, but still rely on personal contact to complete the recruitment process. Understanding the terrorist accessions process will, hopefully, lead to more effective surveillance and response.

Information operations become even more important when responding to terrorist's use of the media. In two essays, Brigitte Nacos reminds the reader that terrorism is "propaganda by deed," whose greatest effect is to convey an impression. That impression could be one of insecurity and horror, directed at the terrorists' adversaries, or one of strength and capability, directed at supporters and potential recruits. Bin Laden's "strong horse" and "weak horse" analogies are examples of the second. Nacos laments the mass media's susceptibility to manipulation, a susceptibility she finds borders on collaboration. Still, she gives inadequate due to the adage "the truth will out." Terrorist acts create facts that the terrorist organization will try to fit into its narrative, but dead children are hard to "spin" in any culture. Indeed, the brutality of al Qaeda in Iraq has certainly limited its attractiveness to Iraqis; there are even reports that other insurgent groups are fighting it. Nacos' key point for US information operators is that they must whenever possible contest the terrorist narrative.

Moving into the physical realm, terrorists require a certain amount of training to be effective. While nothing may seem simpler than self-detonating an explosive device, to get to the point of detonation, a terrorist must evade significant security precautions, such as profiling, access control, and physical inspection, and still be able to navigate their way to the intended target. Obviously, terrorists have more tactics at their disposal than suicide bombing, and it is the teaching of these that grows progressively more difficult. This practical training requires both time and space. In "Training for Urban Resistance," Brian Jackson illustrates how constraints on both these factors limited the capabilities of the Provisional IRA.

Terrorist training camps serve as both recruiting and training centers. Rohan Guaratna and Arabinda Acharya explain that al Qaeda's training camps generally trained recruits in basic combat techniques and ideology, allowing leaders to identify those with potential to be successful terrorist operatives requiring further training. Their article and Magnus Ranstorp's "The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon" provide templates for how these camps function, and, implicitly, how they are arrayed, knowledge that might be useful in designing operational and strategic reconnaissance plans.

At an even more elemental level, the authors point out, it is difficult to get one human being to kill another, and even more difficult are attempts to get the individual to efficiently and effectively kill a large number of non-combatants. Albert Bandura describes how terrorists accomplish this in "Training for Terrorism through Selective Moral Disengagement." The author outlines a variety of well-known techniques including "euphemistic language," "displacement of responsibility," and "dehumanization." His key observation, however, is that such disengagement must take place over time in a "communal setting of intense interpersonal influences insulated from mainstream social life." Throwing suicide into the equation intensifies the re-

quirement for isolation, as Adam Dolnik demonstrates in "Learning to Die: Suicide Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century." In an excellent essay, backed by scores of interviews with incarcerated Palestinian terrorists, Jerrold M. Post describes how an entire society can provide the context for such actions.

Surprising to this reviewer is the fact that, even after extensive conditioning, how fragile reinforcement actually is. In "The Making of Suicide Bombers," Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger report that suicide bombers are accompanied right up to the point of release to preclude the intrusion of "second thoughts." Obviously, not all suicide bombers, or other terrorists for that matter, undergo such intensive preparation. A few of the less intensively prepared bombers go awry, compromising not only the actual operation, but also the terrorist organization. Ergo, understanding the complex and apparently fragile conditioning process by which a person becomes an effective terrorist may allow military leaders to disrupt organizations, with cascading effects.

Root Causes as Strategic Indicators

The Making of a Terrorist provides fair assessment of the type of activity that US and allied forces should be looking for within a particular society in an effort to identify and disrupt terrorist organizations. In the *Root Causes* volume, contributors also identify factors whose intersection may predict the emergence of terrorist activity. To be certain, some essays in the volume also indulge in the customary speculation on how poverty, globalization, deprivation, or other social melees, real and imagined, may drive people to slaughter innocents. There are even a few essays postulating grandiose as a strategic solution to the problem of terrorism. For the most part, however, the essays' authors maintain a more practical tone, acknowledging that they are focused on aspects of the problem rather than grappling with the whole. The word "correlate" is used far more frequently than "cause." The correlations, however, seem useful as predictors of terrorist activity.

In "Terrorism and Export Economies: The Dark Side of Free Trade," Michael Mousseau correlates the emergence of terrorism in societies where there is dependence on an economy of reciprocal exchange. In such societies, security and survival are determined by an adherence to clan and family networks. Clan leaders distribute goods, to include wealth, status and even protection in return for loyalty; competing groups are viewed as the enemy, against which any act, including indiscriminate slaughter, is permissible. The alignment of such value systems with terrorism seems obvious. The essay is oddly named, however, because it seems to blame export economies for the creation of terrorism. Mousseau actually argues that it is the inability of societies based on reciprocal exchange to compete with modern, western economies and it is that inability that creates murderous resentment. An economy based on the extraction of a single commodity, such as oil or diamonds, can sustain these societies in the modern world.

A number of the contributors conclude that the pool of potential terrorists will grow exponentially over the next several decades. In "Socioeconomic and Demographic Roots of Terrorism," Paul Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu remind us of the coming "youth bulge" will result in a growing pool of unemployed or underemployed young

men coming of age in poorly governed, economically dysfunctional countries. It is this demographic, young males between 20 and 34 years of age, that correlates heavily with violence, whether criminal, martial, or terroristic. One need not subscribe to the theory that poverty and oppression cause or legitimate terrorism to suspect that someone, somewhere will manufacture an excuse for such men to turn to violence.

Geography provides another key indicator. In "Digging Deep: Environment and Geography as Root Influences for Terrorism," P. H. Liotta and James F. Miskel are careful to note that geography, per se, does not cause terrorism, but rather it can create favorable conditions for the growth and operational capabilities of terrorist groups. As already noted regarding the "youth bulge" described by Ehrlich and Liu. Liotta and Miskel postulate that much of this growth will occur in the emerging megacities within the developing world, whose shear size combine with physical and social squalor to confound effective policing and control. Moreover, because these megacities remain connected to the globalized world through their physical and informational infrastructures, they provide ideal bases for transnational terrorism.

One of the primary indicators of terrorist activity is state strength, as illustrated by Erica Chenoweth in her chapter on "Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and Failed States." Chenoweth's purpose is to question the Bush administration's strategy of diminishing support for terrorism by promoting democracy. She notes that the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy created opportunities for terrorism to emerge in Indonesia, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, leaving unanswered the question of what other constitutional arrangements besides democracy might produce the enduring economic strength and political legitimacy essential to developing strong and effective institutions. Yet, whether one agrees with Chenoweth that democratization is not necessarily the answer to terrorism, state weakness certainly permits terrorism to emerge.

The Limitations of Understanding

Readers should bear in mind the structural limitations of *The Making of a Terrorist*. Editor James J. F. Forest intended "to provide readers with a centralized and authoritative information source of the most essential topics of terrorist recruitment, training, and root causes," an endeavor in which he admirably succeeded. The series derives considerable strength from the variety of perspectives it offers, from which the practitioner can select those applicable to a particular situation. The result amply justifies the light editorial touch. The appendices, which include profiles of terrorist organizations, examples of training manuals for terrorism and guerilla warfare, and other resources for study, help make this three-volume set a valuable resource.

Yet, the variety of perspectives and the tendency to editorialize means there is much that may not apply in a given context. The essays in *The Making of a Terrorist* do not adhere to a single definition of terrorist. In fact, some explicitly conflate insurgency with terrorism, operationalizing the adage that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Objectively, this may be true, but US joint doctrine distinguishes the two functionally. Joint Publication 1-02 defines an insurgent as a member of "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government

through use of subversion and armed conflict," while a terrorist perpetrates "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." Differentiated by doctrine, terrorists and insurgents employ different strategies, and possess different strengths and vulnerabilities. Undoubtedly, terrorists and insurgents may share similar objectives and employ some of the same tactics, techniques and procedures. The reader cannot simply assume, however, that the terms and implications are interchangeable, and should read the essays with a critical eye toward what actually applies in a particular situation.

Most importantly, the volumes do not pretend to offer a comprehensive solution to the problem of terrorism. Individual essayists do exercise that claim, but their proposals lack the analytical rigor and narrow focus related to studies of "recruitment, training, and root causes." The editor's intent in these three volumes was not to offer a "simple, elegant, and wrong" solution to a complex problem that will continue into the future. Rather, *The Making of a Terrorist* provides practitioners with increments of understanding on which they can base a variety of solutions to a myriad of threats. Based on that understanding, we can then begin to formulate a response. *The Making of a Terrorist* is not the answer, but it helps to frame the question.

The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century. By Dennis J. Blasko. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. 228 pages. $125.00 ($34.95 paper). **Reviewed by Richard Halloran**, onetime lieutenant of airborne infantry, foreign correspondent in Asia, military correspondent in Washington, DC, and now a free-lance writer in Honolulu.

The author of this work on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), an experienced China hand, says in his introduction: "I have tried to write the type of book I would have liked to have read before becoming a US army attaché to China in 1992."

Dennis J. Blasko, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, succeeds admirably. His topic does not lend itself to scintillating writing, but if you want to know how many "trigger pullers" there are in a rifle squad or how the teachings of Sun Tzu some 2,500 years ago are applied in the PLA today, this clearly written primer belongs on your professional bookshelf.

The author, a foreign area officer, is direct about what his book is not. "It is not a net assessment," he says, "of military capabilities across the Taiwan Strait, nor is it a comparative study of the combat power of the PLA versus US forces or other militaries in Asia." The author, wisely, does not attempt to predict "red lines" that, if crossed, could lead to military action.

Instead, Blasko draws primarily from Chinese sources to focus on the modernization of the PLA, mainly the ground forces, since 1999. The author contends that year was when China's leaders decided that their "military power needed to be perceived as more credible to prevent further steps toward Taiwan independence." The next year, a leading advocate of that independence, Chen Shui-bian, was elected president of Taiwan.

It is sometimes difficult for Americans to understand how pervasive the Taiwan issue is among Chinese leaders and how obsessed the PLA is with capturing the island off the southeastern coast of China. In 1949, after a long civil war, the PLA drove Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists from the Chinese mainland; and the Nationalists took refuge in what had been a Japanese colony since 1895.

The PLA, lacking the air and sea forces to go after the Chang's followers, skidded to a halt on the shores of the Taiwan Strait. There the PLA has remained, fuming, while Taiwan evolved from a dictatorship under Chiang to a budding democracy and thriving market economy under his successors. The threads of the PLA's preparation for war over Taiwan run throughout this book.

Blasko covers the organization and deployment of the PLA, its people and equipment, its training and role in society. He recalls that the PLA turned its rifles on its own people to kill hundreds of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen in 1989. Until that stain has been erased, the author contends, "the PLA will continue to be haunted both inside and outside of China by the ghosts of Tiananmen."

The author pulls no punches in explaining the role of the PLA in China's internal politics, stating succinctly: "Steeped in its traditions, the PLA remains the ultimate guarantor of the CCP," the Chinese Communist Party. As the late Mao Zedong wrote long ago: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

"The party-army relationship in the PLA," Blasko writes, "is unlike the civil-military relationships found in most professional military organizations in other countries (where military personnel express loyalty to the state or constitution, not to a particular political party)." An American officer swears allegiance to the Constitution, a Chinese officer to the Communist Party.

That loyalty has paid off for the military. Blasko writes: "PLA generals have seen defense budgets increase significantly over the past decade as the Chinese economy continued to grow." Recent official figures put the budget at $30 billion but no one outside of Beijing believes that number. Most estimates have it about three times that amount. In rival Taiwan, many believe the corresponding figure has hit $100 billion.

Thus, China's defense spending is most likely second only to that of the United States, higher than Russia's and more than twice Japan's. "Whatever the true numbers may be," the author contends, "the Chinese military has a much bigger pot of cash to spend on fewer troops than it did ten years ago." Moreover, most of China's costs, especially for personnel, are far lower than those of the United States or Japan.

Blasko points out another Chinese military characteristic, which is "guanxi," or connections—blood, hometown, schoolmates, and shared experience. He postulates that, "guanxi is a reality in the PLA, just as it is in all of Chinese society." As an example, "The personal connections among members of the field armies influenced the PLA for decades, causing both cooperation and conflict."

After China was defeated in Vietnam in 1979, Chinese military leaders fell back to reexamine their warfighting doctrine. "By the end of the twentieth century," Blasko says, "the PLA had developed a new doctrine to fight local wars under modern high technology conditions on China's periphery."

"At the same time," he goes on, "Chinese military planners continued to study traditional Chinese sources," such as *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu and Mao

Zedong's concept of "People's War." The PLA is thus "integrating old ideas and unavoidable realities with new concepts and technologies to prepare to fight in a manner it has never attempted in its recent history."

Summing up, Blasko believes "it is reasonable to conclude that many of the PLA's new capabilities remain in the rudimentary stage and Chinese estimates of another 10-20 years of development are not unwarranted." Even so, Chinese leaders, military officers, and defense scholars have adamantly asserted that China will go to war if Taiwan declares formal independence. In that case, Blasko asserts, "large scale, ground force-dominated operations are likely to be a last resort following the execution of other options, including missile, air, and naval strikes or blockades." Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the PLA's potential adversaries in Taiwan say much the same thing.

Thieves of Baghdad: One Marine's Passion for Ancient Civilizations and the Journey to Recover the World's Greatest Stolen Treasures. By Matthew Bogdanos with William Patrick. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006. 302 pages. $25.95. **Reviewed by Major Charles P. Moore**, ARCENT/CFLCC Plans and Policy Officer and veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

It is often said that truth is the first casualty of war. That maxim is exemplified in the reports surrounding the looting of one of the world's great museums, the Iraq Museum in Baghdad. During April and May of 2003 reports surfaced about an emerging humanitarian crisis: the potential loss of hundreds of thousands of priceless artifacts from the Iraq Museum, the result of vandalism, looting, and organized crime. Reports that would later turn out to be grossly exaggerated. *Thieves of Baghdad* provides the most detailed accounting of that loss to date. It also tells the story of how the remaining treasures were secured and of ongoing recovery operations.

Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, United States Marine Corps, arrived at the Iraq Museum on 20 April 2003 as head of the US Central Command's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for counterterrorism. The original mission of the team was to assist weapons inspectors in identifying and seizing weapons of mass destruction and other related materials. While enroute to Baghdad, the team began to hear conflicting reports surrounding events at the museum. Colonel Bogdanos requested permission to investigate the reports and arrived to begin his investigation with a party of 14 and a narrowly defined charter.

The team discovered the scope of the problem was much broader than anticipated and immediately set about developing a multi-pronged approach: securing and cataloging the remaining treasures; establishing an improvised amnesty program; and the interviewing of staff members, locals, and anyone with information that might lead to the recovery of missing artifacts.

The author discovered the museum suffered from a myriad of problems both before and during the war. Years of unorthodox cataloging, compartmentalized storage facilities, and occasional seizures of treasure by the Hussein family followed by periodic looting and thefts that left the museum a convoluted crime scene.

With respectful treatment and gentle tenacity, Colonel Bogdanos earned the confidence of key museum employees, a key factor in his ability to conduct a detailed survey of the loss and to refute many of the exaggerated and inaccurate claims.

The team used heightened media attention to emphasize its amnesty program. Thousands of items were recovered through the artful employment of amnesty and community outreach programs. Members of Bogdanos' team manned a drop area in front of the museum, met with local Imams, and visited untold numbers of suspected treasure holders to encourage their cooperation. Additionally, the team worked with influential Iraqi leaders to encourage enhanced border control and seizure of artifacts. These actions resulted in a number of successful recoveries. The team photographed and documented multiple crime scenes in an effort to support future investigations.

Through the employment of sound investigative techniques, and with assistance from the Iraqi museum staff in the completion of numerous inventories, the team was able to discover that approximately 14,000 to 15,000 items were actually missing. Of those, some 5,000 items were later recovered. The loss of 10,000 artifacts, although substantially less than initially reported, was still significant.

It is likely that the author was the single most qualified officer in the theater to be put in charge of this challenging task. With an education in the classics from Bucknell University, a law degree and a master's in Classical Studies from Columbia, combined with 13 years experience as an assistant district attorney in Manhattan, left him uniquely qualified. This background, combined with a reputation for professional excellence provided Bogdanos with the latitude and credibility within USCENTCOM to pursue the investigation. Unfortunately, despite its authoritative narration of an entertaining tale, the book does have detractors.

The book is the story of the recovery of classic art and artifacts interwoven with illuminating quotes and stories. Illustrative at first, the vacillation between modern problem solving and historic resolution tends to become a bit distracting for the reader. The author establishes his unique expertise early on and really does not need to continually reemphasize the point. Unfortunately, the author touts his qualifications while providing little insight into the broader dynamics of relationships with Baghdad officials and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The reader is left to wonder what more this talented Marine and his interagency team might have accomplished in those early days of the occupation.

Speculation aside, what we know is that Bogdanos and his team skillfully oversaw the protection and recovery of artifacts that form the centerpiece of the human story. They were also responsible for one of the first "good news stories" out of Iraq during the early days of the occupation. The book is entertaining and may be of great interest to art enthusiasts or those studying the media in time of war. However, it is too narrowly focused on actions at the museum to provide insight into the broader issues related to the post-conflict environment. Much of the text is dedicated to explaining rudimentary elements of military service and life in a combat zone which seasoned professionals will find mundane and superfluous. The book chronicles a valiant effort by an extraordinary individual, but lacks the explanatory power to better prepare tomorrow's leaders and planners.

The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. By Deborah D. Avant. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 264 pages. $75.00 ($29.99 paper). **Reviewed by Major Richard M. Wrona, Jr.**, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy.

Warfare in the twenty-first century is thought to have assumed a new face. States, rather than competing against each other, now face an ominous threat from networked non-state actors. Tomes are filled with new and revisited ideas about guerrilla warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and the "Clash of Civilizations." Until recently, however, little attention has been paid to the growing importance of (and reliance upon) private entities joining the fray for pecuniary gain. Now Deborah Avant, an associate professor at George Washington University well-versed in both international security and civil-military relations, contributes an important and thoroughly researched text examining the strategic ramifications of these not-so-new actors.

Whether one chooses "private security company" or "mercenary," the idea of organizations engaging in battle exclusively for pay is as old as warfare itself. From antiquity and the Greek mercenaries of Xenophon's *Anabasis* to the German mercenaries of the American Revolution, contracted combatants garnered no special interest or sanction. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, however, broke the contractors' battlefield dominance of previous eras and ushered in a three-century period in which war was thought to be the exclusive domain of the state. In the wake of the Cold War, a variety of factors led to the resurgence of the private security company (PSC). Whether because of western bloc desires to enjoy a peace dividend, or because of Third World dictators seeking new options for security after the loss of patronage by the major powers, PSCs enjoyed an exploding market—a market characterized by little regulation, little oversight, and a glut in the supply of combatants.

In the modern-day, PSCs are hired by states, by multinational corporations, and even by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Their importance in the Global War on Terrorism is demonstrated in Iraq, where the numbers employed by PSCs are second only to American forces, in effect making private companies the second largest "partner" in the American-led coalition. Avant notes the difficulty in defining and tracking the contemporary PSC. First, most of these companies have very little infrastructure or overhead, relying instead on sub-contracting and extensive databases of potential employees. Second, the variety of services that PSCs provide range from simple logistical support (like the support of Kellogg, Brown, and Root to Americans in almost every theater of engagement) to the provision of actual combatants for offensive operations (as Executive Outcomes did in Sierra Leone in the 1990s). Modern PSCs tend to be ephemeral and always adjusting to market demands. As a result, Avant smartly chooses to define her subject by the companies' contracts, since attempting to delineate between different categories of PSCs would be both difficult and arbitrary.

Rather than a simple historical survey, Avant approaches the question of PSCs from political, sociological, and economic viewpoints. In a well-organized work, she clarifies the scope and depth of the topic. PSCs are distinguished from the more notorious (but less effective) "solders of fortune" of the 1960s and 1970s.

PSCs are then investigated, in an attempt to convey the variety of services offered and levels of competence within the community. After setting these basic parameters of what is to be presented, Avant defines the "how" of her study. Since Westphalia, the control of force has often been one of the defining characteristics of the sovereign state. Therefore, changes to this "monopoly of legitimate physical violence" may hallmark the changing importance of different international actors. Purposely avoiding normative good or bad arguments concerning the rise of contractors, she concentrates on the questions of functional, political, and social control of force. A change in any one of these factors, or in the interrelationship between factors, the author argues, denotes the affect of PSCs on the control of force. Avant hypothesizes that these changes may have a variety of impacts on the political control enjoyed by different states, and that any such change brought about by the resurgence of PSCs will present a challenge to the state-centric monopoly of violence.

Although the theoretical tone of Avant's first two chapters may be daunting to some readers, her application of theory and hypotheses to nine case studies highlights the increasing importance of private security companies. She uses wide-ranging cases to investigate three considerations: first, how has state financing of PSCs affected the latter's performance, influence, and professionalization; second, how successful have states been in regulating PSCs originating from within their borders; and third, what has been the effect of PSCs' employment by non-state actors? In each section, Avant's choice of case studies and her meticulous research provide credible support to the notion that PSCs are not only affecting how wars are fought in the post-Cold War era, but also that PSCs play a major role in the increasing amount of competition that states face from other actors in the international arena.

The Market for Force should not be taken lightly. It is not a catalog of PSCs or a historical survey of contracted force, and it is not meant to fill either of these roles. Nor is it a guide that will provide tactical and operational leaders insight on how to best meet the mandates of the most recent QDR, which requires "integrating contractors into the Total Force." Instead, Avant's work provides two overarching benefits. First and foremost, it should be studied by the nation's strategic and political leaders. As the United States has taken the lead role in fostering the supply of and demand for PSCs, it would behoove these decision-makers to better comprehend the domestic and international ramifications of such actions. Second, for those interested in further study of PSCs at any level, *The Market for Force* acts as an outstanding repository of research for every aspect of the topic.

Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military. By Michael Knights. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 396 pages. $39.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy**, Battalion Commander, 3d US Army/CFLCC, Special Troops Battalion.

Cradle of Conflict examines the United States military's long-term struggle with Iraq, beginning with Desert Storm and concluding with key insight about the insurgency that emerged after the fall of the regime in 2003. The first portion of

the book analyzes Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and the lessons that the American military derived from these conflicts. The second part of the book examines the post-Desert Storm decade of American and allied military efforts to contain Iraq through the use of air power and Tomahawk missiles. While the entire book is unique, in that, it is an inclusive perspective on both wars, as well as the interwar period, the work suffers some weaknesses. The first part of the book includes material covered in greater detail in other works. The second portion of the book focuses almost exclusively on the US Air Force's effort in Iraq. The third and final part of this work is probably the most relevant to this journal's readership as it provides a perspicacious account of the 2003 invasion and subsequent insurgency. This review will focus on the latter. The author possesses a doctorate from King's College in London and since 2003 has been an associate at the Institute for Near East Policy in Washington, D.C. *Cradle of Conflict* is a salient read for military and defense professionals because it captures key lessons from the Iraq war, concluding with recommendations of how the US military might adapt to adversaries that increasingly use asymmetric approaches to undermine America's military superiority.

The final portion of the book, "Ending Resistance," examines the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the march on Baghdad, and the resulting insurgency. It also includes a short epilogue detailing future implications for America's military and its adversaries. Knights begins this portion of the book by explaining that in planning to replace Saddam's regime, the elder President Bush and President Clinton were unwilling to seek a military solution in Iraq. The author attributes this to the lack of resolve on the part of allied countries for such an invasion. Likewise, Knights points out that the American public would not support such a military undertaking. The author's view is that the one factor that seemed to change following 9/11 was that the American public supported a more aggressive military policy. The author briefly addresses the US civilian leadership's influence on the timing and the number of troops for the initial invasion. He also provides the reader with descriptions of the role of special operations forces in western and northern Iraq during the early stages of the war. The chapter on the march to Baghdad is full of insights and details regarding irregular Iraqi forces' attacks on US troops during the latter's move toward Baghdad. In summarizing the drive on Baghdad, the author notes, "speed and the use of minimum force were thus the defining and essential elements of the military formula in Operation Iraqi Freedom." Knights also notes that even though such a strategy enabled a rapid movement to Baghdad, it carried a strategic cost. "Neither the US Army nor the US Marine Corps went to war with up-to-date or exercised counterinsurgency doctrine—a shortfall that would not be recognized until eighteen months into the insurgency."

The penultimate chapter is the source of the above quotation and its focus is the insurgency and the coalition's response. This is the most valuable chapter in the book as it includes a description of the Baathist senior leadership's "Challenge Project," a two-stage guerrilla campaign that included a first stage, intended to supplement the conventional defense of Baghdad, and a second stage, intended to begin subsequent to the fall of Baghdad. Knights argues that the Coalition Provisional Authority's twin directives: to disband the Iraqi military and to de-Baathify the country were factors that exacerbated latent insurgent tendencies in the Sunni heartland. This portion of the book also

examines the first six months of the 2003 insurgency, when the military preferences of the American heavy divisions in Iraq inclined toward aggressive big-unit sweeps. A direct result of the US military's lack of doctrine, training, or experience in counterinsurgency operations. The author's description is evocative of the big unit search-and-destroy operations during Vietnam: "the proliferation of multi-divisional operations through-out the Sunni triangle, complete with armor, artillery, and air support" had soldiers searching hundreds of houses and detaining thousands of Iraqis. The result was operations "which engendered greater resentment and fear among local communities."

A key observation in the epilogue is that the Iraqis exhibited three characteristics that could serve as a model for the asymmetrically inclined adversaries challenging the United States in this century. The Iraqi forces, according to Knights, were adaptive; maintaining a semblance of intelligence superiority and forces that were useful for resistance. The author provides the reader with one final inference, that the technologically driven revolution in military affairs will not be sufficient to ensure American military dominance in the future. *Cradle of Conflict* is a very good study of contemporary military history, but it does have two shortcomings. First, for a study of warfare that was intensive in the number of ground forces, Knights work and his sources are somewhat skewed toward the Air Force. Second, this book contains three minor factual errors: Knights misstates the Third Infantry Division's Third Squadron, Seventh Cavalry to be the Seventh Armored Cavalry Regiment; he mistakes the doctrinal term "stability and support operations" as "stabilization and support operations;" and he identifies the 4th Infantry Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as the unit which conducted Operation "Planet X" during May 2003, when in fact it was the 1st BCT of the 4th ID. However, this reviewer heartily recommends this book to military and defense professionals and all students of national security affairs. The book provides a topical and timely account of a critical period in American military operations that has direct implications for current and future conflicts.

House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power. By James Carroll. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006. 657 pages. $30.00. **Reviewed by Jeffrey Record**, Professor of Strategy and International Security, Air War College.

The publisher's flyer announces: "Carroll proves a controversial thesis: the Pentagon has, since its founding, operated beyond the control of any force in government or society. It is the biggest, loosest cannon in American history, and no institution has changed this country more." Indeed, according to Carroll, amateur psychiatrist, author of the 2001 bestseller *Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews, A History*, and son of an Air Force general who served as the first director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, American foreign policy has been contrived ever since the 1940s strategic hysterics for whom "imagined enemies become real by virtue of having been imagined." Thus an unnecessary Cold War was engineered by such Red-scared and psychologically insecure civilians as President Harry Truman, James Forrestal, and George Kennan and fueled by such nuclear war fetishist as generals Curtis Lemay and Thomas Powers. The Pentagon continued to manufacture deadly enemies even after

the Soviet non-threat disappeared, when Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait rescued the "Pentagon's perpetual motion machine made for war." Thus, in Iraq in 2003, the Defense Department finally obtained the cake it had always wanted, albeit absent its preferred nuclear topping: a preventive war.

You get the picture. America + preponderant military power = disaster. *House of War* is a polemic against American might and those who have served it, but it is hardly a surprise coming as it does from a one-time Georgetown University "ROTC Cadet of the Year" turned leftist "peacenik priest" (his words) who remains profoundly troubled as the son of an influential if obscure cold warrior. *House of War* is essentially a sequel to Carroll's 1997 book *An American Requiem: God, My Father, and the War That Came Between Us*; it is as much about Joseph F. Carroll and his estranged son as it is about war and US foreign policy.

There is no question that such alarmists as Forrestal, Paul Nitze, Albert Wohlstetter, and Richard Perle (though hardly the sober realist Kennan) exaggerated the nature and urgency of the Soviet threat and in so doing contributed to the Pentagon's excessive influence on US foreign policy. Nor is there any doubt that the nuclear arms race was overkill, wasteful, and dangerous. It is also true that an indiscriminate anti-Communism which mistook Third World nationalist insurrections for Soviet ventriloquy propelled the United States into the disaster of Vietnam. And in succumbing to the temptation of preventive war against an already deterred and contained Iraq a 9/11-unnerved United States unwittingly stumbled into a protracted irregular war that advertised the limits of America's conventional military supremacy. Great powers make mistakes and the United States has been no exception.

For Carroll, however, the calamity is not America's occasional misuse of power but rather its very possession. Nowhere in *House of War* is there even a hint that, notwithstanding the considerable imperfections of American statecraft since Pearl Harbor, the rise of American power was anything other than, to cite the book's subtitle, "disastrous." Really? Was it a mistake to wage total war against Hitler and Imperial Japan and to contain the postwar expansion of Soviet power? Was the Cold War simply an American misunderstanding of Soviet power? Should the United States have accepted a Soviet-sponsored North Korean conquest of South Korea? Was American power irrelevant to the demise of Soviet totalitarianism and to Europe's unprecedented pacification and democratization? Did American power have nothing to do with the conversion of the Axis dictatorships into free societies? And did not the very presence of large nuclear arsenals contribute to the demise of catastrophic warfare among the great powers? Should the United States have permitted Saddam Hussein to gobble up Kuwait (which, contrary to Carroll's assertion, was never a province of Iraq)? Last but hardly least, why do millions of foreigners seek American citizenship, and why have states of former Communist Europe flocked to join America's primary alliance?

Carroll believes he lives in a "profoundly militarized" America that is "rushing toward the 'Niagara Falls' of military catastrophe." Really? How militarized is a society that imposes no military obligations on its citizenry, currently devotes (with a war on, no less) but four percent of its wealth to the military function, and proudly boasts one of the most politically docile officer corps in the history of the modern nation state? And what military catastrophe awaits the United States,

and who or what will inflict that catastrophe? China? Russia? North Korea? Iran? Venezuela? A battered al Qaeda? Talk about alarmism!

House of War is a failed, 657-page attempt to exorcize the Pentagon of what Carroll believes to be the inherent evil of US military power. It deserves no place in the libraries of serious students of American defense policy.

Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis. By Lyle J. Goldstein. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. 268 pages. $50.00. **Reviewed by Stephen J. Blank**, Professor of National Security Studies, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

The United States began a preventive war against Iraq because it believed that Iraq actually had weapons of mass destruction which could be launched against its allies, itself, or its vital interests. Washington has also made similar threats against North Korea and Iran. It is known that the Clinton Administration came very close to engaging in a preventive war against North Korea for many of the same reasons. As Goldstein illustrates, such wars or at least the likelihood of war between a stronger nuclear power contemplating war against a weaker power who either has a small number of such nuclear weapons or was on the way to getting them, was commonplace during the Cold War. Washington contemplated preventive strikes to stop the Soviet and Chinese nuclear programs, Moscow sought to stop the Chinese program, and in its turn Beijing sought to stop India's nuclear program. In 1981 Israel launched its preventive strike against the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak. And of course, the Clinton Administration contemplated such an attack against North Korea. Thus our war in Iraq is not as unusual an event as might otherwise be inferred from the public debate regarding the war and US foreign policy in general.

Indeed, Goldstein suggests that in the current world order such wars might actually be paradigmatic rather than exceptional crises. Neither are these exceptional cases, for as the author demonstrates, such issues lay at the heart of much of the Cold War's international relations. Based on his historical research, admirably fortified with sources in Russian and Chinese, and interviews with surviving participants or knowledgeable observers, Goldstein makes compelling arguments about the question as to whether the pursuit and acquisition of nuclear arsenals is stabilizing or destabilizing. Goldstein concludes that while the weaker nation pursues such weapons or possesses a small number of them, that such an action is destabilizing because the stronger and rivalrous nuclear power is severely tempted to engage in preventive war against the new "would-be" nuclear power. On the other hand, once that period is past and the new power comes into possession of a credible and usable nuclear deterrent, the fact of that possession becomes a stabilizing factor of the international order.

Iraq, however, is a unique case because here the stronger state was not deterred from launching a preventive war. The author presents a number of cases in which geographical obstacles, the fear of the nuclear state's conventional deterrent, and the possibility of external or an alliance's support for the state; the existence of international norms against preventive war, especially, preventive nuclear strikes have all played a

part in staying the hand of the stronger nuclear power. None of these factors, however, appears to have played a part in inhibiting the United States from acting in Iraq.

Finally, in his concluding epilogue, Goldstein discusses the Bush doctrine of preventive wars, as outlined in President Bush's West Point Commencement Speech in 2002. The author observes that preventive war against proliferators is now the declared centerpiece of US policy. After articulating the premises underlying this new policy Goldstein takes on its critics and offers a sprightly defense of the Administration's policies vis-à-vis Iraq and North Korea. While not all readers will find this epilogue convincing, I too have my reservations, it adds a welcome touch of provocative argumentation based on rigorous and precise reasoning regarding a subject which is all too often engulfed by apocalyptic and overblown charges.

Goldstein's historical examples convincingly show that the Cold War was not, as some claim, a golden age of stable deterrence, but a rather close brush with the apocalypse, and not just with regard to the missiles in Cuba. While he omits what might have been the closest we came to nuclear war with Moscow, the critical period of 1981-84 characterized by the American deployment of missiles to Europe (which in fact was not a proliferation crisis) he does adequately demonstrate to the reader that the causes of the Iraq war, sadly, are all too common in the world of international politics.

For its rethinking of both the present and the past this sprightly and robust book deserves more publicity than Stanford has given it. Readers who are either interested in or who must grapple with the issues raised here should read this book before making up their minds on any course of action.

Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry. By George F. Hofmann. Introductory essay by Donn A. Starry. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006. 578 pages. $45.00. **Reviewed by Colonel Jonathan M. House, USA Ret.**, author of *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century* and Associate Professor of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College.

Between the two world wars, each of the major armies of the world wrestled with the question of how to integrate tanks and other mechanized equipment into their organization and doctrine. No nation entered World War II with the same structure and concepts it had employed in 1918, but different influences led to considerable variations in the final solution reached by each army. In the United States, for example, the effects of budgetary restrictions and of pacifist and isolationist public opinion were complicated by the fact that the available armored vehicles were split between two parochially-minded branches, infantry and cavalry. As a result, even those like George Patton who had commanded tanks in 1918 found it politic to advocate compromise solutions rather than a radical new approach to mechanization.

This conflict is the chosen subject matter of *Through Mobility We Conquer* by George Hofmann. The author is well qualified in this topic, having previously written a history of the 6th Armored Division and co-edited, with General Donn Starry, *Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces*.

In his most recent study, Hofmann focuses on the 1920 creation of strong, independent chiefs of the different combat arms and branches as the principal cause of America's mechanization problems between the wars. First, because the War Department rigidly divided doctrine, budget, and organization along branch lines, the army was unable to develop a truly combined-arms approach to combat of any type and especially with regard to the need for large, combined-arms mechanized formations. Although a series of mechanized units were formed on an experimental basis, units with cavalry designations or commanders were unlikely to receive support from the other combat branches. The resulting mechanized cavalry units were often better suited for traditional cavalry reconnaissance and pursuit than for main battle operations.

Moreover, the author contends that the branch chiefs themselves exacerbated this situation by their strong sense of tradition and territoriality. In particular, Major General John K. Herr, Chief of Cavalry from 1938 to 1942, stubbornly insisted on the superiority of horse cavalry over mechanized forces, preferring at most to create combined horse-mechanized regiments. Hofmann argues that Herr's rigidity not only led to the 1942 abolition of the branch chiefs, but also ensured that neither horse-mounted nor mechanized cavalry divisions fought in America's World War II campaigns. Instead, the new armored divisions, created as a compromise outside the branch structure, performed many of the traditional functions of cavalry.

The remaining divisional and non-divisional cavalry units entered the war with equipment and doctrine that emphasized "sneak and peek" reconnaissance rather than fighting in an attempt to develop information or to perform economy of force missions. In the course of the war, however, numerous cavalry groups (regiments) and squadrons became the nuclei of ad hoc combined-arms maneuver forces.

Through Mobility We Conquer is particularly effective with regard to the controversial tank designer J. Walter Christie. Popular accounts of this period depict Christie as a misunderstood hero whose futuristic tank technology went to the Soviet Union because the US Army was too bureaucratic to recognize his genius. Professor Hofmann provides a more nuanced and detailed explanation, however. Although it was true that the infantry, cavalry, and ordnance corps were all suspicious of Christie's claims, Hofmann strongly suggests that this suspicion was justified. The inventor refused to follow procurement procedures, resisted any changes in his designs to meet the tactical needs of the Army, and continually threatened army officers with legal and political sanctions. In effect, Christie wanted the Army to pay him to conduct unending automotive experiments whose cost could not be absorbed in the restricted military budgets of the Great Depression.

After World War II, both horse and mechanized cavalry units found another incarnation as quasi-police forces in occupied Germany. Hofmann provides extensive detail about this neglected period of history, going beyond the constabulary organization to describe occupation policy, crime, and other matters in considerable detail. The same holds true for his shorter discussion of occupation duty after 1918, an occupation which he acknowledges had minimal involvement by the cavalry.

The principal flaw of *Through Mobility We Conquer* is, in fact, its sometimes excessive length. In particular, the author relies almost exclusively on a chronological approach to a multifaceted story. Virtually every year in the interwar period appears as

a separate section of the book, slicing issues such as the Christie controversy or the evolution of armored cavalry tactics into numerous segments. With the absence of sub-headings within chapters, the reader may find it difficult to connect these segments into an analytical whole. Similarly, when the author turns to World War II, he devotes several chapters chronicling the episodic adventures of various cavalry units before finally providing an excellent, tightly-argued analysis of their performance.

For the reader with sufficient time, however, this remains an excellent work. Indeed, the history of US cavalry in the twentieth century is a case study in the problems of change in military institutions, including the difficulties of adjusting doctrine, organization, budgets, personalities, and attitudes to accommodate new technologies. As such, it has considerable value to historians and military leaders alike.

SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense. By Charles A. Stevenson. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2006. 215 pages. $24.95. **Reviewed by Colonel Matthew Moten**, author of *The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession* and Deputy Head, Department of History, US Military Academy.

The first secretary of defense committed suicide. The second was fired by the president. The combined tenure of the next two was 28 months. From such inauspicious beginnings has grown the second most powerful position in government.

Charles A. Stevenson of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins has spent almost four decades observing defense policy. He was national security adviser to four US senators and then a professor at the National War College for a dozen years. His purpose in this work is to explore the roles of the secretary of defense, to illuminate the personalities of its occupants, and to determine why so many of them seem to have failed. The last goal lends the book its subtitle and, I fear, creates an interpretive problem.

SECDEF begins with a history of the creation of the Department of Defense. Authors of the 1947 National Security Act intended for the office of secretary to be weak and it was. A chapter entitled "The Cemetery for Dead Cats" surveys the formative years before Robert McNamara, including legislation that gave the secretary more power and his department more coherence. This section would benefit from an examination of the predecessor Departments of War and Navy and the deficiencies that demanded their demise.

The bulk of the book assesses the tenures of selected secretaries, grouping them under three categories in an attempt to define their leadership styles and to gauge their effectiveness. "Revolutionaries" came into office with reform agendas and were largely successful. "Firefighters," regardless of their intentions, became captives of historical events. "Team Players" seemed satisfied to stay the course, working harmoniously with colleagues inside the Pentagon as well as the outside. Chapters devoted to ten secretaries, clustered in those three groups, begin with biographical sketches covering the principals early life, education, careers, and world views. Stevenson then evaluates each in their ministerial roles: political relations, operating style, relations with Congress, manager of the Pentagon, war planner, diplomat, and NSC adviser.

The author argues that politics and personalities drive government. Yet his penchant for categorization detracts from that argument. Neat subdivision of each secretary's duties facilitates organized analysis, but at the expense of narrative. Moreover, frequent overlap among the functions necessitates much repetition.

The author treats the "Revolutionaries" (McNamara, Schlesinger, and Weinberger), before the "Firefighters" (Laird, Aspin, and Cohen), followed by the "Team Players" (Brown, Cheney, Perry, and Rumsfeld). This historical back-and-forth sacrifices chronological continuity for the sake of typology. It also induces some omissions, such as the lack of a thorough discussion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the most extensive Department of Defense reform since 1947. Forcing these men into loosely defined groups adds little to our understanding of their personality. It is a stretch to think of Schlesinger, who dealt with the end of the Vietnam war, Nixon's impeachment and resignation, and Ford's search for legitimacy as the first commander-in-chief who had never faced the national electorate, as a "revolutionary." Similarly, one wonders why Rumsfeld is a "team player." His supporters would call him a "revolutionary," while the effects of events since 9/11 would bid to place him with the "fire fighters." That said, the analysis of Rumsfeld's second tour in office is the best of these sketches, balanced and nuanced.

The final part of the book, "Roles and Performances," examines more comprehensively the evolution of the office, arriving at insightful conclusions that buttress Stevenson's argument about the importance of people and politics. Managerial skills, technical expertise, and political savvy are all useful, but a secretary must also maintain effective relations with the senior military, the Congress, his Cabinet colleagues, and especially the president. Stevenson argues that presidents are reluctant to overrule their war ministers, especially when the senior military supports their counsel. Secretaries of defense tend to be cautious about the employment of the armed forces, and the Joint Chiefs are more cautious still. The author carefully dissects the so-called "lessons of Vietnam," arguing that the doctrinal articulation of the operational level of war in the 1970s and the Weinberger doctrine of the 1980s were meant to place constraints on presidents in the deployment of forces. He objectively considers whether uniformed leaders should wield a veto in strategic discussions.

In the end, *SECDEF* fails to live up to its subtitle, because most secretaries have refused to fail. Many have stumbled and all have been frustrated. Yet as the American military has grown stronger and more professional, as American military hegemony has become undeniable, as defense budgets have swelled, and as the secretary's institutional power has burgeoned, it is hard to argue that the occupants of the office have found it impossible. Indeed, Stevenson has convinced the reviewer that secretaries of defense ordinarily perform better than one would have guessed.

To be fair, Stevenson has taken on a daunting task, analyzing the evolution of the SECDEF and the tenures of 60 years of incumbents in just over two hundred pages. My quibbles aside, he largely succeeds. Students of this period of American political, diplomatic, or military history can profit from this book and instructors of national security and defense policy courses will find it most useful.

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